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PROLOGUE: NOTES OF A NATURALIZED SON 
(OR How I BECAME A BLACK AMERICAN) 
I remember the very day I became colored. 
Zora Neale Hurston1 
If there were no black people here in this country, it would have been Bal­
kanized .... But in becoming an American, from Europe, what one has in 
common with that other immigrant is contempt for me - it's nothing else 
but color . . . .  So in that sense, becoming an American is based on an atti­
tude: an exclusion of me. 
Toni Morrison2 
It's been almost two years since I pledged allegiance to the United 
States of America - that is to say, became an American citizen. Be­
fore that, I was a permanent resident of America and a citizen of the 
United Kingdom. 
Yet, I became a black American long before I acquired American 
citizenship.3 Unlike citizenship, black racial naturalization was always 
available to me, even as I tried to make myself unavailable for that 
particular Americanization process.4 Given the negative images of 
1. Zora Neale Hurston, I Love Myself When I am Laughing and then Again When I am 
Looking Mean and Impressive, in A ZORA NEALE HURSTON READER (Alice Walker ed., 
1979). 
2. Toni Morrison, quoted in Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing 
the Tar-Baby - LatCrit Theory and The Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1586, 1602 
n.59 (1987). 
3. Formal citizenship and national membership are not coextensive. See KENNETI-1 L. 
KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND TI-IE CONSTITUTION (1989) 
(arguing that American jurisprudence has failed to produce civic and political participation 
that is inclusive of all segments of society, rendering the legal status of citizenship far short 
of any real sense of national belonging). 
4. Cf GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND 
MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944) (discussing racial subordination as a natural part of Ameri­
can society that co-existed with formalistic ideals of equality); see also DERRICK BELL, AND 
WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1989) (suggesting that 
racism is fundamental to a permanent part of American society); RICHARD DELGADO, THE 
COMING RACE WAR (1996) (same). 
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black Americans on 1970s British television5 and the intra-racial ten­
sions between blacks in the U.K. and blacks in America, I was not ea­
ger, upon my arrival to the United States, to assert a black American 
identity. My parents had taught me "better" than that.6 
But I became a black American anyway. Before I freely embraced 
that identity it was ascribed to me.7 This ascription is part of a broader 
social practice wherein all of us are made intelligible via racial catego­
rization. 8 My intelligibility was skin deep. More particularly, it was 
5. There is an entire body of literature problematizing the racial nature of 1970s 
American television. The television films and situation comedies produced during this 
period are typically referred to as black exploitation productions. For a discussion of the 
politics of race and Hollywood during the 1970s, see KAREN Ross, BLACK AND WHITE 
MEDIA: BLACK IMAGES IN POPULAR FILM AND TELEVISION (1996), and JAMES A. SNEAD, 
WHITE SCREENS, BLACK IMAGES: HOLLYWOOD FROM THE DARK SIDE (1994). See also 
HOLLYWOOD SHUFFLE (Conquering Unicorn 1987) (employing parody, in a Robert 
Townsend film, to comment on the ways in which race structures the ways in which blacks 
are represented on television and in the movies); A Gallery of Twisted Images: The Black 
Man Distorted, EMERGE, Oct. 1995. Of course, the problem of race and television has not 
gone away. In early 2000, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
("NAACP") and other civil rights groups successfully obtained signed commitments from 
the four major U.S. television networks to increase ethnic diversity in television series. 
NAACP President Kweisi Mfume had inaugurated a campaign to promote diversity on tele­
vision in 1999, after the close of a season that was notably lacking in significant characters of 
color. The major studios agreed to address the issue only after the NAACP threatened boy­
cotts and protests. See In Face of Threats, Fox and CBS Join Pledge to Promote Diversity, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2000, at Al4. 
6. For a specific indication of the nature of the conflict between black Americans and 
black Caribbeans, see MARY WATERS, BLACK IDENTITIES: WEST INDIAN IMMIGRANT 
DREAMS AND AMERICAN REALITIES (1999); Reuel Rogers, Afro-Caribbean Immigrants, 
African Americans, and the Politics of Group Identity, in BLACK AND MULTIRACIAL 
POLITICS IN AMERICA 15-59 (Yvette M. Alex-Assensoh & Lawrence J. Hanks eds., 2000); 
and Martin C. Evans, Making Their Mark: Long Island's Black Immigrants Find Success, 
Racial Tension, NEWSDA Y, Sept. 18, 2000, at AS ("Many black immigrants say they are often 
rejected by black Americans as too eager to adopt 'white' attitudes and not sufficiently mili­
tant against anti-black hostility. They say they are also accused of being too willing to take 
on low-wage jobs and too unappreciative of the sacrifices made by black Americans in the 
quest for social equality."). 
7. One can conceptualize the formation of identity through two hypothetically discrete 
processes: one based on self-definition and the other based on the identities others ascribe to 
us. Note, though, that these two conceptions present a false dichotomy, because how we see 
ourselves is a function of how others see us. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE 189 (Robert DeNoon Cumming ed., 1965) ("By the mere appearance 
of the Other, I am put in the position of passing judgment on myself as on an object, for it is 
as an object that I appear to the Other .. . . I recognize that I am as the Other sees me . . .. 
Thus the Other has not only revealed to me what I was; he has established me in a new type 
of being which can support new qualifications."). 
8. See generally Jerry Kang, Cyber-race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130 (2000) (identifying 
cyberspace as a locale where the process of racial categorization can be confounded); Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimi­
nation and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (arguing that 
forms of intergroup discrimination are better identified as the result of embedded cognitive 
processes of racial categorization, rather than discriminatory motives). For further discus­
sions of racial categorization, see CRITICAL RACE THEORY: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION AND REPRODUCTION OF "RACE" (E. Nathaniel Gates ed., 1997) and Sym­
posium, Our Private Obsession, Our Public Sin, 15 LA w & INEQ. 1 (1997). 
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linked to the social construction of blackness, a social construction 
whose phenotypic reach I could not escape.9 Whether I liked it or not, 
my everyday social encounters were going to reflect standard racial 
scripts about black American life.10 
And in fact they did. I was closely followed or completely ignored 
when I visited department stores.11 Women clutched their purses upon 
9. Depending on skin tone, some blacks can escape the phenotypic reach of blackness 
by passing (or trespassing) as whites. For an illuminating narrative about what one might call 
the racial push-and-pull factors that cause a person to pass, see Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as 
Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1710-12 (discussing the author's grandmother's decision 
to "present" herself as a white woman). See also GREGORY HOWARD WILLIAMS, LIFE ON 
THE COLOR LINE: THE TRUE STORY OF A WHITE BOY WHO DISCOVERED HE WAS BLACK 
(1995). This is not to say race is just about phenotype. To the extent that race is socially con­
structed, race is also about performance. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working 
Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000); Ariela Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Ra­
cial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998); John Tehra­
nian, Performing Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation and the Construction of Racial Identity 
in America, 109 YALE L.J. 817 (2000). 
10. There is a growing awareness about the ways in which gender norms operate to cre­
ate certain scripts for women - that is, permissible and impermissible ways of being a 
woman. See Linda B. Epstein, What Is a Gender Norm and Why Should We Care? Imple­
menting a New Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1998) (arguing that 
sexual harassment should be conceptualized more broadly as gender harassment because 
workplace discrimination against women cannot be reduced only to incidents of a sexual na­
ture); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 
696 (1997) (describing sexual harassment as a "technology of sexism" that "perpetuates, en­
forces, and polices a set of gender norms that seek to feminize women"); Vicki Schultz, Re­
conceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1687 (1998) ("[M]any of the most 
prevalent forms of harassment are actions that are designed to maintain work - particularly 
the more highly rewarded lines of work - as bastions of masculine competence and author­
ity."); see also KATE MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS (1970) (presenting a broad critique of con­
structed gender roles from the arena of literary criticism). Racial norms operate in a similar 
way by defining the terms upon which people experience their racial identity. 
11. For discussions of the racial nature of shopping experiences, see Regina Austin, "A 
Nation of Thieves": Securing Black Peoples' Right to Shop and to Sell in White America, 1994 
UTAH L. REV. 147 (1994) (analyzing the perception of black shoppers as "deviants"), and 
Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the 
Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 127-29 (1987) (recounting the author's 
experience of a white employee at a New York City store scrutinizing her and then refusing 
to "buzz" open the shop door, while white shoppers browsed inside). Pervasive discrimina­
tion against black consumers has resulted in a number of monetary settlements with retail­
ers. In December 2000 , New Jersey-based Children's Place Retail Stores, Inc. settled charges 
that it assigned employees in its Massachusetts stores to shadow black customers and that 
the retailer engaged in other "retail racial profiling." Massachusetts Settles Bias Case With 
Retailer, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2000, at A4. In June 2000, insurer American General Corp. 
agreed to pay more than $215 million to settle claims that it had charged African-American 
customers higher premiums on life insurance policies. See Scot J. Paltrow, American General 
to Pay $215 Million Over Premiums Issue, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2000, at Cl. The Adam's 
Mark luxury hotel chain in March 2000 agreed to pay $8 million to settle claims that it 
charged black guests higher prices than whites, and that it segregated black customers in less 
desirable rooms. See Hotel Chain Settles Race Bias Suits, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 21, 2000, at 1. A 
landmark case in this area was a 1994 settlement with Denny's Restaurants, in which the 
chain agreed to pay $54.4 million to compensate black customers who had been refused 
service or asked to prepay for meals. One commentator compared the claims against 
Denny's to "a modern version of the lunch-counter protests of the civil rights movement 
. . . .  " See Jeff Leeds, Denny's Restaurants Settle Bias Suits for $54 Million, L.A. TIMES, May 
25, 1994, at 1. 
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encountering me in elevators.12 People crossed the street to avoid me. 
The seat beside me on the bus was almost always racially available for 
another black person.13 Already I wanted to be a black American no 
more.14 
But that racial desire was at odds with my racial destiny. There was 
nothing I could do to prevent myself from increasingly becoming a 
black American - and more particularly, a black American male.15 
12. Such race-based reactions are common in innumerable contexts. In November 1999, 
African-American actor Danny Glover filed a complaint with the New York City Taxi and 
Limousine Commission after a cabdriver had refused to allow him to ride in the front pas­
senger seat. Alleging racial discrimination, Glover's complaint noted that earlier the same 
day in Manhattan, five passenger-less yellow cabs had refused to stop for him, his daughter 
and her roommate. See Monte Williams, Danny Glover Says Cabbies Discriminated Against 
Him, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1999, at B8. The complaint of a high-profile actor brought re­
newed focus to an ongoing controversy: the commonplace allegation that cabdrivers avoid 
black customers because they assume black people pose a criminal threat. For an analysis of 
the legal implications of such racial calculations, and of the argument that race-based fears 
are empirically rational, see Jody D. Armour, Race lpsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, 
Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1994). Armour 
notes that whites are not alone in their experience of racial fear, recounting the Rev. Jesse 
Jackson's remarks during a 1993 speech in Chicago in which he decried black-on-black 
crime. Id. at 790. Jackson told his audience, "There is nothing more painful to me at this 
stage in my life than to walk down the street and hear footsteps and start thinking about 
robbery - then look around and see somebody white and feel relieved." Perspectives, 
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1993, at 17. 
13. The empty seats next to me demonstrated to me how whites could practice "white 
flight" on public transportation. For a discussion of the white flight phenomenon, see DAVID 
J. ARMOR, WHITE FLIGHT, DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION, AND THE FuTURE OF SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION (1978); William H. Frey, Central City White Flight: Racial and Nonracial 
Causes, 44 AM. Soc. REV. 425 (1979); and Thomas C. Schelling, The Process of Residential 
Segregation: Neighborhood Tipping, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 157-84 
(Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972). 
14. GEORGE SCHUYLER, BLACK NO MORE (1934). 
15. For a particularized discussion of black men's relationship to the law, see Floyd D. 
Weatherspoon, The Devastating Impact of the Justice System on the Status of African­
American Males: An Overview Perspective, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 23 (1994) (providing a broad 
picture of the perilous position black men hold in American society, and the role played by 
the criminal justice system in creating and reinforcing that peril). See also FLOYD D. 
WEATHERSPOON, AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
(1998); A Symposium on the Impact of the Judicial System on the Status of African-American 
Males, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (1994). Some commentators have characterized black American 
males as an "endangered species." See JEWELLE TAYLOR GIBBS, YOUNG, BLACK, AND 
MALE IN AMERICA: AN ENDANGERED SPECIES (1988); Thomas A. Parham & Roderick J. 
McDavis, Black Men, an Endangered Species: Who's Really Pulling the Trigger?, 66 J. 
COUNS. & DEV. 24 (1987); Bryan Burwell, Can Black Males Get Off Endangered-Species 
List?, USA TODAY, May 1, 1992, at 15A; Sylvester Monroe, Brothers, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 23, 
1987, at 55. The idea has even made its way into popular culture. See Ice Cube (featuring 
Chuck D.), Endangered Species (Tales from Darkside), on AMERIKKKA'S MOST WANTED 
(Priority Records 1990). While Parham & McDavis's work is important in providing an indi­
cation of the particular ways in which black men experience racism, it is not always sensitive 
to how gender shapes black women's experiences. See generally Kimberle Williams Cren­
shaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Anti­
discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 
(1989); Devon W. Carbado, The Construction of O.J. Simpson as a Racial Victim, 32 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49 (1997). 
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Resistance was futile.16 The politics of distinction or self-presentation 
strategies with the intra-racial signification, "I am not really like other 
black people, I am the new Negro,"17 was not going to help.18 Out of 
racial necessity,19 my black identity developed one racial interpellation 
after another.20 My collective dis-eminence was inevitable.21 
Nor could I count on colorblindness to protect me.22 That veil of 
ignorance became only too transparent.23 Colorblindness, I would 
come to learn, is precisely what prevents African Americans from be­
coming black no more. Its racial ideology casts all of us in the ongoing 
national drama, "An American Dilemma."24 
16. See generally Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and the 
Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769 (1992) (discussing the politics of distinc­
tion). 
17. Cf THE NEW NEGRO (Alain Locke ed., 1925). 
18. For a discussion of the politics of distinction, see RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, 
CRIME AND THE LAW (1997). See also Austin, supra note 16. For a critique of Kennedy's 
analysis, see Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of Race, Crime, and the Law, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 1270 (1998) (book review). 
19. This ascribed black identity is necessary not only to make me readable to others, but 
also to make others more readable to themselves. My blackness serves to confirm others' 
whiteness. In her article Whiteness as Property, Professor Cheryl Harris traces the construc­
tion of the white racial identity within the evolution of the American slavery system, focus­
ing on how that construction depended on the simultaneous creation and definition of the 
black race. See Harris, supra note 9, at 1716-18. As American whites become less connected 
to their ethnic identity - Italian-American, Irish-American, etc. - self-identification based 
on whiteness alone becomes more of an imperative. See Charles A. Gallagher, White Racial 
Formation: Into the Twenty-First Century, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES 6 (Richard Delgado 
& Jean Stefancic eds., 1997). 
20. The standard cite is to the work of Louis Althusser: 
There are individuals walking along. Somewhere (usually behind them) the hail rings out: 
"Hey you there!". One individual (nine times out of ten it is the right one) turns around, be­
lieving/suspecting/knowing that it is for him, i.e., recognizing that "it really is he" who is 
meant by the hailing. But in reality these things happen without any succession. The exis­
tence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individual as subjects are one and thus 
the same thing. 
LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY 
AND OTHER ESSAYS 174-75 (Ben Brewster trans., 1971 ). For a novel application of the the­
ory of interpellation to the concept of citizenship, see Leti Volpp, The Terrorist and the Citi­
zen, UCLA L. REV. (2002) (forthcoming). 
21. Cf. ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT 
HARVARD AND BEYOND 133 (1992) (suggesting that "collective eminence" is the sense 
within a particular community that the community members are "a distinct group and oc­
cupy a privileged position within society"). For a useful discussion of the extent to which this 
theory might help to explain the behavior of law students at elite institutions, see Note, 
Making Docile Lawyers: An Essay on the Pacification of Law Students, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
2027 (1998). 
22. Cf. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constituion is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 
1 (1991). 
23. Cf JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1975). 
24. Cf. MYRDAL, supra note 4. 
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Like many black Americans, I developed the ability to cope with, 
manage, and sometimes even normalize certain micro-aggressive ra­
cial encounters.25 I have come to view them as incidents in the life of a 
black person, part of the racial mystique of life - the thing that has a 
name:26 the colorline.27 Indeed, today I consider it an aberration every 
time I manage to escape the normality of interpersonal, everyday ra­
cism.28 
I have not, however, been able to normalize my experiences with 
the police. They continue to jar me. The very sight of the police in my 
rear view mirrof'is unnerving. Far from comforting, this sight of justice 
(the paradigmatic site for injustice) engenders feelings of vulnerability: 
How will I be over-policed this time? Do I have my driver's license, 
insurance, etc.? How am I dressed? Is my UCLA parking sticker visi­
ble? Will any of this even matter? Should it? 
And what precisely will be my racial exit strategy this time? How 
will I make the officers comfortable?29 Should I? Will I have time -
the racial opportunity - to demonstrate my respectability? Should I 
have to? Will they perceive me to be a good or a bad black? 
These questions are part of black people's collective consciousness. 
They are symptomatic of a particular colorline anxiety: a police state 
of mind.30 This racial dis-ease is inflicted on black people ostensibly to 
cure the problem of crime. Its social effect, however, is to make white 
people feel good about, and comfortable with, their own racial identity 
and to make black people feel bad about, and uncomfortable with, 
being black. 
25. Cf HARRIET A. JACOBS, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL (1987). 
26. Cf. BETIT FRIEDAN,' THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963) (discussing white women's 
experience with everyday sexism as "the thing that has no name"). 
27. See W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 10 (Bantam Classic 1989) (1903) 
(describing the colorline as "[t]he problem of the twentieth century."). 
28. Importantly, everyday racism transcends class. That is, middle and upper class, and 
not just poor, blacks are vulnerable to racial discrimination. See ELIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A 
PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993). See generally JOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH 
RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS EXPERIENCE (1994). 
29. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 9, at 1301-04 (discussing racial comforting as a 
strategy people of color sometimes employ to put whites at ease with the person of color's 
nonwhite identity). 
30. See Rohan Preston, Police State of Mind, in NOT GUILTY: TWELVE BLACK MEN 
SPEAK OUT ON LAW, JUSTICE AND LIFE 153, 157 (Jabari Asim ed., 2001). Preston asks him­
self a similar set of questions: 
Bob Marley sang, in "Slave Driver," "Every time I hear the crack of a whip, my blood runs 
cold." My own blood does not quite turn to mercury when I see a police man in my rear mir­
ror, but I always ask myself: Are my papers in order, have I used my indicator lights, is there 
anyone around to videotape this, just in case? These encounters transport me to nightmares 
of police dramas, where I am guilty until proven innocent. I ask a battery of ridiculous ques­
tions and try[ J to keep my blood pressure in check: Did I kill/rape/rob anyone today? What 
harms have I done to society? Such encounters also take me into history and I hear ques­
tions from a slave consciousness; Who owns you? Do you have a pass to be here? Are you 
legal? 
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My first racial episode with over-policing occurred only two weeks 
after I purchased my first car: a $1500 yellow, convertible Triumph 
Spit Fire. I had been living in America for a year; my brother had been 
in the States for under a month. It was about nine p.m., and we were 
on our way to a friend's house. 
Our trip was interrupted by the blare of a siren. We were in 
Inglewood, a predominantly black neighborhood south of Los Ange­
les; a police car had signaled us to pull over. One officer approached 
my window; the other stationed himself beside the passenger door. He 
directed his flashlight into the interior of the car, locating its beam, al­
ternatively, on our faces. The characters: two black boys.31 The racial 
stage was set. 
"Anything wrong, officers?" I asked, attempting to discern the face 
behind the flashlight. Neither officer responded. Against my racial 
script, I inquired again as to whether we had done anything wrong. 
Again, no response. Instead, one of the officers instructed, "Step out­
side the car with your hands on your heads." Effectively rehearsing 
our blackness, we did as he asked. He then told us to sit on the side of 
the curb. Grudgingly, we complied. Though we were both learning our 
parts, the racial theater was well underway.32 
As we sat on the pavement, "racially exposed," our backs to the of­
ficers, our feet in the road, I asked a third time whether we had done 
anything wrong.33 One officer responded, rather curtly, that I should 
"shut up and not make any trouble." Perhaps foolishly, I insisted on 
knowing why we were being stopped. "We have a right to know, don't 
we? We're not criminals, after all." 
Today I might have acted differently, less defiantly. But my strange 
career with race, at least in America, had only just begun.34 In other 
words, I had not yet lived in America long enough to learn the ways of 
the police,35 the racial conventions of black and white police encoun­
ters, the so-called rules of the game: "Don't move. Don't tum around. 
Don't give some rookie an excuse to shoot you."36 No one had ex-
31. Cf RICHARD WRIGHT, BLACK BOY (1945).  
32. Cf JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER (1993); ERVING GOFFMAN, THE 
PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959); BRUCE WILSHIRE, ROLE PLAYING 
AND IDENTITY (1982). 
33. It was not just our race in some abstract sense that was exposed here. More funda-
mentally, our presumed racial connection to crime was exposed. 
34. Cf. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d ed., 1974). 
35. Cf. LANGSTON HUGHES, THE WAYS OF WHITE FOLKS (1934). 
36. CHRISTOPHER A. DARDEN, IN CONTEMPT 110 (1996). Darden, one of the lead 
prosecutors in the O.J. Simpson murder trial, employs these rules during encounters with 
police officers as a survival strategy. See also Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr. , Notes From Cali­
fornia: Rodney King and the Race Question, 70 DENY. U. L. REV. 199, 200 (suggesting that 
the "rules of engagement of black malehood" require that black men "make no quick 
moves, remove any possibility of danger and never give offense to danger"). 
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plained to me that "if you get pulled over by the police "[n]ever get 
into a verbal confrontation . . .  Never! Comply with the officer. If it 
means getting down on the ground, then get down on the ground. 
Comply with whatever the officer is asking you to do. "37 It had not oc­
curred to me that my encounter with these officers was potentially life 
threatening. This was one of my many racial blind spots.38 Eventually, 
I would develop my second sight.39 
The officer discerned that I was not American. Presumably, my ac­
cent provided the clue, although my lack of racial etiquette -
mouthing off to white police officers in a "high-crime" area40 in the 
middle of the night - might have suggested that I was an outsider to 
the racial dynamics of police encounters.41 My assertion of my rights, 
my attempts to maintain my dignity, my confronting authority (each a 
function of my pre-invisibility blackness )42 might have signaled that I 
was not from here and, more importantly, that I had not been racially 
socialized into, or internalized the racial survival strategy of, per­
forming obedience for the police. From the officer's perspective, we 
were, in that moment, defiant ones.43 
37. KENNETH MEEKS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: HIGHWAYS, SHOPPING MALLS, 
TAXICABS, SIDEWALKS: WHAT TO Do IF You ARE A VICTIM OF RACIAL PROFILING 138 
(2000) (suggestions of a black detective) (emphasis added). 
38. Cf Barbara Flagg, "Was Blind But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the 
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993). 
39. See W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 10 (Henry Louis Oater & Terri 
Hume Oliver eds., 1999) (1903). 
40. The characterization of a neighborhood as a "high-crime" area lends law enforce­
ment wider latitude in exercising its search-and-seizure powers - the reputation of the 
neighborhood forming one phrase of an articulable suspicion. See United States v. Rickus, 
737 F.2d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The reputation of an area for criminal activity is an ar­
ticulable fact upon which a police officer may legitimately rely."). For a critique of an overly 
simplistic reliance on neighborhood reputation in justifying police stops, see Margaret 
Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the Neigh­
borhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 100-01 (1999) (arguing 
that the use of neighborhood reputation as a factor for determining reasonable suspicion can 
undercut the requirement of a particularized suspicion, and runs the risk of making every 
resident of a "high-crime" area "stop-eligible"). See also David A. Harris, Factors for 
Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659 
(1994); David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court 
Rhetoric Verses Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 975 (1998); 
Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the 
Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1990). 
41. Jim Crow required blacks to perform a kind of racial etiquette for whites. A classic 
example is the domestic worker who implicitly understands that a racial condition of her 
employment is that she signal happiness (by, for example, singing or smiling) while per­
forming her work. 
42. Cf RALPH ELLISION, INVISIBLE MAN 17-18 (1952) ("In those pre-invisibility days I 
visualized myself as a Booker T. Washington."). Ellison's notion of pre-invisibility suggests a 
kind of false consciousness, or at least unawareness, of the realities of race. 
43. Cf THE DEFIANT ONES (United Artists 1958). 
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The officer looked at my brother and me, seemingly puzzled. He 
needed more information racially to process us, to make sense of what 
he might have experienced as a moment of racial incongruity. While 
there was no disjuncture between how we looked and the phenotypic 
cues for black identity, our performance of blackness could have cre­
ated a racial indeterminacy problem that had to be fixed.44 That is, to 
the extent that the officers harbored an a priori investment in our 
blackness (that we were criminals or thugs), our English accents might 
have challenged it.45 At best, this challenge was partial, however; racial 
inscription was inevitable. The officer could see-with his "inner 
eyes"46 - that we had the souls of black folk.4 7 He simply needed to 
confirm our racial stock so that he could freely trade on our blackness. 
"Where are you guys from?" 









"Uhmm . . . .  " We were strange fruit.48 Our racial identity had to 
be grounded. 
"Where are your parents from?" 
"The West Indies." 
We were at last racially intelligible. Our English identity had been 
dislocated, falsified - or at least buried among our diasporic roots.49 
44. See PHILLIP BRIAN HARPER, ARE WE NOT MEN?: MASCULINE ANXIETY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN IDENTITY 146 (1996) (observing that racial discourse 
sometimes makes it difficult "to account for the potential disjuncture between physical ap­
pearance and designated race"). For a discussion of the extent to which the social meaning 
or content of a person's racial identity is a function of identity performance, see Carbado & 
Gulati, supra note 9; Gross, supra note 9; and Tehranian, supra note 9. 
45. The American racial map having been drawn so precisely along white/nonwhite 
lines, any personal attribute that does not fit one's established racial identity (i.e., an accent, 
a manner of speaking) will regularly produce moments of social surprise or confusion. See 
Kang, supra note 8, at 1133 (recounting the author's first meeting with a roommate who had 
spoken to the author only by telephone and who had made the "default" racial assumption 
that he was white). For further discussion of the strained social interactions produced by ra­
cial ambiguity, see KATYA GIBEL AZOULAY, BLACK, JEWISH AND INTERRACIAL 126-33 
(1997). 
46. See ELLISON, supra note 42, at 1 (referring to the "inner eye" as the "eye[ ] with 
which they look through their physical eyes upon reality"). 
47. Cf. W.E.B. Du BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK, supra note 39. 
48. BILLIE HOLIDAY, STRANGE FRUIT (Commodore 1939). 
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"How long has he been in America?" the officer wanted to know, 
pointing at me. 
"About a year," my brother responded. 
"Well, tell him that if he doesn't want to find himself in jail, he 
should shut the fuck up." 
The history of racial violence in his words existentially moved us.so 
We were now squarely within a sub-region of the borders of American 
Blackness. Our rite of passage was almost complete. s1 
My brother nudged me several times with his elbows. "Cool it," he 
muttered under his breath. The intense look in his eyes inflected his 
words. "Don't provoke them." 
By this time, my brother needn't have said anything. I was begin­
ning to see the white over black racial picture. s2 We had the right to do 
49. Black and Asian English people typically experience what one might call "nation­
hood displacement." A white person will ask: "Where are you from?" To which the black 
person might respond, "Birmingham." 
"No, I mean where are you really from?" 
"Birmingham. Smethwick, Birmingham." 
"Yes, alright, but where are your mom and dad from?" 
"The Caribbean." 
(Sometimes, to determine how racially invested a white English person is in falsifying 
our national identity, my siblings and I respond to the question about our parents by ren­
dering them English-born as well.) 
"Are you going to go back to the Caribbean some day?" 
"Actually, I have never been." 
Blacks and Asians in Britain experience these exchanges all the time. They function to 
remind us that, to borrow from Paul Gilroy, "there ain't no black in the Union Jack." See 
generally PAUL GILROY, "THERE AIN'T No BLACK IN THE UNION JACK": THE CULTURAL 
POLITICS OF RACE AND NATION (1987). Thus my exchange with the officer was a familiar 
one. The extent to which Asian Americans experience nationhood displacement in the 
United States was underscored in the case of Wen Ho Lee, the Chinese-American physicist 
accused of stealing nuclear secrets for China. See Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: 
Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689, 1694 (2000) ("The 
assignment to Wen Ho Lee of a presumption of disloyalty is a well-established marker of 
foreignness. And foreignness is a crucial dimension of the American racialization of persons 
of Asian ancestry. It is at the heart of the racial profile of Chinese and other Asian Ameri­
cans."); see also Leti Volpp, "Obnoxious to Their Very Nature": Asian Americans and Con­
stitutional Citizenship, 8 ASIAN L.J. 71, 82 (2001) (interrogating the heading "American 
beats out Kwan," on the grounds that it conveys the idea that "White American skater, Tara 
Lipinski, was victorious over the purportedly non-American Michelle Kwan") (emphasis 
added). 
50. Cf J.L. AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (2d ed.) (1975). 
51 .  The rite of passage for black people might be described as a journey of pain to an 
experience of subordination. Cf Anthony Paul Farley, All Flesh Shall See It Together, 19 
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 163, 167 (1998) (characterizing the "middle passage" as an expe­
rience within which "[a]ll manner of nations went into the wombs of those . . .  terrible ships 
to be born again 'as blacks' after a transatlantic labor of hate"). 
52. WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD 
THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1968). 
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whatever they wanted us to do, a reasonable expectation of uncer­
tainty.53 With that awareness, I simply sat there. Quietly. My brother 
did the same. We were in a racial state of rightlessness, effectively out­
side the reach of the Fourth Amendment.54 The experience, in other 
words, was disciplinary. Although I didn't know it at the time, we were 
one step closer to becoming black Americans.55 Unwillingly, we were 
participating in a naturalization ceremony56 within which our submis­
sion to authority reflected and reproduced black racial subjectivlty.57 
We were being "pushed" and "pulled" through the racial body of 
America to be born again.58 A new motherland awaited us. Eventually 
we would belong to her.59 Her racial burden was to make us Natural­
ized Sons.6() 
Without our consent, one of the officers rummaged through the 
entire car - no doubt in search of ex post probable cause;61 the other 
watched over us. The search yielded nothing. (No drugs.) (No stolen 
property.) (No weapons.) Ostensibly, we were free to leave. 
53. Cf Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (articulating the "reasonable expecta­
tion of privacy" test for determining whether a particular governmental activity constitutes a 
search). 
54. Cf. Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. 
REV. 1 (1991). 
55. D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 
GEO. L.J. 437, 457 (1993) (noting that "blackness is largely constituted of the treatment of 
blacks"). 
56. I thank Muneer Ahmad for suggesting the employment of this term. 
57. I am not suggesting that African Americans accept racial subordination passively. 
Quite clearly they do not - and historically have not. Indeed, it is difficult to think of pro­
test movements without thinking of African Americans. For treatments of the African­
American protest tradition, see AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 
(John Hope Franklin & Genna Rae McNeil eds., 1995); ROBERT COOK, SWEET LAND OF 
LIBERTY?: THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY (1998); and EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS (Blackside, 
Inc. & The Corporation for Public Broadcasting 1986-87). My point is that part of being an 
African American is knowing when and when not to confront authority. See generally 
DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTER 
(1994). 
58. Cf Devon W. Carbado, Motherhood and Work in Cultural Context: One Woman's 
Patriarchal Bargain, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 4-5 (1998) (discussing the "push" and "pull" 
factors that explain West Indian immigration to England after World War II). 
59. Cf KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (1989). 
60. Cf RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (1940). 
61. For a discussion of the extent and nature of police perjury, see generally THE CITY 
OF NEW YORK COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE 
ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, COMMISSION REPORT: 
ANATOMY OF FAILURE: A PATH FOR SUCCESS (1994); Alan Dershowitz, The Best Defense, 
in RONALD J. ALLEN & RICHARD B. KUHNS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
28-29 (2d ed. 1991); and Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do 
About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996). 
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But what if the search had resulted in the production of incrimi­
nating evidence? That is, what if the officers' racial suspicions were 
confirmed? Would that have rendered their conduct legitimate? 
Would they thereby become "good" cops? Would that have made us 
"bad" blacks - blacks who confirm negative stereotypes, blacks who 
are undeserving of public sympathy, blacks who discredit the race? 
One of the officers asked for my driver's license, which I provided. 
My brother was then asked for his. He explained that he didn't have 
one because he had been in the country only a few weeks. 
"Do you have any identification?" 
"No. My passport is at home." We both knew that this was the 
wrong response. 
The officers requested that we stand up, which we did. Pursuant to 
black letter law, or the law on the street for black people, they forced 
us against the side of the patrol car. Spread-eagled, they frisked and 
searched us. (Still no guns.) (Still no drugs.) (Still no stolen property.) 
The entire incident lasted approximately twenty minutes. Neither 
officer provided us with an explanation as to why we were stopped. 
Nor did either officer apologize. By this time, I understood that we 
were not in a position to demand the latter, even as I did not under­
stand that, in some sense, the entire event was racially predetermined. 
The encounter ended when one of the officers muttered through the 
back of his head, "You're free to go." 
"Pardon?" 
"I said you can go now." 
And that was that. The racial bonding was over (for now).62 I 
wanted to say something like, "Are you absolutely certain, Officer? 
We really don't mind the intrusion, Officer. Do carry on with the 
search. Honest." But the burden of blackness in that moment ren­
dered those thoughts unspeakable.63 Thus, I simply watched in silence 
as they left. 
The encounter left us more racially aware and less racially intact. 
In other words, we were growing into our American profile. Still, the 
officers did not physically abuse us, we did not "kiss concrete," and we 
managed to escape jail.64 Relative to some black and Blue encounters, 
62. Typically, racial bonding is described as an antiracist activity. I employ the term here 
to suggest that often racial groups are bonded under circumstances of violence, coercion, 
and subordination. 
63. The point is not that, were I white, I would have felt completely free to "mouth off' 
to the officer. Presumably, police encounters have a chilling effect on most peoples' speech. 
The point is simply that the extent to which one feels chilled likely is a function of race. 
64. See David Dante Trout, The Race Industry, Brutality, and the Law of Mothers, in 
NOT GUILTY, supra note 30, at 57 ("I have had a weapon pulled on me only once: I've never 
kissed concrete."). 
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and considering my initial racial faux pas - questioning author­
ity/asserting rights - we got off easy.65 
Subsequent to that experience, I have had several other incidents 
with the police. In this respect, and like many black people, I am a re­
peat player. While each racial game bears mention (as part of a 
broader informal naturalization process · that structured the racial 
terms upon which I became American66), I shall recount only one 
more here. This encounter, too, occurred on my way to American citi­
zenship. And, like the first, it facilitated my (intra)racial integration 
into black American life.6 7 
Two of my brothers and my brother-in-law had just arrived from 
England. On our way from the airport, we stopped at my sister's 
apartment, which was in a predominantly white neighborhood. After 
letting us in, my sister left to perform errands. It was about two o'clock 
in the afternoon; my brothers wanted some tea. I showed one of them 
to the kitchen. After about five minutes, we heard the kettle whistling. 
65. See Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters" - Some Preliminary Thoughts 
About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 262 
(1991) ("The realities of the street, however, make challenging an officer's authority out of 
the question for a black man."). One reality to which Maclin refers is that minorities are 
more likely than whites to be subjected to police brutality. According to Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, Hispanics and African Americans constituted about 50% of the people subjected 
to police force in 1996, despite representing only one-fifth of the relevant population. The 
types of force enumerated in the Bureau's report included being hit, pushed, choked, threat­
ened by a flashlight, restrained by a dog, and threatened by a gun. See Robert Suro, Study 
Says Cops Used Force v. 500,000, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 24, 1997, at 21; see also David 
Lester, Officer Attitudes Toward Police Use of Force, in POLICE VIOLENCE: 
UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 180, 183 (William A. 
Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996) ("The presumed moral inferiority and the race of suspects 
leads the police to see them as less than human, thereby justifying brutality."); Tracey 
Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 390 (1998) (citing a report 
by Amnesty International that police brutality victims in New York City are largely minor­
ity, and that nearly all victims in cases of death in custody were members of racial minori­
ties); Seth Mydans, Videotaped Beating by Officers Puts Full Glare on Brutality Issue, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, at Al (reporting that in Los Angeles, "[c]ourt documents from several 
misconduct cases show that nearly all the victims of maulings by Los Angeles police dogs in 
the last seven years were black or Hispanic - although whites committed nearly a third of 
the crimes in which dogs are usually deployed"). 
66. Cf NOEL IGNATIEV, How THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995); Karen Brodkin 
Sacks, How Did Jews Become White Folks?, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES, supra note 19, at 
395. 
67. Little attention has been paid to the ways in which black ethnic experiences con­
verge around the issue of police abuse. In this respect it is worth noting that some of the 
most recent episodes of alleged race-based policing have involved immigrant blacks. These 
episodes include the March 2000 shooting death of Haitian immigrant Patrick Dorismond in 
New York City; the February 1999 shooting death of Guinean immigrant Amadou Diallo in 
New York City; and the August 1997 torture of Haitian immigrant Abner Louima, also in 
New York City. See Robert D. McFadden & Tina Kelley, Angry Mourners and Police Clash 
at Funeral of Man Shot by Officer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2000, at Al; Jane Fritsch, Four Offi­
cers in Diallo Shooting Are Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2000, at Al; 
David Barstow, Officer, Seeking Mercy, Admits to Louima's Torture, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 
1999, at Al. Each of these incidents perform a kind of racial integration wherein immigrant 
blacks are integrated into the "mainstream" Black American experience. 
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"Get the kettle, will you." There was no answer. My other brother 
went to see what was going on. Finally the kettle stopped whistling, 
but he never returned. My brother-in-law and I were convinced that 
my brothers were engaged in some sort of prank. "What are they do­
ing in there?" Together, we went into the kitchen. At the door were 
two police officers. Guns drawn, they instructed us to exit the apart­
ment. With our hands in the air, we did so. 
Outside, both of my brothers were pinned against the wall at gun­
point. There were eight officers. Each was visibly edgy, nervous and 
apprehensive. Passersby comfortably engaged in conspicuous racial 
consumption.68 Their eyes were all over our bodies.69 The racial prod­
uct was a familiar public spectacle: white law enforcement officers dis­
ciplining black men. The currency of their stares purchased for them 
precisely what it took away from us: race pleasure and a sense of racial 
comfort and safety. 70 This racial dialectic is a natural part of, and helps 
to sustain, America's racial economy, an economy within which racial 
bodies are differentially valued, 71 propertized, 72 and invested with so-
68. For a useful discussion of the relationship among identity formation, consumption, 
and production, see Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, & 
Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 188-91 (2001). 
69. See Marcia Grahn-Farley, Not for Sale! Race and Gender Identity in Post-colonial 
Europe, XVII N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 271, 289 (2000) (observing that "[t]o look is to 
touch"). 
70. For a conceptualization of American racial dynamics as a form of race pleasure, see 
Anthony Paul Farley, The Black Body As Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 457 (1997). 
71. The death penalty debate has brought into full relief the different values attached to 
white and black life in America. Most famously, the statistical study at issue in McCleskey v. 
Kemp ("the Baldus study") concluded that, in Georgia, the killer of a white victim was much 
more likely to receive a death sentence than a capital defendant whose victim was nonwhite. 
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH !INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL 
DISPARITIES 5 (1990) (echoing the findings of the Baldus study on a national scale). 
72. While blackness becomes "propertized," or objectified, in this racial economy, 
whiteness becomes "propertied," or imbued with rights and privileges that sustain whites' 
racial identity. See Harris, supra note 9; see also GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE 
INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: How WHITE PEOPLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS 
(1998). 
' 
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cial meaning.73 No doubt, our policed presence confirmed what the on­
looking racial interpellaters74 already "knew": that we were criminals. 
The officers wanted to know whether there was anyone else inside. 
We answered in the negative. "What's going on?" my brother-in-law 
inquired. The officer responded that they had received a call from a 
neighbor reporting that several black men had entered an apartment 
with guns. "Rubbish, we're just coming in from the airport." 
"Do you have any drugs?" 
"Of course not. Look, this is a mistake." The officers did not be­
lieve us. We were trapped inside their racial imagination75 - the heart 
of whiteness.76 (Quite possibly they were as well.) The body of evi­
dence - that is to say, our race - was uncontestable. We were un­
covered.77 At the very least we were race traffickers. Our only escape, 
then, was to prove that, in a social meaning sense, we were not what, 
phenotypically, we quite obviously were: black. 
"May we look inside the apartment?" 
"Sure," my brother in-law "consented."78 "Whatever it takes to get 
this over." 
Two officers entered the apartment. After about two minutes, they 
came out shaking their heads, presumably signaling that they were not 
at a crime scene.79 In fact, we were not criminals. Based on "bad" in-
73. Although these passersby might disavow any overt expressions of racism, and might 
object to the cliched negative stereotype of blacks as criminals, our onlookers were con­
fronted with a racial scene so deeply invested with social meaning that the racial conclusions 
to be drawn were cognitively inescapable. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and 
Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 336-39 (1987) 
(arguing that a multitude of social meanings regarding race is tacitly learned and internal­
ized, and resides in the unconscious); see also Greta McMorris, Critical Race Theory, Cogni­
tive Psychology, and the Social Meaning of Race: Why Individualism Will Not Solve Racism, 
67 UMKC L. REV. 695, 697 (1999) ("Under a psycho-social paradigm, the perpetuation of 
racism occurs at two levels: first through society's acceptance of racist beliefs, and second 
through the individual's acceptance of racist beliefs. Both of these processes give race its so­
cial meaning."). 
74. Apologies to Louis Althusser. See ALTHUSSER, supra note 20. 
75. See generally GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND 
(1971). 
76. Cf JOSEPH CONRAD, THE HEART OF DARKNESS (1902). 
77. Cf Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002). 
78. Of course, the officer did not inform my brother that he had a right to refuse con­
sent. 
79. This misperception, or assumption, that a group of black men were carrying guns is 
unfortunately far from an isolated occurrence. According to a report drafted by New York 
City's Civilian Complaint Review Board, NYPD officers "were more likely to say that they 
saw a 'suspicious-looking bulge' or a waistband movement indicative of a gun" when they 
provided their reasons for stopping blacks or Latinas/os, while officers said they detained 
most white suspects "for being in a high-crime area." Alice McQuillan, New York Police Use 
Force More Often to Detain African Americans, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 12, 2001. During 
the trial of the four New York City police officers who shot and killed unarmed African im­
migrant Amadou Diallo, the defendant officers testified that they saw Diallo pull a black 
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formation - but information that was presumed to be good - they 
had made an "error."80 "Sometimes these things happen."81 At least, 
they were willing to apologize. 
"Look, we're really sorry about this, but when we get a call that 
there are [black] men with guns, we take it quite seriously. Again, we 
really are sorry for the inconvenience."82 With that apology, the offi­
cers departed. Our privacy had been invaded, we experienced a loss of 
dignity, and our blackness had been established - once more - as a 
crime of identity. But that was our law-enforcement cross to bear. In 
other words, the police were simply doing their job: acting on racial 
intelligence. And we were simply shouldering our racial burden: dis­
confirming the assumption that we were criminals. No one was really 
injured. Presumably, the neighbors felt a little safer. 
My eyes followed each officer into his car. As they drove off, one 
of them turned his head to witness the after-spectacle: the four of us 
(racially) traumatized in the gunned-down position they had left us. 
Our eyes met for a couple of seconds, and then he looked away. It was 
over. The racial transaction - routinized social power freely ex-
object out of his pocket and that they assumed it was a gun. It turned out that Diallo had 
been holding his wallet. See Fritsch, supra note 67. 
80. It is well established that there is a disproportionately high error rate in cross-racial 
suspect identifications. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Crimi­
nal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984) (arguing for discrete analysis of and safeguards 
against cross-racial identification errors in addressing the general problem of unreliable 
eyewitness testimony). The initial national response in the 1994 Susan Smith child murder 
case provided an example of the instant credibility of an accusation against a black assailant. 
For a discussion of this and other racial themes surrounding the Smith case, see Cheryl I. 
Harris, Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials of 0.1. Simpson and Susan Smith - Specta­
cles of Our Times, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 225 (1996). For a further discussion of racial hoaxes 
such as the Smith case, see KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME 69-93 (1998). In 
a chapter detailing racial hoaxes, Professor Russell discusses cross-racial allegations by both 
whites and blacks, but notes that "[t]he public appears to be more willing to believe someone 
White who says they were victimized by someone black than someone black who says they 
were victimized by someone White." Id. at 83. This explicit link between race and credibility 
manifested itself in nineteenth century laws that prohibited black participation on juries. In 
1879, the U.S. Supreme Court declared such laws unconstitutional in Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); however, the force of that opinion was neutralized by the 
adoption of other means to prevent the inclusion of black jurors, such as poll taxes and citi­
zenship tests. In recent years, the credibility and impartiality of black jurors is under attack 
in the debate over jury nullification. See Elissa Krauss & Martha Schulman, The Myth of 
Black Juror Nullification: Racism Dressed Up in Jurisprudential Clothing, 7 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 57 (1997). 
81. This episode makes apparent the link between racial profiling and race-based sus­
pect descriptions. See generally, R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Color­
blind Equal Protection Doctrine & Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075 (2001). 
82. I do not mean to suggest that had the police officer received a call that there were 
white men with guns, or simply men with guns, entering an apartment, they would not have 
taken it seriously. Presumably, they would have. The point is that race likely compounded 
the extent to which the officers, and the person who made the call to the police, perceived us 
and the situation to be dangerous. 
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pended upon black bodies - was complete. Another day in the life, 
for the police and for us.83 
Simple injustice.84 
We went inside, drank our tea, and didn't much talk about what 
had transpired. Perhaps we didn't know how to talk about it. Perhaps 
we were too shocked. Perhaps we wanted to put the incident behind us 
- to move on, to start forgetting. Perhaps we needed time to recover 
our dignity, to repossess our bodies. Perhaps we knew that we were in 
America. Perhaps we sensed that the encounter portended a racial 
taste of things to come, and that this experience of everyday social re­
ality for black Americans would become part of our invisible life.85 
Perhaps we understood that we were already black Americans, that 
our race had naturalized us.86 Perhaps we knew that this naturalization 
83. Cf IN THE LIFE: A BLACK GAY ANTHOLOGY (Joseph Beam ed., 1986). 
84. Cf RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976). 
85. Cf RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 1 (1947) ("I am an invisible man . . . .  I am a 
man of substance, of flesh and bone, fiber and liquids - and I might even be said to possess 
a mind. I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me . . . .  When they 
approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination -
indeed, everything and anything except me."); see also E. LYNN HARRIS, INVISIBLE LIFE: A 
NOVEL (1994). 
86. Congress's first naturalization law, passed in 1790, limited citizenship eligibility to 
"free white persons." Until the element of race was formally eliminated in 1952, the greater 
part of naturalization litigation was concerned with (re)defining and (dis)proving "white­
ness." For a study of the racial prerequisite litigation up to the 1920s, see IAN F. HANEY 
LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996) (tracing the shifting 
definition of legal race from two competing doctrines: genetics rooted in "scientific evi­
dence" of phenotype and sociology evidenced by "common knowledge" of whiteness). An 
alternative reading of the racial prerequisite cases points to the Court's role in the develop­
ment of racial performance as the ultimate basis for judging racial identity, reflecting an as­
similationist policy in immigration law. See Tehranian, supra note 9; see also Enid Trucios­
Haynes, The Legacy of Racially Restrictive Immigration Laws and Policies and the Construc­
tion of the American National Identity, 76 OR. L. REV. 369 (1997) (describing assimilation as 
the underlying theme for race relations discourse in the United States, and arguing that as­
similation theory continues to dominate political discourse and influence public policy). Ex­
clusionary citizenship policies and the Court's role in expanding and mostly contracting the 
zone of whiteness, Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922), reflected the single 
most important consideration in U.S. immigration policy: the ability of aliens to "quickly 
merge into the mass of our population and lose the distinctive hallmarks of their . . .  origin." 
United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 215 (1923). Today, naturalization does not formally 
depend on race. 8 U.S.C.A § 1422. Race, however, is a stubborn "hallmark of origin" and 
continues to pose a threat to the underlying assimilationist character of American identity. 
See PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S 
IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995) (arguing that the current policy on naturalization is eroding 
the "racial hegemony of white Americans" and precipitating the decline of United States 
economic and cultural superiority). Current immigration policies continue to have racially 
restrictive effects, although the restrictions ostensibly are based on political, economic or 
linguistic considerations. See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic 
Race Relations: A "Magic Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111 (1998); Juan 
F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, 
and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269 (1992). 
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was fundamentally about race and place,87 a project in social position­
ing that rendered us the racial embodiment of social transgression. 
We relayed the incident to my sister. She was furious. "Bloody bas­
tards!" She lodged a complaint with the Beverly Hills Police Depart­
ment. She called the local paper. She contacted the NAACP. "No, no­
body was shot." "No, they were not physically abused." "Yes, I 
suppose everyone is alright." 
Of course, nothing became of her complaints.88 After all, the police 
were "protecting and serving." We, like other blacks in America, were 
the unfortunate but necessary casualties of the war against crime. We 
were impossible witnesses to police abuse.89 Eventually, we would 
learn that within America's racial environment, policed black identity 
is a natural and national resource.90 It is the raw material for a nation­
building project to make America feel safer - ostensibly for all of 
us.91 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A growing body of literature contests the racial dimensions of 
Fourth Amendment law.92 The central claim this literature advances is 
that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is insensitive to, and uncon-
87. The notion of race and place carries with it at least the following two interrelated 
ideas: (1) that one's social position in society - that is to say, how one lives - should be a 
function of one's race; and (2) that where one lives should be a function of one's race. For a 
very useful discussion of the racialization of space and the spatialization of race, see Richard 
T. Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1841 (1994). 
88. A 1999 Associated Press study of Justice Department records found that, between 
1992 and 1996, federal prosecutors took no action in 96% of the roughly 2,000 claims of civil 
rights violations that were referred to them by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or other 
agencies. Most of the civil rights claims involved allegations of abuse by police or other law 
enforcement personnel. By comparison, federal attorneys prosecuted 90% of the immigra­
tion cases referred to the Justice Department during the same period, and 75% of drug case 
referrals. See Complaints of Civil Rights Violations Rarely Prosecuted, Associated Press 
Study Reveals, JET, Apr. 5,  1999, at 6. 
89. Cf. DWIGHT A. MCBRIDE, IMPOSSIBLE WITNESSES: TRUTH, ABOLITIONISM, AND 
SLAVE TESTIMONY (2001 ). 
90. Cf RALPH ELLISON, SHADOW AND ACT 29 (1964) (noting that blacks often func­
tion as "a human 'natural' resource who, so that white men could become more human, was 
elected to undergo a process of institutionalized dehumanization"). 
91. Cf. Volpp, supra note 20 (suggesting that racial profiling against Arab/Muslim 
Americans is a nation-building project). 
92. See generally Harris, supra note 40; Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to 
Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983); Maclin, supra note 65; Robin K. Magee, The 
Myth of the Good Cop and the Inadequacy of Fourth Amendment Remedies for Black Men: 
Contrasting Presumptions of Innocence and Guilt, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 151 (1994); Anthony 
C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 956 (1999). 
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cerned with, the contemporary realities of race.93 While this body of 
work is important and illuminating, it can be expanded upon in three 
important ways. First, virtually none of this literature links the 
Supreme Court's racial insensitivity in the Fourth Amendment context 
to racial ideology - that is, commitments about and conceptions of 
race.94 Put another way, the race and Fourth Amendment scholarship 
fails to examine the nexus between the development of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine on the one hand, and ideological notions about 
what race is and should be on the other. Part of the project of Critical 
Race Theory95 has been to illustrate not only the role courts play in 
constructing racial identities, but also the relationship between the 
construction of race in judicial opinions and the production and le­
gitimation of racial inequality.96 For the most part, scholars writing 
about race and the Fourth Amendment have not meaningfully en­
gaged this body of work.97 Thus, they have failed to consider the race-
93. See Maclin, supra note 65, at 340 (arguing that "[a]lthough the casual reader of the 
[Supreme] Court's Fourth Amendment opinions would never know it, race matters when 
measuring the dynamics and legitimacy of certain police-citizen encounters); Thompson, su­
pra note 92, at 962 (analyzing a series of Supreme Court decisions to illustrate "the Court's 
conception of a raceless world of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: a constructed reality in 
which most police officers do not act on the basis of considerations of race, the facts under­
lying a search or seizure can be evaluated without examining the influence of race, and the 
applicable constitutional mandate is wholly unconcerned with race"). 
94. Scholars who have interrogated the relationship between racial ideology and the law 
include Kimberle Williams Crenshaw and D. Marvin Jones. See Kimberle Williams 
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Discrimi­
nation Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1376-81 (1988) (tracing the "partial transformation of 
the functioning of race consciousness that occurred with the transition from Jim Crow to 
formal equality in race law"); D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor and 
the Racial Self, 82 GEO. L.J. 437 (1993) (identifying historical narratives that have served to 
construct racial identities and analyzing how those narratives act to reify racial difference in 
the law). 
95. For a discussion of the genesis and intellectual commitments of Critical Race The­
ory, see Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY 
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii-xxxii (Kimber le Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); 
Richard Delgado, Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE xiii-xvi 
(Richard Delgado ed., 1995); and Adrien Katherine Wing, Introduction to CRITICAL RACE 
FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Wing ed., 1997). For an indication of the diversity of this 
literature, see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibli­
ography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993); see also Anthony V. Alfieri, Black and White, 85 CAL. 
L. REV. 1647 (1998) (reviewing the two leading critical race theory texts). 
96. A now-classic article that articulates this relationship in the context of an analysis of 
whiteness as property is Harris, Whiteness as Property, supra note 9. See also Richard Del­
gado, Recasting the American Race Problem, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1389 (1991); Gotanda, supra 
note 22; Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
1 (1994); Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: An Historic and Contemporary View of the 
Native American Experience, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 713 (1986). 
97. In part, this might be because Critical Race Theorists have not performed a social 
constructivist critique of Fourth Amendment law. Still, there is a vast literature on the social 
construction of race that could shape the way in which Fourth Amendment law is discussed. 
See MICHAEL OM! & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1980s 63 (1986); Stuart Alan Clarke, Fear of a Black Planet: Race, 
Identity Politics, and Common Sense, 21 SOCIALIST REV. No. 3-4, 37 (1991); Haney Lopez, 
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constructing role the Court performs in the Fourth Amendment con­
text.98 An examination of this role could further illuminate the disjunc­
ture between how the Court on the one hand and police on the other 
make race matter. This illumination would help to highlight the 
Court's complicity in, and legitimation of, police practices that target 
people of color.99 
Second, the literature on race and the Fourth Amendment has not 
fully examined the ways in which current doctrine affects the everyday 
lives of people of color. Certainly, the suggestion that suspicion is ra­
cialized and that this racialization burdens people of color is not novel. 
The literature, however, fails to capture the precise nature of this bur­
den. The burden includes, but is not limited to, internalized racial 
obedience toward, and fear of, the police. Few people have noted that 
people of color are socialized into engaging in particular kinds of per­
formances for the police.100 They work their identities in response to, 
and in an attempt to preempt, law enforcement discipline. This iden­
tity work takes place in a social atmosphere of fear and loathing.101 It is 
intended to signal acquiescence and respectability. This under­
theorized part of the interaction between police officers and people of 
color provides a more complete understanding of the racial costs of 
current Fourth Amendment law. While the identification of these ad­
ditional costs may, given the current political culture of the Supreme 
Court, be insufficient substantively to change existing doctrine, their 
incorporation into Fourth Amendment discourse could perform an 
supra note 96. For a useful application of the insights of critical race theory to the way in 
which trials are conducted and understood, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEXAS L. 
REV. 1293 (1998). 
98. Scholars have thoroughly examined the ways that the Supreme Court constructs 
race in the Fourteenth Amendment context. See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Demargi­
nalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination 
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989); Jerome 
McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy Ar­
guments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162 (1994); Kenneth L. Karst, 
Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA 
L. REV. 263 (1995). However, there has been virtually no discussion of the legal construction 
of race in the Fourth Amendment context. 
99. Cf Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and 
Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 188 (1983) (identifying legitimation 
as one of the functions of criminal procedure). 
100. For a general discussion of identity performances as a strategy to preempt racism, 
manage it, or both, see Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 9. 
See also Devon W. Carbado and Mitu Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103 
(2000) (discussing identity performances as a response to institutional norms). For a discus­
sion of how identity performances are employed in the context of police encounters, see in­
fra Section 11.B.2. 
101. See RUSSELL, supra note 80, at 34 (pointing to "the general fear and loathing that 
many Black men have of the police"). 
March 2002) ( E)Racing The Fourth Amendment 967 
epistemological function.102 Specifically, an awareness of the relation­
ship between identity performance and race-based policing could 
shape how scholars think about Fourth Amendment law and render it 
more difficult for the Court to ignore or race neutrally construct 
race.103 
Finally, the scholarship on race and the Fourth Amendment is un­
derinclusive, focusing primarily on blacks. The point is not that we 
have a complete understanding of how the Fourth Amendment bur­
dens black people; indeed, part of my aim in this Article is to broaden 
that understanding. Instead, the point is that to the extent that black­
ness is but one - albeit significant - racial identity burdened by the 
Court's formulation of Fourth Amendment doctrine, focusing exclu­
sively on blacks presents a black and white racial picture of this body 
of law. Lost in this picture is the conception of race-based policing as a 
multiracial social phenomenon.104 Such a conception provides scholars 
with a window through which to broaden both their understanding of 
race and policing and their critique of the Supreme Court. Indeed, to 
the extent that race-based policing is perceived to affect only black 
people, the Supreme Court's indifference to it, and the practice itself, 
is easier to ignore. 105 
The project of this Article, broadly stated, is to fill these gaps. To 
do so, it examines Fourth Amendment case law as a jurisprudential 
site within which the Supreme Court engages in the production of 
race. What I mean to suggest here is that, in the Fourth Amendment 
context, the Court both constructs race (that is, produces a particular 
conception of what race is)106 and reifies race (that is, conceptualizes 
race as existing completely outside of or apart from the very legal 
frameworks within which the Court produces it). My specific aim is to 
illustrate how the Supreme Court's construction and reification of race 
in Fourth Amendment cases legitimizes and reproduces racial 
102. For many observers, the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore shed a harsh light on this 
political culture; liberal commentators wryly noted the conservative majority's acceptance of 
the petitioner's Equal Protection argument, given that bloc's past refusals to back Equal 
Protection claims advanced by racial minorities. For an analysis of the Supreme Court's cur­
rent political climate, seen through the lens of Bush v. Gore, see ALAN DERSHOWITZ, 
SUPREME INJUSTICE (2001). See also RICHARD POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK 
(2001). For a detailed account and analysis of the Bush v. Gore decision, see Linda 
Greenhouse, Bush v. Gore: A Special Repon; Election Case a Test and a Trauma for Justices, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001, at Al. 
103. See infra Section 11.C.2. 
104. See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, Racial Profiling: "Driving While Mexican" and Af­
firmative Action, 6 MICH. J.  RACE & L. 195 (2000). 
105. Significantly, this Article does not present a complete picture of the racial effects of 
the Fourth Amendment or of particular kinds of police practices. Although I engage the ex­
periences of Latinas/os, I do not say much about Asian Americans or Native Americans. 
106. As I explain more fully below, because race does not exist prior to but is an effect 
of discourse, any articulation of race is race-constructing. 
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inequality in the context of policing. In this sense, the Article will de­
lineate the racial world that Fourth Amendment law helps to create 
and sustain. 
The central claim I advance is that the racial effects of the 
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment law is a function of the Court's 
adoption of what I call the perpetrator perspective.107 Two normative 
and race-constructing commitments underwrite this perspective: (1) 
the notion that how people interact with and respond to the police is 
neither affected by nor mediated through race; and (2) the idea that 
whether and how the police engage people is not a function of race. 
As a result of these commitments, the Court conceptualizes race pri­
marily through the racial lens of colorblindness. In this sense, the race 
and Fourth Amendment problem is not just a function of the fact that 
the Court ignores race.108 It is also, and perhaps more fundamentally, a 
function of the Court's underlying investment in a particular concep­
tion of race: race neutrality or colorblindness.109 
The Supreme Court's investment in colorblindness reflects a per­
petrator perspective in the sense that race becomes doctrinally rele­
vant only to the extent that the presumption of race neutrality and 
colorblindness can be rebutted by specific evidence that a particular 
police officer exhibits overtly racist behavior - in other words, is ob­
viously a perpetrator of racism. Put another way, race potentially mat­
ters in the Fourth Amendment context only when a case involves a 
"racially bad" cop.1 10 Police officers who cannot be so described are 
107. The phrase "perpetrator perspective" previously was employed by Alan David 
Freeman to refer to a conception of "racial discrimination not as conditions, but as actions, 
or series of actions, inflicted on the victim by the perpetrator. The focus is more on what par­
ticular perpetrators have done or are doing to some victims than it is on the overall life situa­
tion of the victim class." Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through 
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 
1049, 1052-57 (1978). I use the phrase in the Fourth Amendment context to capture the Su­
preme Court's active construction of an imaginary, race-less arena in which Jaw enforcement 
and minorities interact. In this arena, the specter of explicit bigotry serves to mask subtex­
tual bias, and a focus on racist actors serves to blur the experiences of race victims. 
108. Some race and the Fourth Amendment scholars have ably demonstrated this 
problem. See, e.g. , David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the 
Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. Cr. REV. 271, 316-23 (1997) (elucidating the Supreme Court's 
"general pattern in Fourth Amendment cases of overlooking the special grievances of blacks 
and other racial minorities"); Thompson, supra note 92, at 978 (concluding a detailed analy­
sis of an "array of Supreme Court cases denying or minimizing the role of race in police 
searches and seizures"). 
109. One could articulate this problem of seeing race through the lens of colorblindness 
in terms of racial recognition and de-recognition. See Cheryl I. Harris, Symposium - The 
Constitution of Equal Citizenship for a Good Society: Equal Treatment and the Reproduction 
of Inequality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1753 (2001) (discussing the ways in which the Supreme 
Court, in the context of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, both recognizes and de­
recognizes race). 
1 10. For example, in 1993, the city of Reynoldsburg, Ohio, settled a lawsuit filed by a 
black man who had claimed that local police officers arrested him because of his race. Sev­
eral members of the city's police force admitted in depositions that there was a group of offi-
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presumed to be "racially good," and their racial interactions with peo­
ple on the street are presumed to be constitutional.111 
Significantly, the Supreme Court has not explicitly articulated col­
orblindness as a guiding principle of Fourth Amendment law. This 
ideology has to be excavated. Doing so helps to reveal precisely what 
the perpetrator perspective obscures: the racial allocation of the bur­
dens and benefits of the Fourth Amendment. The material result of 
this racial allocation is that people of color are burdened more by, and 
benefit less from, the Fourth Amendment than whites. Consequently, 
the former are likely to feel less "secure in their persons, homes, pa­
pers, and effects" than the latter. Stated differently, people of color 
are more likely than whites to experience the Fourth Amendment as a 
technology of surveillance rather than as a constitutional guardian of 
property, liberty, and privacy.112 This problem is compounded by the 
fact that, as a historical matter, people of color have not been the 
beneficiaries of effective law enforcement. 113 In other words, the pri­
vacy losses they experience are not the price they pay for effective 
crime prevention and detection, but a cost of race. This suggests that 
people of color are under-protected even as they are over-policed.114 
In effect, from the perspective of many people of color, the Fourth 
Amendment has been eraced.115 
cers in the department who dubbed themselves the "Special Nigger Arrest Team," and who 
targeted blacks for traffic stops and arrests. See Michael A. Fletcher, Driven to Extremes; 
Black Men Take Steps to Avoid Police Stops, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1996, at Al. 
111. See Magee, supra note 93 (invoking the experiences of black men with the police to 
challenge the notion of a "good cop"). 
112. For a related argument about the maldistribution of Fourth Amendment protec­
tions, see William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1265 (1999). 
113. Typically, Fourth Amendment inquiries (for example, the question of whether 
there is a search or seizure and the question of whether the search or seizure is reasonable) 
are framed in terms of balancing. Specifically, the "government's interest" in law enforce­
ment is balanced against "our interest" in privacy. This framing obscures that "our interests" 
reside on both sides of the balancing. That is, effective law enforcement benefits "us" by 
helping to create and sustain safe and socially healthy communities. Part of the problem with 
the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is that no attention is paid to an uncontestable 
social reality: people of color experience more privacy losses and less effective law enforce­
ment than whites. 
114. Some scholars assert that antiracist efforts that target the criminal justice system of­
ten are insufficiently attentive to underenforcement problems. See, e.g. , RANDALL 
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997). Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares have sug­
gested that a rights-based approach to the criminal process can compound the underen­
forcement problem and deny communities of color the opportunity to develop creative ways 
to advance their interest in having effective but non-discriminatory law enforcement. See 
Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 
GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998); See also Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights are Wrong, 
BOSTON REV., Apr./May 1999, at 4. 
115. Cf. Lani Guinier, (£)racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L. 
REV. 109 (1994). 
. 
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This Article suggests that the Supreme Court should abandon the 
perpetrator perspective in favor of the victim perspective. Fundamen­
tal to this perspective is the idea that, because people of color often 
experience their race as a crime of identity, and because this experi­
ence derives, at least in part, from availability heuristics about race, 
people of color are always vulnerable to being victims of police abuse. 
The victim perspective, in other words, is explicitly race-conscious, 
and not only with respect to people with vulnerable racial identities 
(that is, potential victims), but also with respect to racial interpolators 
like the police (that is, potential perpetrators). The victim's perspec­
tive, then, is less concerned with whether police officers are racially 
blameworthy or racially culpable in the "bad cop" sense, and more 
concerned with the coercive and disciplinary ways in which race struc­
tures the interaction between police officers and nonwhite persons. 
The shift in focus to the victim perspective from the perpetrator 
perspective is not just rhetorical; it has descriptive, normative, and 
doctrinal value. As discussed more fully below, the victim perspective 
provides a more complete understanding of the harms of race-based 
policing, a more sophisticated sense of the Court's role in legitimizing 
those harms, and a normative basis for re-interpreting and re­
conceptualizing particular Fourth Amendment doctrines. 
The argument proceeds as follows. Part II analyzes the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the "free to leave" test. This test determines 
whether, for Fourth Amendment purposes, a particular police activity 
"seizes" an individual - that is, renders the individual unfree either to 
leave or to terminate the police encounter. Focusing on Florida v. 
Bostick1 16 (which directly implicates blacks) and INS v. Delgado117 
(which directly implicates Latinas/os), this Part specifically illustrates 
how the Supreme Court's seizure analysis relies too heavily on the 
perpetrator perspective. This overreliance simultaneously creates a ra­
cial-avoidance problem (that is, the Supreme Court's willful blindness 
to uncontestable facts about race and policing) and a racial­
construction problem (that is, the Court's ideological representation of 
defendants and police officers without racial specificity). Identifying 
these problems helps to illustrate how the Supreme Court doctrinally 
masks (and not simply ignores) the ways in which race shapes (1) an 
officer's decision to select a particular individual for questioning, (2) 
the form and substance of the questioning, and (3) how the subject of 
the questioning responds. Part II argues that this doctrinal masking le­
gitimizes, even as it obscures, the racial terms upon which po­
lice/citizen encounters are transacted. 
1 16. 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
117. 466 U.S. 210 (1984). 
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Part III shifts the discussion to Fourth Amendment consent doc­
trine, the body of law that is concerned with determining the circum­
stances under which a person can be said to have consented to a par­
ticular governmental intrusion (e.g., the search of one's clothing or 
belongings). Broadly speaking, here, too, the project is to demonstrate 
the racial productivity of this body of law - the ways in which Fourth 
Amendment law constructs (not simply avoids) and reifies (not simply 
discovers) race - to implicate more directly the Supreme Court in 
people of color's experiences with the police. The more specific aim is 
to demonstrate that the Supreme Court's adjudication of what consti­
tutes a valid consent race neutrally constructs suspects and police offi­
cers. This construction renders Latinas/os, for example, just people -
a construction that erases their particular racial experiences with, and 
impressions of, the police. Simultaneously, white police officers be­
come just police officers - a construction that erases their particular 
racial impressions of, and social interactions with, Latinas/os. 
This colorblind production of identities exacerbates and legitimizes 
Latinas/os' (and other people of color's) racial vulnerability to consent 
searches. This vulnerability derives from four important social reali­
ties. First, given pervasive stereotypes as to the color of crime,118 police 
officers may be racially committed to searching Latinas/os' personal 
effects.119 Second, should a police officer ask a Latino for permission 
118. See generally RUSSELL, supra note 80 (exploring the various connections between 
race and crime). Stereotyping results from schematic processing - the way we obtain, retain 
and organize a life-long database of experiences and information. Stereotypes are "cognitive 
frameworks consisting of knowledge and beliefs about specific social groups." Greta 
McMorris, Critical Race Theory, Cognitive Psychology, and the Social Meaning of Race: Why 
Individualism Will Not Solve Racism, 67 UMKC L. REV. 695, 706 (1999) (citing ROBERT A. 
BARON & DONN BYRNE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: UNDERSTANDING HUMAN INTERACTION 
231 (1994)). The empirical evidence produced by social cognition theory raises serious ques­
tions about how discrimination is framed in law. If discrimination results from cognitive pro­
cesses as opposed to intentionally biased decisionmaking, racism's remedy cannot derive 
from a neutrality approach. As Linda Hamilton Krieger explains, people categorize objects 
in their environment in a particular way because it proves useful in understanding their envi­
ronment and predicting future events. It would be difficult to argue credibly that racial, eth­
nic, or gender distinctions have no utility in understanding American society or negotiating 
experience within it. Because gender, ethnic, and racial distinctions are often perceptually 
apparent, and because these categories are made salient by our social and cultural context, 
we can expect race, ethnic, and gender-based schemas to be implicated in the processing of 
information about other people. Once activated, the content of a schema will profoundly 
affect how we interpret a person's subsequent behavior, what about that behavior we re­
member, and how we use the behavior in judging the person later. Linda Hamilton Krieger, 
The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal 
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1 161, 1201 (1995); Lawrence, supra note 74 
(problematizing intentional and animus-based conceptualizations of racism). 
119. The media is frequently pointed to as the most potent mode of reinforcement, if 
not the original source, of stereotyping African Americans as criminals. Katheryn Russell 
observes that media focus on the "young black male" has made the image of young African­
American men "synonymous with deviance." RUSSELL, supra note 80, at 5. The focus is on 
the fraction of young black men in the criminal justice system rather than the rest, who are 
not - and little media attention touches on the more than 400,000 young black men in col­
lege. Id. She also suggests that the stereotype of black men as criminals is reinforced jointly 
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to search his belongings, pressure exists for that person to say yes.120 
He may believe that, if he says no, the officer's (racial) suspicions will 
intensify. Central to this thinking could be the perception that, to the 
extent that this intensification occurs, the officer will prolong the en­
counter.121 Third, Latinas/os (especially young Latinas/os in the inner 
by fictional portrayals in TV shows and film, where blacks are predominantly represented as 
deviant, as well as "reality" police shows and news broadcasts that focus on violent street 
crime. Id. at 2. 
In a 1997 study, UCLA researchers found that after viewing television news crime re­
ports, 42% of survey participants recalled having seen a perpetrator, even though no suspect 
had been mentioned. Of these participants, 66% recalled that the imaginary perpetrator was 
black. See Howard Kurtz, A Guilty Verdict on Crime, Race Bias; TV Viewers Often Assume 
Su�pects Are Black, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1997, at Cl. The same researchers found that 
over the course of one year, one Los Angeles television station showed or described suspects 
in 50% of their crime reports. Of those identified suspects, an overwhelming majority, 70%, 
were minorities - even though the percentage of all crimes actually committed by minori­
ties in Los Angeles County was far smaller. Id. at C4; see also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial 
Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739 (1993) (arguing that pre-trial publicity is 
particularly likely to reinforce the stereotype of the black man as criminal, because newspa­
pers tend to print the race of suspects only if they are not white, and interracial crimes 
against whites receive more media attention than other crimes). One of the most notable 
uses (or abuses) of this stereotype in recent years was the attempt by George Bush's 1988 
presidential campaign to cast the opponent, Michael Dukakis, as "soft on crime" by repeat­
edly showing the image of Willie Horton, a black inmate who was convicted of committing 
two violent crimes while out on furlough. The Bush campaign manager made statements 
suggesting that choosing Jesse Jackson as a running mate would be the same as choosing 
Willie Horton, thereby pushing an image that all black men are criminals. Richard Dvorak, 
Cracking the Code: "De-coding" Colorblind Slurs During the Congressional Crack Cocaine 
Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611, 626-27 (2000). 
Latina/o Americans are similarly stereotyped as criminals, particularly in film and the 
news media. See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Con­
ception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996) (explaining that the Latino-as­
criminal stereotype is linked to other Latino stereotypes, particularly that of illegal immi­
grants - who are presumed to be lawbreakers - and that of "machos," who are presumed 
to be hot-tempered and prone to violence); Ediberto Roman, Who Exactly is Living La Vida 
Loca?: The Legal and Political Consequences of Latino-Latina Ethnic and Racial Stereotypes 
in Film and Other Media, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 37 (2000) (examining the portrayals of 
Latinos and Latinas in a number of films and observing that in film, if a Latina/o is depicted 
as a romantic interest, "he or she is much more likely to be a gang member than a physi­
cian"). 
120. The employment of the masculine pronoun here is not intended to suggest that ra­
cial profiling, or more broadly, race-based policing, is solely a problem for men. Black 
women, for example, are particularly vulnerable to racial profiling at airports. See Mike 
Dorning, Black Women Most Likely Targets of Airport Searches, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 10, 2000, 
at 1 (reporting the results of a U.S. General Accounting Office survey that found African­
American women were much more likely than other airline passengers to be subjected to 
strip searches and x-ray exams); see also John Gibeaut, Marked for Humiliation, 85 AB.A. J. 
46, 46-47 (1999) (recounting the experiences of one African-American woman who was re­
peatedly strip-searched at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport, and who joined more 
than 80 other African-American women in a federal lawsuit against the U.S. Customs Serv­
ice for racial profiling). 
121. Of course all people, regardless of race, likely perceive police encounters to be or 
experience them as coercive. However, the extent of the coercion one experiences likely is a 
function of race. Because race differentially situates people with respect to the level of suspi­
cion a police officer is likely to have about them, the pressure to respond to police authority 
likely varies across race. 
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city) often will have imperfect information about their constitutional 
rights.122 Thus, they will not always know that they have a right to 
refuse consent. Fourth, assuming that police officers know that 
Latinas/os may be uninformed or apprehensive about exercising their 
constitutional rights, police officers have an incentive to exploit these 
vulnerabilities.123 
Significantly, these interracial dynamics do not turn on whether 
police officers are "racially bad" in the sense of exhibiting hard racial 
animus. Cumulatively, they provide a basis for rethinking consent doc­
trine and, more particularly, the way that doctrine was applied in the 
central consent doctrine case: Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.124 Together, 
Parts II and III broaden our understanding of the racial dynamics be­
tween people of color and police officers, redescribe the race and 
Fourth Amendment problem as a function of the Court's racial pro­
ductivity, and provide a normative basis for articulating alternative 
doctrinal regimes to constitutionally regulate police conduct. 
Part IV focuses on a specific race and policing problem: the Driv­
ing While Black/Brown ("DWB") phenomenon. The section defines 
DWB as an example of racial profiling and employs the perpetrator 
perspective to explain how the public campaigns against, and the 
Supreme Court's response to, racial profiling have functioned to man­
age (rather than solve) this pervasive social problem. The Supreme 
Court has responded to racial profiling through doctrinal avoidance. It 
accomplishes this avoidance, in part, by conceptualizing racial profil­
ing as an "attitude" that resides in the minds of "racially bad" police 
officers (the perpetrator perspective), rather than as a disciplinary 
practice that police officers deploy and people of color experience (the 
victim perspective). In effect, the Supreme Court recognizes racial 
profiling - that is, acknowledges that the phenomenon exists - only 
to de-recognize it - that is, to ignore how racial profiling is actually 
experienced. 125 Part IV exposes this racial recognition/de-recognition 
dynamic to demonstrate how the Court strategically uses race to 
achieve a particular doctrinal outcome: that the Fourth Amendment 
122. Again, people across races are likely to have imperfect information about their 
constitutional rights. Here, too, the claim is that some races are more vulnerable to the 
problem than others. Given the quality of education within inner city communities and this 
constituency's general lack of social capital, it is reasonable to conclude that black inner city 
young people are especially likely to be unaware of the protections that the Constitution 
theoretically affords them. 
123. I do not mean to suggest that none of the foregoing dynamics affects white people. 
The point is that nonwhite identity compounds each. 
124. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
125. Cf. Harris, supra note 109, at 1758 (describing the Supreme Court's Fourteenth 
Amendment analyses as "a jurisprudential strategy to recognize or see race (i.e. the racial 
identities of particular bodies) in order to de-recognize or not see race (i.e. a structural sys­
tem of group-based privileges and disadvantages produced by socio-historical forces)"). 
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does not reach racial profiling. Demonstrating that this outcome is 
both ideologically invested and contingent creates a doctrinal space 
within which to articulate approaches to the Fourth Amendment un­
der which racial profiling would be deemed unconstitutional. 
The public's response to racial profiling has been one of condem­
nation. This condemnation, however, derives not from the idea that 
racial profiling is per se problematic. Instead, reflecting the perpetra­
tor perspective, it is based on the perception that "racially bad" cops 
are profiling "racially good" blacks and Latinas/os. Almost every pub­
lic narrative about racial profiling, including the ones with which this 
Article begins, involves "respectable" people: lawyers, actors, doctors, 
teachers, students, etc. The notion is that these people were not sup­
posed to be racially profiled. In other words, in each case, the police 
officer should have known that he was profiling a "good" (nonstereo­
typical) person of color. To a considerable extent, this racial mistake is 
what the public discourse against racial profiling, including the 
ACLU's campaign, focuses on. This focus does not fundamentally 
change our norms about race and policing. Indeed, on some level, it 
confirms if not entrenches our racial suspicions about crime and 
criminality. 
II. RACE AND THE "FREE TO LEA VE" TEST 
When a white man faces a black man, especially if the black man is help­
less, terrible things are revealed. 
James Baldwin126 
A. Introduction 
The "free to leave" test - the test the Supreme
. 
Court applies to 
determine whether a particular police activity is a seizure of the per­
son that implicates the Fourth Amendment - constitutes a specific 
doctrinal site within which the construction of race exploits and exac­
erbates existing racial inequalities. Two cases in particular bear this 
out: Florida v. Bostick and INS v. Delgado. While there is some dis­
cussion of Bostick in the race and Fourth Amendment literature, 
Delgado is virtually ignored. Moreover, to the extent that scholars en­
gage either of these cases, they pay almost no attention to the race­
constructing ideologies that underlie them. The dominant way of un­
derstanding Bostick, for example, is that it constitutes an instance in 
126. JAMES BALDWIN, The Five Next Time, in THE PRICE OF THE TICKET 333, 355 
(1985). 
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which the Supreme Court ignores race.127 While not entirely inaccu­
rate, this understanding obscures the racial productivity of Bostick -
that is, the Court's construction and reification of race in that case. 
Re-reading Bostick and Delgado as cases that are actively engaged in 
constructing race helps to make the point that colorblindness is not in 
fact race neutral, but instead reflects a particular racial preference that 
systematically burdens nonwhites.128 Exposing this preference in the 
Fourth Amendment context provides a richer description of the racial 
costs of, and a normative basis to re-shape, current Fourth Amend­
ment doctrine. 
B.  A Racial Re-Reading o/Florida v.  Bostick 
1. The Racial Facts 
In Bostick, two armed Broward County Sheriff officers wearing 
bright green "raid" jackets boarded a Greyhound bus at Fort 
Lauderdale. The bus had made a temporary stop on its way from 
Miami to Atlanta. When the officers entered the bus, the bus driver 
exited, closing the door behind him. Without suspecting any individual 
passenger of wrongdoing, the officers approached Terrance Bostick, 
who was asleep in the back of the bus. One of the officers asked to see 
Bostick's ticket and a piece of identification. Bostick obliged, provid­
ing the officer with a Florida driver's license and a ticket stub, both of 
which the officer returned to Bostick. The officers then explained that 
they were narcotics agents and asked for Bostick's permission to 
search his luggage.129 Upon searching Bostick's luggage the officers 
found approximately one pound of cocaine, and they arrested him. 
Subsequently, Bostick was charged with trafficking in narcotics, and 
he pleaded no contest. 
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor "refrain[ed] from deciding 
whether or not a seizure occurred in this case." She maintained, how­
ever, that the facts left "some doubt" that Bostick was seized. In other 
words, she implicitly suggested that the encounter was consensual; that 
at all times, Bostick was free to leave. Central to her analysis is the no­
tion that an individual's interaction with the police does not become a 
127. See Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistc Ignorance, and 
the Myth of Colorless Individualism in Florida v. Bostick, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979, 2028-30 
(1993); Maclin, supra note 92, at 338-39; Magee, supra note 92, at 178-79. 
128. Certainly this point has been made with respect to Fourteenth Amendment law. 
See, e.g. , Harris, supra note 109, at 1773 (describing the submersion of racial differences in 
the Supreme Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence as an "approach [that] renders inco­
herent any alternative vision of racial justice and re-legitimates the existing social order in 
which myriad forms of racial inequality are legal and white privilege is simply there"). 
129. There is conflict as to whether the officer informed Bostick that he had the right to 
refuse consent to the search, and whether Bostick exercised that right. Both of these issues 
were resolved in favor of the state. 
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seizure simply because the officer asks that individual a few questions, 
requests that the individual produce identification, or seeks permission 
to search the individual's personal effects. "[A]s long as the police do 
not convey a message that compliance with their request is re­
quired,"'30 a seizure has not occurred. Justice O'Connor's opinion in­
vites the conclusion that neither the officers' communication nor their 
conduct toward Bostick conveyed a message of compulsory compli­
ance. 
Fourth Amendment scholars typically advance two arguments to 
challenge Justice O'Connor's approach. One claim is that "[f]or all 
practical purposes, the Court's test [for whether a seizure has oc­
curred] erases the inherently coercive nature of all police encoun­
ters. "131 That is, the Court fails to consider the extent to which police 
encounters always reflect a show of authority. The second claim is that 
Justice O'Connor ignores race or, more particularly, the racial nature 
of police/citizen encounters. While both claims challenge the approach 
the Court takes in Bostick, I focus on the latter. It provides an impor­
tant opportunity to discuss racial ideology and to re-articulate the ra­
cial problem of Bostick as deriving from the Court's construction of 
race through the racial lens of colorblindness. The ideological archi­
tecture of this racial construction obscures two significant racial dy­
namics: (1) the relationship between race and vulnerability to police 
encounters; and (2) the ways in which race mediates how people re­
spond to such encounters. Discussing the Court's obfuscation of these 
dynamics in terms of racial construction, which heretofore has not 
been done, provides another way to deconstruct - expose and dele­
gitimize - the racial structure of current Fourth Amendment law.132 
This delegitimization and deconstruction clears the jurisprudential 
ground for the construction of alternative doctrinal approaches.133 
2. Racial Vulnerability to Police Encounters 
a. The Initial Decision to Stop. Assume that a drug enforcement of­
ficer, as in Bostick, has been instructed to investigate a particular 
neighborhood for drug trafficking. This neighborhood is somewhat ra-
130. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991). 
131. See DA YID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 20 (1999). 
132. Cf Jones, supra note 55, at 445 (noting that the "primary imperative [of Critical 
Race Theory] is to reveal how race is being used against us while hidden in some neutral­
looking guise") (emphasis in the original). 
133. Part of the project of deconstruction is to demonstrate that a given text is "vulner­
able" to multiple interpretations, and that a dominant interpretation acquires legitimacy by 
obscuring its own contingency and subordinating competing interpretations. These ideas are 
captured by Jacques Derrida's notion of "difference." See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN 
LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 231 (1995). 
March 2002] ( E)Racing The Fourth Amendment 977 
cially integrated - 50% white, 20% black, 20% Latino, 10% Asian 
American. As the officer walks through the neighborhood, he ob­
serves two groups of men, one white, the other black, walking in oppo­
site directions. Although the officer has no objective reason to believe 
that either group has done anything wrong, he would like, but is not 
able, to stop both groups of men. Given racial stereotypes as to the 
color of crime, the officer will likely stop the group of black men. In 
the absence of other information, the officer's racial default position is 
likely to reflect the belief that, as between the two groups, there is a 
greater likelihood that the group of black men is involved in crime. In 
this sense, the black group is more vulnerable to police encounters 
than the white group.134 
As a result of this racial vulnerability, a black man, over the course 
of his lifetime, is likely to have several encounters with the police. 
During these encounters, the police may ask him to produce identifi­
cation, to justify his presence at a particular location, to explain where 
he is traveling to and from, and to answer questions about whether he 
uses, distributes, or manufactures drugs. They may well ask him for 
permission to search his personal belongings. To the extent that these 
inquiries reside outside of the reach of the Fourth Amendment, police 
officers have virtually unbridled discretion in deciding which individu­
als to engage in this way. In the context of my hypothetical, for exam­
ple, the Fourth Amendment, as it is presently interpreted, does not 
require the police officer to explain the basis upon which he decided 
to question the group of black men.135 
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Bostick legitimizes and simultane­
ously obscures this social reality. The officers in Bostick were not con­
stitutionally required to explain why they selected Bostick, who was 
seated at the back of the bus, for questioning. Nowhere in Justice 
O'Connor's opinion does she entertain the possibility that Bostick 
may have been targeted because he is black. In fact, Justice O'Connor 
does not even mention Bostick's race. Nor does she mention the race 
of the officers. In this sense, an argument can be made that Justice 
O'Connor's analysis ignores race. This argument, however, is only par-
134. In at least two ways, an argument can be made that this outcome is rational: (1) the 
officer is acting on information he honestly believes to be accurate; and (2) the officer's as­
sumptions as to the link between race and crime are empirically accurate. To the extent that 
this Article is concerned with identifying the racial costs of Fourth Amendment law for peo­
ple of color (i.e., is victim perspective-centered), the issue as to whether the officer's conduct 
can be deemed rational (which reflects the perpetrator perspective) need not be resolved. 
Still, it is important to point out that there is a literature challenging the "rational racism" -
that is, the notion that there is an empirical basis for assumptions about the relationship be­
tween race and crime. See generally RUSSELL, supra note 80; COLE, supra note 131, Armour, 
supra note 12. 
135. Moreover, even to the extent that the encounter triggers the Fourth Amendment 
and is considered a "stop" - that is, a seizure that falls short of an actual arrest - "articula­
ble suspicion" is sufficient to justify it. 
978 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:946 
tially correct. That is, while it is fair to say that Justice O'Connor's 
analysis ignores the fact that Bostick is black and the officers are 
white, it is more accurate to say that her analysis constructs Bostick 
and the officers with the racial ideology of colorblindness. In other 
words, the problem is not that Justice O'Connor does not see race, but 
rather that she sees race in a particular way. Her decision to see 
Bostick as a man and not as a black man does not ignore race; it con­
structs race. 
Perhaps it would be helpful to comment more generally on the no­
tion of race as a social construction. Informing this claim is the idea 
that race does not exist at all antecedently of its invention in culture. 
Put differently, race does not exist outside of, but is instead the effect 
of, discourses (in, for example, law, science, and politics ). 136 These dis­
courses delineate race as though it were a preexisting fact, ontologi­
cally prior to language. As a result, race becomes socially salient, and a 
particular race consciousness emerges: namely, that race is real and 
that everyone has one. Under this race consciousness, which tran­
scends ideological orientation, the question is not whether we want 
race but rather what we want race to mean. That this is the point of 
departure for much of our contemporary discussions about race signi­
fies the extent to which race is reified. The racial productivity of 
Fourth Amendment law builds upon the existing consensus that race is 
real. Fundamental to the Supreme Court's racial productivity is the 
notion that race is already "out there"; the project is thus to determine 
what race is. 
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Bostick engages in this project. This 
might not be immediately apparent, however, because, in the Fourth 
Amendment context, Justice O'Connor is not required to articulate 
explicitly her normative commitments about race. But consider her 
representation of (1) Bostick as a man sitting in the back of a bus,13 7 
and (2) the police as two officers who asked a man in the back of a bus 
a few questions.138 Keep in mind that these representations exist in a 
social, legal, and political context within which race is perceived to be 
real and everyone is presumed to have one. In this sense, race is not 
absent from Justice O'Connor's representation of Bostick and the po­
lice officers; it is obscured. Nor is race ignored; it is given a particular 
content. In other words, notwithstanding the textual invisibility of 
Bostick's blackness and the police officers' whiteness in the opinion, 
both are materially present. Presumably, Justice O'Connor would not 
say, for example, that the reason she did not mention Bostick's race in 
136. Cf. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE 
HUMAN SCIENCE (1970). 
137. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991). 
138. Id. at 437. 
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writing her opinion is because Bostick is not in fact black or because 
Bostick does not in fact have a race. Nor, presumably, would she offer 
similar explanations to account for the absence of the police officers' 
race in the text. The reason whiteness and blackness are not explicitly 
signified in Bostick, the reason Justice O'Connor writes them out of 
the opinion, has to do with the colorblind social meaning that she at­
tributes to race - namely, that it does not matter. That is, Bostick's 
race and the race of the police officers are irrelevant. 
Unpacking this social meaning is important. Doing so helps to 
challenge the narrow way in which race consciousness is understood. 
Typically, we attribute race consciousness to actions or claims that 
make explicit use of race. The notion is that to the extent that a person 
is racially conscious, she is not ignoring race. Under this view, had 
Justice O'Connor described Bostick as a black man sitting in the back 
of the bus, her opinion would have been racially conscious. The ab­
sence of this racial description suggests that she is ignoring race. The 
problem with this argument is that it fails to consider the race con­
sciousness of identity significations that are not explicitly racialized. 
Describing Bostick as black is no more racially conscious than de­
scribing him as a man. Both descriptions send a particular message 
about race. In the former, that race is relevant. In the latter, that it is 
not. In both instances, attention is being paid to race. Neither descrip­
tion is race neutral. 
One way to make more apparent the racial construction or the race 
consciousness (that race is irrelevant) of identity representations that 
do not explicitly reference race is to imagine the following scenario: a 
crime has been committed and the victim believes that the perpetrator 
is black. The victim provides this racial information to the police along 
with other descriptions of the perpetrator (height, weight, clothing, 
etc.). Stipulate that a police officer stops Bostick, searches him and 
finds incriminating evidence. Bostick moves to suppress the evidence 
on the ground that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him.139 
If Justice O'Connor were adjudicating the constitutionality of the 
officer's conduct (asking herself whether the officer had probable 
cause to believe that Bostick had committed the crime), presumably 
she would explicitly invoke race. That is, in providing an indication as 
to the events leading up to, and the nature of, the encounter between 
Bostick and the police officer, she would somewhere mention the fact 
that Bostick is black. 
The question is: Why would Justice O'Connor reference Bostick's 
race in an opinion based on my hypothetical but not in the actual case 
of Bostick? The answer relates to the notion that, whereas race is rele-
139. Assume that the "stop" was the functional equivalent of an arrest and that the gov­
ernment's argument as to the legitimacy of the police conduct rests on a search-incident-to­
arrest theory. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
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vant in my hypothetical - it is part of a racial description - in the 
context of the Bostick opinion it is not.140 Of course, this claim can be 
challenged. With respect to my hypothetical, for example, an argu­
ment can be made that race should be irrelevant because race poorly 
captures an individual's description.141 It would be more accurate, 
more relevant, for the police officer to act on information with respect 
to skin tone, hair texture, and facial features. My aim here, however, is 
not to decide the question of whether race should be relevant in the 
context of suspect descriptions. I employ the hypothetical and juxta­
pose it against Bostick to advance the following three claims: (1) we 
explicitly invoke race when we perceive that race is relevant; (2) we 
choose not to explicitly invoke race when we perceive that race is not 
(or should not be) relevant; and (3) determinations as to the relevance 
of race socially construct race. 
This is not to say that racial determinations will always be explicit. 
Indeed in Bostick, the determination that race is (or the construction 
of race as) irrelevant is implicit. Consider again Justice O'Connor's 
decision to describe Bostick and the police officers without reference 
to their race. This description is not simply, and could never simply be, 
an "objective" representation of Bostick and the officers as they exist 
"out there" in the "real world." Instead, Bostick and the police offi­
cers are necessarily the ideological effect of Justice O'Connor's color­
blind representation.142 Her text bring them into being.143 Their color­
blind presence in her opinion forwards the notion that race does not 
(or, at least in the context of Bostick, should not) matter. 
That Justice O'Connor is of the view that, by and large, race does 
not and should not matter is clear from her race jurisprudence in the 
Fourteenth Amendment context. According to Justice O'Connor, 
"[r]acial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our 
society. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of 
our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their 
skin."144 For Justice O'Connor, " 'the individual is important, not his 
race, his creed, or his color.' "145 This normative commitment about 
race, although articulated in a different doctrinal context, helps to ex-
140. For a thoughtful discussion of the extent to which police employment of race-based 
suspect descriptions are subject to virtually no criticism, see Bank, supra note 81. 
141. Id. 
142. Cf MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 129 (1992) (observing that 
the "formal norm of legal neutrality . . .  conceals the ways in which legal rules participate in 
the construction of [identity differences]"). 
143. See JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 158 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
trans., 1977) (observing that "(t)here is nothing outside of the text"). 
144. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993). 
145. Id. at 648 (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66 (1964) (Douglas, J . ,  dis­
senting)). 
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plain Justice O'Connor's construction of Bostick and the police offi­
cers. From Justice O'Connor's perspective, textually referencing their 
respective racial identities would entrench existing negative racial im­
pressions of - that is, stigmatize - both. The thinking might be that, 
because of stereotypes, the starting point for conceptualizing an inter­
action between a black man and a white police officer might be that 
the former is a criminal and the latter a racist.146 To disrupt these social 
meanings, and to prevent the attribution of them to Bostick and the 
police officers, Justice O'Connor constructs these parties as "individu­
als." 
Again, precisely because Justice O'Connor does not explicitly dis­
cuss race in Bostick, one cannot say definitively that she constructed 
Bostick and the police officers to disrupt particular social meanings 
about race. But uncovering Justice O'Connor's actual intent here is 
considerably less important than uncovering the ideological racial 
work her opinion performs. Whether Justice O'Connor in fact intends 
to connect the conception of race she articulates in the Fourteenth 
Amendment context with her treatment of race in Bostick, the link is 
there. In the Fourteenth Amendment arena, O'Conn·or expresses a 
commitment to individualism - not race.147 In the Fourth Amend­
ment context, that commitment is realized in her individualistic con­
struction of Bostick and the police officers - that is, her representa­
tion of them without explicit racial reference. This representation 
places Bostick and the police officers in a social context without racial 
motivation, negative racial meanings, or racial history. This social con­
text may be normatively appealing, but it is not the social context 
within which Bostick and the officers were situated. 
Justice O'Connor's commitment to individualism (not race) ob­
scures the fact that individualism as an ideological concept is itself ra­
cializing and thus race-constructing. To appreciate how, assume that 
Justice O'Connor's construction of Bostick and the police officers as 
146. It is unlikely that the person who perceives the police to be racist in such a context 
would perceive the black man to be criminal. To the extent that the black man is perceived 
to be criminal, likely the police officer will be perceived to be a "good" cop. And to the ex­
tent that the police officer is perceived to be a racist, likely the black man will be perceived 
as an actual or potential racial victim of police abuse. 
147. Cheryl Harris argues that the Supreme Court's commitment to individualism en­
trenches inequalities among racial groups. See Harris, supra note 109, at 1765 ("[T)he asser­
tion of colorblindness as [an) equal protection mandate rests upon the contention that the 
races are formally and legally equal . . . .  Indeed, adherents of this view argue that the Con­
stitution commands that the law not see these groups; the law must see only (raceless) indi­
viduals."); see also Burke Marshall, In Honor of Brown v. Board of Education: A Comment 
on the Nondiscrimination Principle in a "Nation of Minorities, " 93 YALE L.J. 1006, 1007 
(1984) (arguing that a focus on the individual in the Fourteenth Amendment context is mis­
placed because "[t]he equal protection clause is not primarily concerned with the protection 
of individuals against invidious discrimination. On the contrary, it cannot sensibly be inter­
preted in any other way than . . .  in terms of its protection of groups, and of individuals only 
by reason of their membership in groups"). 
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individuals without races disrupts both the social meaning of Bostick 
as a criminal and the social meaning of the police as racist cops. This 
disruption does not eliminate race; Bostick remains black and the po­
lice officers remain white. The disruption merely re-defines what 
blackness vis-a-vis Bostick and whiteness vis-a-vis the police officers 
signify. Under this redefinition, Bostick becomes a black man without 
the presumption of criminality and the police become white officers 
without the presumption of a racist identity. In the abstract, both dis­
ruptions might make sense. But in the context of Bostick, they obscure 
that Bostick may have held and acted on a racial presumption that the 
police officers were racists and the police may have held and acted on 
a racial presumption that Bostick was a criminal. 
b. The Nature of the Interaction After the Stop. Modify the hypo­
thetical with which this Section begins. Recall that the police officer 
observes two groups of men - one white, one black; that he has no 
objective reason to believe that either group has done anything wrong; 
and that he nevertheless would like to stop and question both groups. 
Assume now that the police officer is able to approach both groups of 
men and in fact does so. The racial vulnerability problem does not dis­
appear. There is likely to be a racial asymmetry with respect to how 
the officer comports himself during each encounter. This asymmetry 
remains because blackness and whiteness are differentially communi­
cative and evidentiary. That is, the officer may still hold stereotypes 
that blacks are more likely to engage in criminal conduct than whites. 
This stereotype will inform how the officer "screens" each group -
that is, ascertains whether his hunch regarding their respective crimi­
nality is more than a hunch. Because of stereotypes, the officer's inter­
action with the black group may be shaped by a conscious or uncon­
scious racial investment in confirming his suspicions as to the group's 
criminality. His interaction with the white group is less likely to be ra­
cially invested in that way. Instead, the officer's interface with the 
white group is likely to reflect a desire on the part of the officer either 
to dispel his suspicions of the group or simply to "check things out." 
Consequently, the black group is likely to be subjected to more ex­
tended and probing screening than the white group. The officer will 
need more time with and more information from the former. Other 
things being equal, the officer will likely ask the white group fewer 
questions and his temperament is likely to be less hostile.148 
Bostick captures none of the foregoing racial dynamic. In two sig­
nificant respects, the perpetrator perspective helps to explain why. 
First, implicit in Justice O'Connor's opinion is the notion that the offi-
148. The point is not to suggest that every white/black, police/citizen encounter will re­
flect the foregoing dynamics. The point instead is that, given what we know about the link 
between racial stereotypes and overpolicing, there is reason to think that the set of asymme­
tries I have described likely will obtain in a good number of cases. 
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cers did not intend to seize Bostick. They simply "walked up to 
Bostick . . .  asked him a few questions, and asked if they could search 
his bags."149 Second, her suggestion that Bostick was not seized is 
based in part on the fact that at no point during the encounter "did the 
officers threaten Bostick with a gun."150 While "one officer carried a 
zipper pouch containing a pistol . . .  the gun was [n]ever removed from 
its pouch, pointed at Bostick, or otherwise used in a threatening man­
ner. "151 Because Justice O'Connor looks for, but does not find, evi­
dence of police overreaching, or any indication that the officers har­
bored hostility towards Bostick, she implicitly suggests that the 
encounter was consensual. Thus, even to the extent that Bostick felt 
seized - that is to say, he did not feel free to leave or to ignore the of­
ficers' questions - the officers are not to be blamed. They did nothing 
wrong. Their investigation was routine. Therefore, the Fourth 
Amendment is not implicated. 
It makes sense that Justice O'Connor would begin her analysis of 
the free-to-leave test by examining the officers' conduct.152 For one 
thing, the Fourth Amendment is not triggered in the absence of gov­
ernmental action.153 For another, there is little doubt that a seizure oc­
curs when an officer's conduct towards a suspect is overtly coercive or 
violent. If the officers had approached Bostick with their guns drawn 
or if at any time during the encounter they had physically restrained 
him, presumably Justice O'Connor would have concluded that Bostick 
was seized.154 
149. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.429, 437 (1991). 
150. Id. at 432. 
151. Id. 
152. After reciting the facts, Justice O'Connor focuses on "[t]wo facts [that she per­
ceives to be] particularly worth noting. First, the police specifically advised Bostick that he 
had the right to refuse consent . . . .  Second, at no time did the officers threaten Bostick with 
a gun." Id. Her focus on these facts privileges what the officer did and said over how a per­
son in Bostick's position might have responded to either. 
153. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921): 
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as 
shown in the previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and his­
tory clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, 
and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies. 
154. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980): 
Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not at­
tempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a 
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of lan­
guage or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be com­
pelled. 
The Supreme Court's "oft-repeated" definition of what constitutes a seizure of a person 
within the Fourth Amendment context is the "meaningful interference, however brief, with 
an individual's freedom of movement." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 n.5 
(1984); see also Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) (finding seizure in the use of a 
police roadblock to stop the high-speed flight of a car thief); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 
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The absence of overtly coercive police tactics, however, should not 
end the seizure analysis. To the extent that courts employ the officer's 
conduct to ascertain whether an individual was seized, they should ex­
amine this conduct from "the victim's perspective." By the victim's 
perspective, I do not mean an inquiry into the perspective of the per­
son who actually experienced the encounter. Such an approach would 
reduce the free-to-leave test to whether that individual claims she did 
not feel free to leave. By the victim's perspective I mean a framework 
under which courts actually (and not merely purport to) analyze the 
seizure question from the perspective of a person in the defendant's 
position, "taking into account all the circumstances surrounding the 
encounter."155 
But what factors should courts take into account when employing 
this framework? In other words, how particularized or contextual 
should the seizure inquiry be? In the context of Bostick, for example, 
should the seizure analysis take into account the fact that Bostick was 
on a bus? Does that fact help to support an argument that Bostick was 
seized? Certainly Bostick advanced this argument - that his presence 
on the bus rendered the police interaction more coercive than it would 
have been had the encounter transpired on the street. Although, as I 
explain more fully below, Justice O'Connor does not treat this argu­
ment as seriously as she might have, she does at least engage it. She 
acknowledges that Bostick's presence on the bus is one of "the cir­
cumstances surrounding the encounter."156 But she deems this fact, 
standing alone, insufficient to establish a seizure. According to Justice 
O'Connor, Bostick's status as a passenger is relevant to, but not dis­
positive of, whether he was seized.157 
The more fundamental problem with Justice O'Connor's analysis 
is that it does not explicitly engage race. Throughout her opinion, race 
remains unspeakable.158 A more careful analysis would, at the very 
(holding that a seizure occurs when a police officer accosts a person and restrains that per­
son's ability to walk away). The Terry Court, finding that a seizure had occurred, added the 
caveat that "not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' 
of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in 
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen niay we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16; cf Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (finding no seizure 
had occurred when a marked patrol car accelerated to catch up with an individual and then 
drove alongside the individual for a short distance). 
155. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (emphasis added) ("We conclude that a person has 
been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the cir­
cumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was 
not free to leave."). 
156. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437. 
157. Id. at 439-40. 
158. Cf id. at 441 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The basis of the decision to single out 
particular passengers during a suspicion!ess sweep is less likely to be inarticulable than un­
speakable."). 
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least, have racialized Bostick's interaction with the officers. Certainly 
there is Fourth Amendment precedent for doing so.159 In this sense, 
even Justice Marshall's dissent, which provides a detailed account "of 
the elements of coercion associated with a typical bus sweep,"1(i() is in­
sufficiently particular. Part of the circumstances of the encounter was 
race - more particularly, Bostick's race and the race of the police of­
ficers. The interaction of black male identity with white male police 
authority creates a physically confining social situation every bit as 
real as (and operating independently from) being on a bus. Most, if 
not all, black people - especially black men - are apprehensive 
about police encounters. They grow up with racial stories of police 
abuse - witnessing them as public spectacles in the media, observing 
them firsthand in their communities, and experiencing them as daily 
realities. Put another way, race-based policing is part of black people's 
collective consciousness. Thus, when black people encounter the po­
lice, " [t]hey don't know whether justice will be meted out or whether 
judge, jury and executioner is pulling up behind them."161 Yet, Justice 
O'Connor situates her seizure analysis outside of this racial reality. 
She removes Bostick and the police officers from a social context in 
which race is material to a discursive, socially constructed world in 
which it is not. At no time does Justice O'Connor consider how 
Bostick, or a man in his racial position, might have experienced two 
white police officers crowded around him on a bus. She race neutral­
izes the encounter. Bostick's race, the race of the officers, and the rela­
tionship between the two receive no textual engagement in her analy­
sis. Thus, her opinion fails to consider that Bostick may have been the 
target of a particular racial preference.162 
Perhaps Justice O'Connor does not discuss the racial dimensions 
of the encounter for the same reason that she discounts the coercive 
aspects of police encounters on buses. With respect to the latter, she 
159. See Mendenhall, 446 U .S. at 558 (suggesting that race is a relevant factor in making 
a determination as to whether an individual has been seized). 
160. Id. at 446 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In recounting the details of the encounter 
Marshall notes that the officers who boarded the bus made an "intimidating 'show of 
authority' " by displaying their badges and wearing "bright, green 'raid' jackets," with one 
officer visibly carrying a firearm. Id. Marshall recounts that "[o]ne officer stood in front of 
respondent's seat, partially blocking the narrow aisle through which respondent would have 
been required to pass to reach the exit of the bus." Id. Marshall notes that, from the record, 
the officers at no point advised Bostick that he was free to end the "interview." Id. Although 
Marshall raises the issue of race in a footnote, see id. at 441 n.l, the ways in which race might 
have affected the particular encounter he describes is notably absent from his dissent. 
161. ROBERT L. JOHNSON & DR. STEVEN SIMRING, THE RACE TRAP: SMART 
STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE RACIAL COMMUNICATION IN BUSINESS AND IN LIFE 127 
(2002). 
162. Cf Paul Butler, Affirmative Action and Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 841 
(1997) (suggesting six proposals for affirmative action in the criminal process to address the 
extent to which blacks are particularly vulnerable to police investigation and incarceration). 
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argued that, to the extent that "Bostick's movements were 'con­
fined' . . .  this was the natural result of his decision to take the bus; it 
says nothing about whether or not the police conduct at issue was co­
ercive. "163 In other words, "Bostick's freedom of movement was re­
stricted by a factor independent of police conduct - i.e. , by his being a 
passenger on a bus."164 Given this fact, Justice O'Connor's test for 
whether Bostick was seized is not whether a person in his position 
would have felt free to leave, but rather whether that person would 
have felt free to terminate the encounter. The Court's analysis reflects 
the idea that because Bostick chose to board the Greyhound bus, and 
because the police had nothing to do with that decision,165 it is consti­
tutionally permissible for the officers to exploit Bostick's vulnerability 
as a bus passenger.166 
A similar argument about police culpability - or the lack thereof 
- can be made more broadly with respect to race and racial vulner­
ability. The argument would be that to the extent that Bostick's en­
counter with the officers reflects a degree of coercion that derived 
from the black/white racial interaction between Bostick's race and the 
race of the officers, that coercion existed apart from the conduct of the 
officers. " [I]t says nothing about whether or not [their] conduct . . .  
was coercive."167 The police officers did not make Bostick black. They 
found him that way.168 Nor did they make themselves white. Finally, 
neither officer is to be blamed for black people's general distrust of 
and apprehensions about the police. They have a right simply to do 
their jobs without being burdened by contemporary racial realities. 
Finally, to the extent that police officers, like the officers in Bostick, 
merely exploit or take advantage of (racial) circumstances they did not 
themselves create, no Fourth Amendment problem exists. 
Again, because Justice O'Connor does not explicitly engage race in 
Bostick, one might reasonably raise the question of whether she would 
embrace the perpetrator conception of race I attribute to her. One 
way to answer that question is to turn once more to the Fourteenth 
Amendment context - and more particularly, to Justice O'Connor's 
163. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436. 
164. Id. 
165. COLE, supra note 131, at 19. 
166. To the extent that these encounters do not trigger the Fourth Amendment, the in­
centives are for police officers to exploit our vulnerabilities as passengers on public transpor­
tation. See id. at 19-20 (observing that "[t]he consequence of Florida v. Bostick is that police 
are free to engage in dragnet-like searches of buses and trains, in settings where it is ex­
tremely difficult for any citizen to refuse to cooperate"). 
167. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436. 
168. Cf COLE, supra note 131, at 19 (suggesting that the Bostick Court discounts the 
coercive nature of bus encounters in part because "[t]he police officer did not make him 
[Bostick] get on the bus. They merely found him there"). 
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affirmative action jurisprudence. Consider, for example, City of 
Richmond v. J.A.  Croson.169 In that case, the Supreme Court adjudi­
cated the constitutionality of an affirmative action plan that required 
the building companies to whom the city awarded contracts to "set 
aside" 30% of their subcontracts for "Minority Business Enter­
prises."170 Speaking for the Court, Justice O'Connor invalidated the 
plan. Central to her opinion is the idea that to the extent an asymme­
try exists between black and white access to contracting opportunities 
within the City of Richmond, current white subcontractors are not 
culpable.171 They did not cause that asymmetry. They are not respon­
sible for contemporary "societal discrimination,"172 nor should they be 
held racially liable for historical discrimination. They are racially "in­
nocent," and they have "personal rights."173 They should not be made 
to suffer - via affirmative action - because of social problems they 
did not themselves create.174 They should be able to exploit the racial 
circumstances in which they find themselves. 175 This is one way to 
characterize Justice O'Connor's approach to race in the affirmative 
action context, and this characterization is consistent with the perpe­
trator-centered conception of race Bostick reflects. 
Thus far, my aim has been to deconstruct Bostick's racial produc­
tivity to provide a more sophisticated understanding of the case: 
namely, that Bostick constructs (and not simply ignores) race to mask 
169. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
170. /d. at 477. 
171. Id. at 505-06. 
172. Id. at 503. 
173. Id. at 493. 
174. Id. at 505-06 ("The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is 
irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting 
preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs."). The idea of white 
racial victims of affirmative action is perhaps most apparent in the context of cases litigating 
the constitutionality of university admissions programs. See Regents of University of 
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (noting that "there is a measure of inequity in 
forcing innocent persons in respondent's position to bear the burdens of redressing griev­
ances not of their making"); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934-35 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(" 'Racial preferences appear to "even the score" . . .  only if one embraces the proposition 
that our society is appropriately viewed as divided into races, making it right that an injustice 
rendered in the past to a black man should be compensated for by discriminating against a 
white.' " (citation omitted)). 
175. According to Justice O'Connor: 
While there is no doubt that the sorry history of both private and public discrimination in 
this country has contributed to a lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs, this observa­
tion standing alone, cannot justify a rigid racial quota in the awarding of public contracts in 
Richmond, Virginia. Like the claim that discrimination in primary and secondary schooling 
justifies a rigid racial preference in medical school admissions, an amorphous claim that 
there has been past discrimination in a particular industry cannot justify the use of an un­
yielding racial quota. 
Croson, 488 U.S. at 499. 
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(and not simply avoid) particular racial dynamics. This deconstruction 
both clears the ground for, and provides a normative foundation to 
support, alternative doctrinal approaches. Before outlining what those 
approaches might be, the next section offers a similar critique of INS 
v. Delgado.176 
To some extent, the racial productivity of Delgado is more appar­
ent than the racial productivity of Bostick. Yet, Delgado is virtually ig­
nored in the race and Fourth Amendment literature, and does not 
even appear - except as a note - in many criminal procedure case­
books.177 The marginalization of Delgado in Fourth Amendment dis­
course is particularly troubling given the jurisprudential space 
Delgado occupies in Bostick. As several Fourth Amendment scholars 
have observed, prior to Bostick, the test for a seizure had been 
whether a person felt free to leave the police encounter.178 Typically, 
this claim is advanced to suggest that the "otherwise terminate the en­
counter" language the Bostick Court employs to downplay the fact 
that Bostick was on a bus reflects something of a doctrinal leap. In a 
formal sense, this argument is right. That is, in Bostick, the Court does 
indeed explicitly modify the seizure inquiry. In a substantive sense, 
however, Bostick's seizure analysis was not entirely new. On the con­
trary, it is consistent with and buttressed by the seizure analysis in 
Delgado. In other words, Delgado's seizure analysis, like Bostick's, re­
flects the perpetrator perspective. 
Given the doctrinal connection between Delgado and Bostick, the 
failure of scholars meaningfully to engage the former is surprising. 
Engaging Delgado helps to elucidate Bostick not only in terms of the 
doctrine the Court articulates, but also in terms of the racial construe-
176. Part of the aim is to multiracialize our understanding of Fourth Amendment law. 
The point is not that Bostick affects blacks and INS v. Delgado affects Latinas/os. While 
non-Latina/o blacks are less likely than Latinas/os and Asian Americans to experience the 
specific encounter Delgado presents, non-Latina/o and Black Latinas/os across ethnicities 
are also vulnerable to INS surveys. For a discussion of black identity formation in the con­
text of Latinas/os' culture and politics, see Tanya K. Hernandez, An Exploration of the Effi­
cacy of Class-Based Approaches to Racial Justice: The Cuban Context, 33 U.C. DA VIS L. 
REV. 1135, 1 167-71 (2000) (arguing that the suppression of Afro-Latina/o identity within the 
Latina/o community itself might be one obstacle in the fight against Latinas/os' subordina­
tion within the U.S.). See also TAINO REVIVAL: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUERTO 
RICAN IDENTITY AND CULTURAL POLITICS 49 (Gabriel Haslip-Viera ed., 1999) (describing 
some Puerto Ricans' assertion of Taino ancestry in order to deny their African heritage); 
Devon W. Carbado, The Ties That Bind, 19 UCLA CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 283 (1998) 
(inquiring as to whether "the 'black' preceding 'Latino' signif[ies] some lesser claim to La­
tino identity (I've never heard a Latino referred to as a Brown Latino, though I have heard 
Latinas/os referred to as Brown-skinned)? Doesn't blackness here function as a qualifier, 
presupposing an identity that is 'just Latina/o?' "). Moreover, the racial reach of Bostick 
transcends black identity. My discussion of Delgado will help to illustrate why that is indeed 
the case. 
177. See JAMES B. HADDAD ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 426, 499 (5th ed. 1998); 
MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 99 (1998). 
178. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
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tion the Court performs.179 Moreover, to the extent that race and 
Fourth Amendment scholars ignore Delgado, they further entrench 
what some scholars refer to as the Black/White Paradigm180 - that is, 
an understanding of American racial dynamics in black and white 
terms.181 In the Fourth Amendment context, this entrenchment ob­
scures the particular ways in which the Supreme Court's seizure analy­
sis racially burdens Latinas/os. My discussion of Delgado, then, is in­
tended (1) to illustrate how Delgado facilitated the doctrinal move the 
Bostick Court performs, and (2) to suggest that Delgado's seizure 
analysis produces a conception of (or racially constructs) Latinas/os as 
Outsiders - that is, as people whose American identity "citizenship or 
permanent residency" must be demonstrated.182 Under the racial pro-
179. For a useful discussion of the extent to which the racial ideology of Delgado legiti­
mizes racial profiling, see Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race in Immigration En­
forcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675 (2000). 
180. Juan Perea refers to this tendency as the "Black/White binary paradigm." He de­
fines the paradigm as "the conception that race in America consists, either exclusively or 
primarily, of only two constituent racial groups, the Black and the White," and he asserts 
that Americans' shared understanding of race is essentially limited to this paradigm. Juan F. 
Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal" Science of American Racial 
Thought, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 127, 133 (1998). For further discussion of the Black/White Para­
digm, see Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian-American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race 
Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241 (1993) (criticizing the 
fact that most discussions of race and the law focus on African-Americans, to the exclusion 
of non-African American racial minorities); Chris K. Iijima, The Era of We-Construction: 
Reclaiming the Politics of Asian Pacific American Identity and Reflections on the Critique of 
the Black-White Paradigm, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 47 (1997) (arguing that decon­
struction of the Black/White Paradigm is necessary in order to create more sophisticated 
models, but that a focus must remain on the effects of white supremacy ideology); and 
Francisco Valdes, Theorizing 'Outcrit' Theories: Coalitional Method and Comparative Juris­
ptudential Experience - RaceCrits, QueerCrits, and LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1265 
(1999) (arguing that the Black/White Paradigm reproduces white domination and black sub­
ordination and erases all other minorities). 
181. Note that scholarship on the Black/White Paradigm is not entirely of one accord. 
See Devon W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming June 2002) 
(critiquing the problematic ways in which the Black/White Paradigm discourse has been 
framed); see also Janine Young Kim, Are Asians Black?: The Asian-American Civil Rights 
Agenda and the Contemporary Significance of the Black/White Paradigm, 108 YALE L.J. 2385 
(1999) (arguing that positioning all people of color as "black" within the paradigm does not 
necessarily require the elision of interethnic differences and of the varieties of racism expe­
rienced by each minority group). 
182. While the notion of an insider presupposes an outsider, it is important to point out 
that the insider/outsider dichotomy is not a mere binary relationship. Critical Race Theory 
has done much to account for the complicated matrix of insider/outsider status. See Angela 
P. Harris, Foreword: The Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 1 1  BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 207 
(1996) (discussing the contradictory nature of identity which is at once possessed and im­
posed); Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, Religion, Gender, Sexuality, Race and 
Class in Coalitional Theory: A Critical And Self-Critical Analysis of LatCrit Social Justice 
Agendas, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 503 (1998) (acknowledging differences in position­
ality within anti-subordination work); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory 
ancf. Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821 (1997) 
(explaining that a multirelational approach exposes the ways in which positions shift to align 
with dominant institutions, constantly toggling the power relations within and among social 
groups). A related point is that one can be an insider in one setting and an outsider in an-
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ductivity of Delgado, Latinas/os are presumed not to "belong." Be­
cause of this presumption, they are vulnerable to governmental in­
quiries as to whether they in fact "belong."183 These inquiries reside 
outside of the constitutional reach of the Fourth Amendment. 
C. A Racial Re-reading of INS v. Delgado 
1. The Racial Facts 
INS v. Delgado concerned the constitutionality of three so-called 
factory surveys - the INS practice of entering workplaces, with the 
employer's consent or with the authorization of a warrant, to question 
workers about their immigration status.184 These surveys were con­
ducted without individualized suspicion. That is, in none of the surveys 
did the INS have an articulable suspicion that any particular worker 
was undocumented.185 For two reasons, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that these surveys triggered the Fourth 
Amendment: (1) the surveys effectuated a seizure of the entire work­
place, and (2) the individuals whom the INS subjected to questioning 
as to their immigration status were seized.186 Writing for the Supreme 
Court, Justice Rehnquist disagreed on both counts. He began by re­
sponding to the claim that the INS survey effectively seized the entire 
workplace. Below I demonstrate how, via the perpetrator perspective, 
his response is doctrinally and normatively connected to Justice 
O'Connor's seizure analysis in Bostick. Then, I tum to Justice 
Rehnquist's argument that the individuals whom the INS questioned 
were not seized. I examine this claim to demonstrate Delgado's racial 
other. See Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
1467 (2000) (exploring the extent to which white gays and lesbians are insiders within the 
gay and lesbian movement and black heterosexuals are insiders within black civil rights 
movements). 
183. For an examination of how Latinos are automatically perceived to be foreigners in 
American society, see Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confudidos: De-Conflating Latinos/as' 
Race and Ethnicity, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 69, 150 (1998). Sandrino-Glasser argues 
that the homogenization of Latino identity has removed Latinos "from the sphere of the 
imagined American self identity, and into the arena of 'foreign Other.' " See also Robert S. 
Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National Imagination, 85 CAL. L. 
REV. 1395 (1997); Kevin R. Johnson, Fear of an "Alien Nation": Race, Immigration, and 
Immigrants, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 1 1 1  (1996); Kwei Yung Lee, supra note 119; Roman, 
supra note 1 19. 
184. For a discussion of the nature of these practices, see EDWIN HARWOOD, IN 
LIBERTY'S SHADOW: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT 101-09 
(1986). See also David K. Chan, INS Factory Raids as Nondetentive Seizures, 95 YALE L.J. 
767, 767-68 (1986); Mark Starr et al., Target: Illegal Aliens, NEWSWEEK, May 10, 1982, at 45 
(describing a Delgado-era INS operation dubbed "Project Jobs," a coordinated nationwide 
sweep of 275 companies that prompted criticism of the INS's "Gestapo-like tactics"). 
185. 466 U.S. 210, 212 (1984). 
186. Id. at 214. 
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productivity: its construction and reification of Latinas/as as presumed 
Outsiders. This demonstration will provide a more complete racial pic­
ture of current Fourth Amendment law as well as a basis to undermine 
its ideological foundation. 
2. The Workplace Was Not Seized: Delgado's Racial Relationship to 
Bostick 
Justice Rehnquist's holding that the entire workplace was not 
seized proceeds in three steps, the third of which Justice O'Connor 
draws heavily on in Bostick. He begins with the uncontroversial obser­
vation that all personal interactions with the police do not implicate 
the Fourth Amendment.187 Next, he suggests that law enforcement 
questioning of individuals does not, without more, constitute a sei­
zure.188 Finally, he states that the fact that such questioning occurs in 
the context of the workplace does not necessarily create a Fourth 
Amendment event. According to Justice Rehnquist, "[o]rdinarily, 
when people are at work their freedom to move about has been 
meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of law enforcement offi­
cials, but by the workers' voluntary obligations to their employers."189 
Thus, to the extent that the employees in Delgado did not feel free to 
leave the workplace, their workplace responsibilities, and not the INS, 
restricted their freedom of movement.190 
In Bostick, Justice O'Connor cites to and builds on this last argu­
ment. According to Justice O'Connor, "[l]ike the workers in 
[Delgado], Bostick's freedom of movement was restricted by a factor 
independent of police conduct - i.e. , by his being a passenger on a 
bus."191 Implicit in her argument is the notion that the bus is to Bostick 
what the workplace is to the employees in Delgado - a space that, 
with or without police presence, is confining. Her analysis replicates 
Delgado's conduct/context dichotomy. Specifically, she conceptualizes 
law enforcement conduct apart from the context in which it is being 
187. Id. at 215. 
188. Id. at 216. 
189. Id. at 218. 
190. Id. In its brief, the government advanced a similar argument: 
Preliminarily, we note that it is only in a theoretical sense that the work force here, or in any 
typical factory survey, can be characterized as having a "freedom to leave" that is restrained 
by the appearance of the INS. The factory surveys in this case were conducted entirely dur­
ing normal working hours. At such times the employees presumably were obligated to their 
employer to be present at their work stations performing their employment duties; accord­
ingly, quite apart from the appearance of the INS agents, the employees were not "free to 
leave" the factory in any real sense. 
Brief for Petitioners at 22-23, INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (No. 82-1271) (citations 
omitted). 
191. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991). 
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performed. Moreover, she analyzes social context (e.g., being on a 
bus) as though it were unaffected by the presence of law enforcement 
personnel. This conduct/context dichotomy connects Delgado to 
Bostick in two significant ways. 
First, the dichotomy obscures the agency law enforcement officials 
exercise to exploit people's sense of confinement (e.g., as bus passen­
gers and factory workers) and focuses on the agency people exercise 
to restrict their own freedom of movement (e.g., by working in facto­
ries and taking public transportation). Second, the conduct/context 
disaggregation enables both Courts to ignore not only how law en­
forcement presence alters the nature of a particular social context, but 
also how the context in which law enforcement officials act shapes 
how individuals interpret and experience these officials. For example, 
one of Justice O'Connor's central claims in Bostick is that "[t]here is 
no doubt that if this same encounter had taken place before Bostick 
boarded the bus or in the bus terminal, it would not have risen to the 
level of a seizure. "192 Reflecting the perpetrator perspective, her 
thinking seems to be that if the officers had engaged in precisely the 
same conduct in some place other than on a bus, few people would ar­
gue that that conduct effectuated a seizure of Bostick. 
From the victim perspective, this claim makes little sense; an en­
counter with a law enforcement officer on the street is not the same as 
an encounter with that same officer on a bus. In other words, Bostick's 
encounter with the police officers would not in fact have been the 
same had it occurred in a bus terminal. Moreover, the difference be­
tween these encounters is not simply the difference between a per­
son's sense of confinement, in the absence of police presence, on a bus 
and in a bus terminal. The difference is also a function of the extent to 
which police presence alters how a person experiences both settings. 
That is, a bus with law enforcement presence is different from, and 
more difficult to negotiate than, a bus without such presence. When, 
for example, the officers in Bostick entered the Greyhound bus, they 
transformed that already confining space into a more coercive envi­
ronment. With their presence, and from the perspective of a person in 
Bostick's position, the bus was no longer simply a bus. It became the 
site of a particular (and often racialized) government activity: a bus 
sweep. 
The workplace, too, becomes a different place, and a more difficult 
place to negotiate, with a law enforcement presence. When, for exam­
ple, the INS officials in Delgado entered the factory, the factory was 
no longer simply a factory. The presence of the INS transformed that 
1 92. Id. at 434 (emphasis added). 
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already confining workplace into a particular (and often racialized) 
governmental activity: an INS raid.193 
In sum, Delgado's conceptualization of law enforcement conduct 
as outside of the context in which people experience it is reproduced 
in Bostick. Thus, although Delgado employs the traditional test for a 
seizure (whether a person feels free to leave the encounter) and 
Bostick modifies it (whether a person feels free to leave or otherwise 
terminate the encounter), the two cases are, to some meaningful ex­
tent, analytically indistinct. The failure of race and Fourth Amend­
ment scholars to discuss Delgado makes Bostick appear to be more of 
jurisprudential leap than it is. 
3. The Individuals Whom the INS Questioned Were Not Seized: 
How Delgado Racially Burdens Latinas/os 
Discussing Delgado also presents an opportunity to challenge the 
seizure analysis outside of the black experience. 194 More particularly, 
Delgado demonstrates one of the ways in which Latinas/os are racially 
burdened by the Supreme Court's conception of what it means to be 
seized. This racial burden is a function of, and helps to reproduce, the 
notion of Latinas/os as Outsiders. The racial production of Latinas/os 
as Outsiders is apparent in Justice Rehnquist's argument that the indi­
viduals whom the INS questioned were not seized. 
Fundamental to Justice Rehnquist's conclusion (that the individu­
als whom the INS questioned were not seized) is the notion that "[t]he 
questioning of each respondent by INS agents seems to have been 
nothing more than a brief encounter." 195 In other words, "nothing 
more occurred than that a question was put to them."196 Specifically, 
the INS simply inquired as to the workers' place of origin - where 
193. It is also important to note that at urban work sites such as the facilities raided in 
Delgado, as opposed to farming or ranching operations, there is a greater likelihood that 
citizens and legal residents work alongside undocumented workers. See HARWOOD, supra 
note 184, at 98. 
194. Of course, this is not to say that the black experience is monolithic. Differences of 
class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, religion, and political commitment within the 
black community complicate the idea that a black community actually exists. See Regina 
Austin, "The Black Community, " Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1769 (1992) (characterizing a unified, identifiable "black community" as "more of 
an idea, or ideal, than a reality"); Dorothy E. Roberts, BlackCrit Theory and the Problem of 
Essentialism, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855, 862 (1999) ("Blacks are not consigned to a super­
imposed, pre-ordained, uniform, universal, biological identity. We have fluid identities that 
shift according to the context and that are, at least in part, political and deliberately cho­
sen.") . For a discussion of the ways in which essentialism complicates black antiracist poli­
tics, see Carbado, supra note 182; Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of 
Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1 
(1999). 
195. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 219 (1984). 
196. Id. at 220. 
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they were born, whether they were citizens, whether they had "pa­
pers."197 According to Justice Rehnquist, this "could hardly result in a 
reasonable fear that respondents were not free to continue working or 
to move about the factory."198 
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Rehnquist completely discounts 
the circumstances under which the workers were questioned. More 
particularly, he considers "each interrogation in isolation as if [the 
workers] had been questioned by the INS in a setting similar to an en­
counter between a single police officer and a lone passerby that might 
occur on a street corner."199 In fact, the encounter between the work­
ers and the INS in Delgado was far more coercive than that. For one 
thing, there were between twenty and thirty INS agents; several of 
them guarded the exits while others moved, "in para-military forma­
tion,"200 systematically through the rows of the factory.201 This work­
place occupation lasted between one and two hours. For another, the 
agents were armed, they carried and displayed handcuffs, and they 
wore INS badges.202 Finally, the agents did not inform the workers that 
they were free to leave.203 Likely, the workers inferred just the oppo­
site, especially since the INS arrested several of the workers who at­
tempted to exit the factory.204 As one worker explained, "[t]hey see 
you leaving and they think I'm guilty."205 
With the foregoing context in mind, the question ·is: How are we to 
interpret Justice Rehnquist's claim that the workers whom the INS 
questioned were not seized? How are we to understand the jurispru­
dential violence his opinion performs?206 Below I attempt to make 
sense of it. To do so, I uncover the argument's racial ideology: that 
Latinas/os are presumptively Outsiders. They are, in other words, al­
ways at the border. At this location, the INS has "plenary power"207 to 
197. Id. at 219-20. 
198. Id. at 220-21 .  
199. Id. at  229 (Brennan, J . ,  dissenting) . 
200. Brief for Respondents at 17, INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (No. 82-1271). 
201. Id. at 3-4. 
202. Id. at 4. 
203. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 217. 
204. Brief for Respondents at 3-4, 18, Delgado (No. 82-1271 ) . 
205. Id. at 20 (testimony of one of the workers) . 
206. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) 
(stating that "legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death" and noting that 
"[w]hen interpreters have finished their work, they frequently leave behind victims whose 
lives have been torn apart by these organized, social practices of violence") (footnote omit­
ted). 
207. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed Congress's "plenary power" over im­
migration matters. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) ("The Court without 
exception has sustained Congress' 'plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens 
and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden.' 
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determine, via intimidating citizenship questioning, the legitimacy of 
Latinas/os' claim to American belonging. 
There are at least four ways to interpret Justice Rehnquist's argu-
ment that individuals whom the INS questioned were not seized: 
Interpretation 1: All the workers felt free to leave the factory. 
Interpretation 2: The workers who were citizens or legal residents 
of the United States felt free to leave the factory. 
Interpretation 3: Any reasonable Latina/o who legally resides in 
the United States would have felt free to leave the factory. 
Interpretation 4: Any reasonable person would have felt free to 
leave the factory. 
None of these interpretations is satisfying. The first two frame the 
seizure inquiry in subjective terms - whether the individuals who ex­
perienced the INS encounter actually felt free to leave the factory. As 
previously suggested, however, the Supreme Court has been clear to 
point out that the free-to-leave test is not in fact subjective. The third 
interpretation explicitly racializes the reasonable person. While this 
racialization renders the seizure analysis more contextual, it is incon­
sistent with Justice Rehnquist's colorblind opinion. Nowhere in 
Delgado does Justice Rehnquist consider how Latina/o communities 
- and especially the Latina/o communities from which the workers in 
Delgado were drawn - are likely to perceive and respond to INS 
authority. 
One might conclude, then, that the fourth interpretation captures 
Justice Rehnquist's seizure analysis. This interpretation - whether 
any reasonable person would have felt free to leave the factory - de­
lineates the reasonable person without racial/ethnic specificity. It is, in 
other words, race neutral, or at least ostensibly so. While Justice 
Rehnquist may want us to believe (or may himself think) that he is 
applying a race neutral standard, in fact he is not.208 To begin with, the 
'[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is 
over' the admission of aliens." (citations omitted)). This power has allowed the INS to en­
gage in practices that are arguably racially discriminatory. While court rulings have barred 
INS officers from instigating interrogations based on a suspect's foreign appearance or ac­
cent, these rulings do not prohibit INS operatives from using such factors to determine 
whom not to interrogate. For example, one commentator who accompanied INS agents 
during a workplace raid witnessed the agents interrogate a number of Haitian and Central 
American workers, but then saw them pass by a group of workers at the same location who 
appeared to be of European origin. Although the observer explained that such "negative 
sorting" might be the result of constraints on INS resources rather than bias, it would be im­
possible to deny the racial component of such starkly disparate treatment. See HARWOOD, 
supra note 184, at 109. On a more esoteric note, the racialized nature of INS practices is il­
lustrated by the fact that one of the agency's largest endeavors to expel undocumented 
workers during the mid-1950s was formally dubbed "Operation Wetback." See supra at 5. 
208. Indeed, as I explain more fully below, there is no race neutral position from which 
to apply the free-to-leave test. 
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"any reasonable person" category presumably includes Latinas/os. 
Latinas/os and non-Latinas/os, however, are likely to perceive the INS 
in different ways. Whether or not Latinas/os are documented, they 
are, on the whole, more likely than non-Latinas/os to be apprehensive 
about encounters with the INS.209 Given the difference between how 
Latinas/os and non-Latinas/os are likely to respond to INS authority, 
Justice Rehnquist's unmodified reasonable-person approach is fic­
tional. Specifically, it creates the misimpression that there is a neutral 
identity position from which to ask the seizure question. In other 
words, that Justice Rehnquist does not explicitly frame the seizure in­
quiry in terms of identity does not mean that, with respect to identity, 
his analysis is neutral. Because of the multiplicity of ways in which ra­
cial identity is given meaning in our society, there is no exit from race, 
only stated or unstated racial preferences. To the extent that 
Latinas/os and non-Latinas/os are likely to perceive or respond differ­
ently to INS authority, framing the seizure analysis without identity 
specificity is tantamount to framing it from a non-Latina/o perspec­
tive. In this sense, Justice Rehnquist's analysis is not race neutral. On 
the contrary, it reflects an unstated racial preference for non-Latina/o 
identity. 
Even under a non-Latina/o framing, however, Justice Rehnquist's 
application of the free-to-leave test is, as Justice Brennan suggests, 
"striking . . .  [in] its studied air of unreality."210 Given the facts of 
Delgado, it is hard to believe that many people would have felt free to 
disregard the INS or to leave the factory. I have taught Delgado to 
more than three hundred students, most of them non-Latinas/os.211 
209. See Elvia R. Arriola, LatCrit Theory, International Human Rights, Popular Culture, 
and the Faces of Despair in INS Raids, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 245, 257 (1997): 
Nor does any published account (of an INS raid] ever explore the impact of a raid on the 
lives of the people caught without legal papers or of the failure of the INS to come up with 
nondiscriminatory methods of enforcement. . . .  (N]ever does an account of an INS raid con­
sider the possibility that the INS's approach to apprehending workers, with its heavy focus 
on the Mexican population and on people with brown skin, smacks of blatant human rights 
abuses when the consequences of getting caught are to send a worker off to be detained and 
deported without due process or time to contact the family he or she is leaving behind. 
210. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 226 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
211. This has been one of the many difficulties of teaching at a public institution without 
affirmative action. In 1995, the University of California adopted a pair of admissions poli­
cies, dubbed SPl and SP2, that effectively banned affirmative action. This ban was in effect 
codified a year later when California voters approved a statewide ballot measure, Proposi­
tion 209, that prohibited affirmative action programs in all state agencies. After the adoption 
of SPl and SP2 and the passage of Proposition 209, the percentage of black and Latina/o ap­
plicants admitted to the UC system dropped precipitously, and the number of black and 
Latina/o applicants also declined. While the number of black and Latina/o students in the 
UC system has increased in recent years, the enrollment of such students at the system's 
most selective campuses, UCLA and Berkeley, remains below 1995 levels. In May 2001, the 
UC regents voted unanimously to repeal SPl and SP2, but because Proposition 209 will con­
tinue to enforce the ban on affirmative action, the vote was seen largely as a symbolic ges­
ture. See Rebecca Trounson & Jill Leovy, UC Ends Affirmative Action Ban, L.A. TIMES, 
May 17, 2001, at Bl; see also Laura E. G6mez, Personal Perspective: Loss of UC Diversity 
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Not one has said he or she would have felt free to leave the factory or 
to ignore the INS. To be sure, this is not hard empirical evidence (even 
as law students tend to disagree about everything). Still, the observa­
tion does suggest that, even under a non-Latina/a framing of the sei­
zure inquiry, Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that the individuals whom 
the INS questioned were not seized is "rooted . . .  in fantasy."212 
The question, then, is why Justice Rehnquist would have engaged 
in this fantasy. To the extent that he was invested in legitimizing the 
conduct of the INS, at least one other doctrinal route was available to 
him. He could have invoked United States v. Martinez-Fuerte.213 At is-
. sue in that case was whether "a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed 
[immigration] checkpoint for brief questioning of its occupants even 
though there is no reason to believe the particular vehicle contains il­
legal aliens."214 The Court answered the question in the affirmative. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court assumed that the motorists who 
passed through the checkpoint were seized.215 It balanced the nature of 
that seizure, however, against the government's interest in regulating 
immigration and concluded that "[w]hile the need to make routine 
checkpoint stops is great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth 
Amendment interests is quite limited."216 
One could apply the reasoning of Martinez-Fuerte to Delgado. The 
argument would be that illegal immigration is a growing and costly 
problem in the United States;217 that the government's interest in ad-
Means Lost Opportunity for Law Students, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2000, at M3 (exploring the 
educational costs of the elimination of affirmative action). 
212. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 229 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
213. 428 U.S. 543 (1976); see also JOHNSON & SIMRING, supra note 161, at 696 (observ­
ing that "Martinez-Fuerte effectively permits a racist Border Patrol Officer to stop all per­
sons of Mexican ancestry"). 
214. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545. 
215. Id. at 546 n.1.  
216. Id. at 557. 
217. Analysis of recently released data from the 2000 census has suggested that there 
are possibly eleven million or more undocumented immigrants currently residing in the U.S., 
a population nearly twice the size of previous official estimates. See Aaron Zitner, Immi­
grant Tally Doubles in Census, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at Al. According to the data, 
about 40% of undocumented immigrants live in California. Id. It was in California in 1994 
that an overwhelming majority of voters passed Proposition 187, a ballot initiative that 
sought to cut off public services to undocumented persons. At that time, when the state 
economy was mired in recession, officials estimated that 100,000 immigrants entered the 
state illegally every year, and that such immigrants cost state taxpayers $3.6 billion in public 
services annually. State courts invalidated many of Proposition 187's provisions, and Cali­
fornia's economy has prospered in recent years, but opposition to "illegal immigration" re­
mains strong in the state. Paul Maslin, a pollster for Governor Gray Davis, said in March 
2001 that California voters' negative feelings about undocumented immigrants had not 
changed, and that Proposition 187 would pass again if it came up for another vote. See 
George Skelton, Capitol Journal: Mexican President Enters Eye of the Immigration Storm, 
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2001, at A3; see also Ruben J. Garcia, The Racial Politics of Proposi­
tion 187, in THE LATINO/A CONDITION 118 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998). 
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dressing this problem is high; that workplace surveys are an effective 
and efficient means to mitigate if not solve it; and that the manner in 
which these surveys were conducted did not unnecessarily or unrea­
sonably burden the Fourth Amendment interests of the workers. 
Justice Rehnquist could have argued that while the workers whom the 
INS questioned were seized, the conduct of the INS was constitution­
ally legitimate because the seizure was reasonable. This is precisely 
how Justice Powell, who authored Martinez-Fuerte, decided Delgado 
in his concurrence.218 Moreover, this was one of the arguments the 
government advanced on appeal.219 Why would Justice Rehnquist take 
another doctrinal path? What, in terms of racial ideology, is at stake? 
One answer relates to the racial idea that Latinas/os should render 
themselves available for INS surveillance, especially to the extent that 
they occupy places where undocumented workers are likely to be pre­
sent.220 This racial expectation could reflect at least three interrelated 
arguments. First, that in the absence of intrusive INS surveillance of 
the sort reflected in Delgado, the INS would have a difficult time 
separating the legal from the illegal.221 Second, Latinas/os can help 
America manage this difficulty by rebutting the presumption that they 
are undocumented - that is, by proving their American identity. 
Third, reasonable Latinas/os would be willing if not eager to shoulder 
this racial burden. As the government implicitly argued, reasonable 
Latinas/os should have understood that they were required to do 
nothing more than answer a few questions about their immigration 
218. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 221-24 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring). 
219. According to the government, 
[e)ven if the stationing of agents at factory exits is in some technical sense a 'seizure' of the 
entire work force, that seizure is nevertheless 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amend­
ment . . . .  [T]he governmental interests that support the practice of stationing agents at fac­
tory exits during a survey substantially outweigh the minimal intrusion, if any, that this prac­
tice entails on employees' Fourth Amendment interests. By focusing on businesses that 
employ significant numbers of illegal aliens, factory surveys are by far the most effective 
means of apprehending illegal aliens who have eluded the Border Patrol. 
Brief for Petitioners at 16, Delgado (No. 82-1271). 
220. See id. at 3 (observing that "(i]n the experience of the Immigration and Naturaliza­
tion Service, high concentrations of illegal aliens are likely to be found in factories that em­
ploy large numbers of unskilled or semi-skilled workers"). 
221. Historically, U.S. immigration authorities have not attached much significance to 
this difficulty. See Garcia, supra note 217, at 119 ("By 1946 (after the large influx of Mexican 
workers that came to the U.S. in the Bracero contract-labor program], it became impossible 
to separate Mexican Americans from deportable Mexicans. Thus, in 1954, over one million 
people were deported under 'Operation Wetback.' Many United States citizens were mis­
takenly 'repatriated' to Mexico, including individuals who looked Mexican but had never 
even been to that country."). Such indiscriminate treatment of a racial minority recalls the 
U.S. military's justification for the internment of all Americans of Japanese ancestry in the 
western U.S. during World War II. The military argued, and the Supreme Court agreed, that 
a broad internment was necessary because "it was impossible to bring about an immediate 
segregation of the disloyal from the Joyal." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 
(1944). 
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status and to "produce their alien registration papers."222 They "should 
have understood that the INS agents at the exits were positioned to 
stop only illegal aliens from leaving."223 
To the extent that one accepts any of the foregoing arguments, one 
is likely to conclude that the Latinas/os in Delgado were unreasonable 
or that it was unreasonable for them to challenge the INS survey. It is 
this racialized notion of reasonableness that butresses Justice 
Rehnquist's conclusion that the factory workers whom the INS ques­
tioned were not seized.224 That is, while his seizure analysis purports to 
be about how a reasonable person would feel under the facts of 
Delgado, it is really about what reasonable Latinas/os should be pre­
pared to tolerate and internalize. The analysis, in other words, is disci­
plinary.225 Under Delgado, Latinas/os are presumptively Outsiders.226 
Quite literally on the borders of American identity, part of their racial 
duty is to demonstrate that they "belong."227 
222. Brief for Petitioners at 24 n.16, Delgado (No. 82-1271) (arguing that "[a]t most, re­
spondents were asked one or two questions about their immigration status and, where ap­
propriate, were asked to produce their alien registration papers"). 
223. Id. at 23 (emphasis added). 
224. Of course, I cannot get inside Justice Rehnquist's head. In other words, there is no 
uncontroversial way to know what he is thinking outside of what his opinion facially argues. 
What I am suggesting is that, quite apart from what Justice Rehnquist subjectively thinks, 
one has a better understanding of his application of the free-to-leave test with my normative 
interpretation in mind. 
225. Alan Hunt and Gary Wickman provide the following account of disciplinary power: 
Discipline, rather than being constituted by 'minor offenses,' is characteristically associated 
with 'norms,' that is, with 'standards' that the subject of a discipline come to internalize or 
manifest in behavior, for example, standards of tidiness, punctuality, respectfulness, etc. 
These standards of proper conduct put into place a mode of regulation characterized by in­
terventions designed to correct deviations and to secure compliance and conformity . . . .  It is 
through the repetition of normative requirements that the 'normal' is constructed and thus 
discipline results in the securing of normalization by embedding a pattern of norms dissemi­
nated throughout daily life and secured through surveillance. 
ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKMAN, FOUCAULT AND LAW: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 
AS GOVERNANCE 49-50 (1994); see also Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, Afterward 
to MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 208, 221 (Hubert 
L. Dreyfus & Paul Rabinow eds., 1982) (suggesting that disciplinary power "structure[s) the 
possible field of action of others"). 
226. As Delgado argued: 
[I]nnocuous conduct does not become suspect merely because the person observed is non­
white. Yet that is precisely what occurs during these raids. Every Latin is suspected of being 
an undocumented alien due to his or her race. Members of a distinct minority characterized 
by immutable traits are singled out because they are suspected to be illegal aliens. As a re­
sult, innocent members of the class suffer an impairment of their privacy (a Joss not suffered 
by members of the White or black community) because the standard applied fails to distin­
guish in any meaningful way between the guilty and the innocent. 
Brief for Respondents at 43, Delgado (No. 82-1271).  
227. U.S. immigration law requires that a permanent resident "shall at all times carry 
with him and have in his personal possession any certificate of alien registration or alien 
registration receipt card." 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (2000). If an INS agent can articulate a reason-
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D. Integrating Race into the Seizure Analysis 
Thus far, I have argued that both Bostick and Delgado are better 
understood as cases not just about racial indifference or racial avoid­
ance but also about racial construction. That is, the problem in Bostick 
and Delgado is not just that the Court in both cases ignores race, but 
that it constructs race in a particular way. My aim has been to describe 
and delegitimize the nature of these racial constructions by exposing 
the race consciousness, or the ideological racial preferences, upon 
which they are based. Implicit in this project is the idea that the Court 
can do better. The question to which I now tum is: Precisely how? 
Asked more specifically, given the free-to-leave test, can the Supreme 
Court or lower courts meaningfully engage race? The short answer is 
yes. Below, I lay out three doctrinal approaches courts might take to 
do exactly that: a per se approach, a rebuttable presumption approach, 
and a totality of the circumstances approach. Informed by the victim 
perspective, each approach is explicitly race conscious in a manner 
that is sensitive to the coercive ways in which race structures po­
lice/citizen encounters. As a caveat, I should be careful to point out 
that I do not present these approaches as fully-worked-up theories. 
They should be viewed as conceptual starting points. 
The Per Se Approach. Under the per se approach, any interaction 
between a black person and the police would constitute a seizure, un­
less the officer advises that person that she is under no obligation to 
talk to the officer. To the extent that the officer provides such a warn­
ing and performs no overt acts of coercion, and if the suspect chooses 
to interact with the officer, the per se rule would work the other way 
- that is, the encounter would be deemed consensual. 
The Rebuttable Presumption Approach. Under this approach, the 
presumption would be that black/police encounters are seizures. This 
presumption could, but would not necessarily, be rebutted by evidence 
that, among other things, the officer informed the suspect of his consti­
tutional rights. For example, the fact that a police officer informs a 
suspect of his constitutional rights would not mitigate the coercive na­
ture of an encounter in which the officer also has his gun drawn and 
pointed at the suspect. In the absence, however, of overtly coercive 
conduct on the part of the police officer - and if the officer informs 
the suspect of her constitutional rights - the presumption would be 
that the encounter was consensual. 
The Totality of the Circumstances Approach. The totality of the cir­
cumstances approach adds race to the list of factors courts should con­
sider in determining whether a particular police activity seizes an indi­
vidual. Under this framework, the inquiry would be whether, under 
able suspicion of a person's alienage, the agent can detain the person and demand that the 
person produce the required documentation. 
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the facts of a given case, a person with the suspect's racial identity, and 
considering the racial identity of the police officers, would have felt 
free to leave or otherwise terminate the encounter.228 
Each of these approaches can be challenged. For one thing, to the 
extent that they focus on blacks to the exclusion of other racial minori­
ties, they are underinclusive. They create the impression that race­
based policing burdens only black people. Of course, this is not the 
case. Racial policing burdens other nonwhites as well.229 
But even if these approaches are racially rearticulated so that they 
are triggered by interactions between the police and people of color, 
each approach still has its difficulties. To begin with, one might object 
to their explicit race-conscious orientation. Specifically, one could ar­
gue that each approach legitimizes a constitutional regime under 
which people of color have "special" Fourth Amendment standing.230 
228. In effect, this is the standard the Supreme Court articulated in United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (suggesting that the defendant's identity as "a female 
and a Negro" "were not irrelevant" to the question of whether she was seized). 
229. See COMMJTIEE AGAINST ANTI-ASIAN VIOLENCE, POLICE VIOLENCE IN NEW 
YORK CITY'S ASIAN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES, 1986-1995 4-11 (1996) (observing that while 
blacks and Latinas/os are the most common targets of police misconduct, reports of police 
violence against Asian Americans increase annually). In 1995, over 75% of the reported vic­
tims of police brutality in New York City were blacks, Latinas/os or Asian Americans, with 
the starkest racial disparity found among custodial deaths and shootings. AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: POLICE BRUTALITY AND EXCESSIVE 
FORCE IN THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 11 (1996). Special Commission re­
ports in the Los Angeles area also have reported a pattern of "racially biased treatment of 
African American, Hispanic, Asian-American and other minorit[ies)" by law enforcement 
officers. THE Los ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT: A REPORT BY SPECIAL 
COUNSEL JAMES G. KOLTS & STAFF 299 (1992). The racially biased treatment that minori­
ties face includes "disrespectful and abusive language, employing unnecessarily intrusive 
practices . . .  and engaging in use of excessive force." REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 70 (1991). For Latinas/os and 
Asian Americans, the burden of racist police practices are compounded by anti-immigrant 
biases. See Gotanda, supra note 49, at 1694 ("The assignment to Wen Ho Lee of a presump­
tion of disloyalty is a well-established marker of foreignness. And foreignness is a crucial 
dimension of the American racialization of persons of Asian ancestry. It is at the heart of the 
racial profile of Chinese and other Asian Americans."). Real and perceived cultural differ­
ences add specific dangers to police encounters for Asian Americans. In the context of po­
lice interrogations, Asian Americans are perceived to be more acquiescent and less likely to 
unequivocally end the encounter; for many Asian Americans, withholding consent from an 
authority figure is contrary to cultural norms. Adam Geoffrey Finger, How Do You Get a 
Lawyer Around Here? The Ambiguous Invocation of a Defendant's Right to Counsel Under 
Miranda v. Arizona, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 1041, 1061 (1996). Other factors particular to immi­
grant/police encounters that significantly determine police (mis)conduct are limited English 
proficiency or heavily accented English. ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE 
ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 75-77 (1998). 
230. This argument would have the least force with respect to the totality of the circum­
stances approach. This approach does not, at the level of doctrine, specify any particular ra­
cial identity. It simply provides that the inquiry be conducted from the perspective of a per­
son in the suspect racial position, regardless of what that person's race is. Thus, a court 
would take into account the fact that a suspect is white just as it would take into account the 
fact that a suspect is Latino. How the suspect's race would shape the inquiry would turn on 
the other (racial) facts of the encounter. Still, even this approach could be problematized 
depending on one's conceptualization of strict scrutiny, and more particularly if one is of the 
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The argument would be that because under each approach people of 
color would have an easier time than whites demonstrating they were 
seized, each approach functions as a racial preference - that is, as 
Fourth Amendment affirmative action. In the absence of a compelling 
justification, this preferential treatment or reverse discrimination is 
unconstitutional. 231 
There are several responses to this argument. First, the argument 
assumes that the application of the free-to-leave test does not already 
reflect a racial preference. If we assume, for example, that nonwhite 
people are more vulnerable to being stopped by the police than 
whites, more likely than whites to feel apprehensive about such en­
counters, and less likely than whites to know and feel empowered to 
exercise their constitutional rights, ignoring this racial disparity privi­
leges whites.232 It prefers their racial position vis-a-vis police interac­
tions to the racial position of nonwhites. In this respect, it bears reiter­
ating that there is no race neutral position from which to conduct the 
"reasonable person under the circumstances" inquiry. Put another 
way, there is no reasonable person who is racially unsituated. Thus, for 
example, the fact that the Bostick Court fails to engage race does not 
mean that the opinion is raceless or even that it is race neutral. To 
avoid explicitly invoking race is to invoke it in a particular way. Race 
avoidance conveys the idea that race does not matter, and masks the 
ways in which it actually does. 
But with respect to how people experience law enforcement offi­
cials - which is (or should be) what the free-to-leave test is all about 
- race does matter. More specifically, whiteness and non-whiteness 
matter differently. To the extent that the application of the free-to­
leave test avoids this racial difference, masks it, or both, it legitimizes 
racial asymmetries in people's vulnerability to and perceptions of po­
lice authority. In other words, eliding the ways in which race structures 
view that strict scrutiny is triggered any time a particular policy makes any racial classifica­
tion. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240-41 (1995) (Thomas, J., con­
curring) (rejecting a distinction between "benign" and "invidious" racial discrimination, and 
applying strict scrutiny in review of a federal program designed to aid minority-owned busi­
nesses); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (also rejecting the 
benign/invidious distinction); Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295 
n.34 (1978) (same). 
231. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (describing an affirmative action program in the rheto­
ric of white reverse-discrimination, noting that the plan "denies certain citizens the opportu­
nity to compete for a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race. To 
whatever racial group these citizens belong, their 'personal rights' to be treated with equal 
dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an as­
pect of public decisionmaking"); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996) (refer­
ring to an affirmative action admissions program as a system of "racial preferences"). 
232. Of course, each of these are empirical claims, the most controversial of which is the 
notion that whites are more familiar with their constitutional rights than nonwhites. 
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how people interact with and respond to the police leaves people of 
color in a worse constitutional position than whites. 
A second response to the argument that the approaches I have 
suggested reflect a racial preference relates to the way in which the 
"under the circumstances" component of the free-to-leave test is cur­
rently interpreted. In effect, the free-to-leave test is a "totality of the 
circumstances" inquiry, under which everything is potentially relevant 
to, and no one thing is necessarily dispositive of, whether a law en­
forcement officer's interaction with an individual effects a seizure.233 
Focusing on everything but race is tantamount to discrimination based 
on race. That is, if race is potentially relevant to, but ignored in the 
application of, the free-to-leave test, people who are especially vulner­
able to police encounters because of their race are systematically dis­
advantaged in comparison to people who are not. 
Third, even to the extent that each approach is conceptualized as 
racial preference, each need not be rejected. Accepting the racial 
preference argument as a starting point, there are two ways to pro­
ceed. First, one could eliminate the preference but not eliminate the 
thrust of the approach. With respect to the first approach, for exam­
ple, this would mean that all encounters with the police - irrespective 
of the racial identity of the parties involved - would be deemed a sei­
zure unless the police placed the individual on notice as to her consti­
tutional rights. Second, one could maintain the preference and attempt 
to justify it via a compelling state interest analysis. The notion would 
be that given the high incidence of police abuse within communities of 
color and the empirical evidence suggesting that some racial identities 
are presumed to be criminal while others are not,234 racial preferences 
in the context of the Fourth Amendment are appropriate. This latter 
approach is less doctrinally viable than the first. In the context of 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has made 
it clear that "generalized" or "societal" discrimination is insufficient to 
support affirmative action, that race-based remedial efforts need to be 
supported by "identified" discrimination.235 Presumably, the Court 
233. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (describing the "totality of the 
circumstances test" as "necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coercive 
effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on particular details of that 
conduct in isolation. Moreover, what constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to 
conclude that he is not free to 'leave' will vary, not only with the particular police conduct at 
issue, but also with the setting in which the conduct occurs"). 
234. See supra note 148. 
235. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 499 ("While there is no doubt that the sorry history of 
both private and public discrimination in this country has contributed to a lack of opportuni­
ties for black entrepreneurs, this observation, standing alone, cannot justify a rigid racial 
quota in the awarding of public contracts in Richmond, Virginia."); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. 
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) ("Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous 
a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy."); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309 n.44 ("Title VII 
principles support the proposition that findings of identified discrimination must precede the 
fashioning of remedial measures embodying racial classifications."). 
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would take the same doctrinal position with respect to Fourth 
Amendment law. 
* * * 
The preceding discussion centers on the free-to-leave test. Part III 
shifts the analysis to consent doctrine. Here, too, the aim is to illus­
trate the racial productivity of Fourth Amendment law. The point of 
departure for the discussion is Bostick. The issue in Bostick was not 
just whether Bostick was seized but, assuming that he was not, 
whether his consent to the officers' request for permission to search 
his belongings was voluntary. In addition to providing a richer account 
of how Fourth Amendment consent law implicates race, my discussion 
of that doctrine will shed new light on, and provide a new basis to cri­
tique, the case that has become foundational to consent law jurispru­
dence, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.236 
III. (E)RACING CONSENT SEARCHES 
We wear the mask that grin and lies, 
It hides our cheeks and shades our eyes, -
This debt we pay to human guile; 
With torn and bleeding hearts we smile ... 
Paul Laurence Dunbar237 
A. Introduction 
Central to the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment consent juris­
prudence is the notion that people should be free to forego certain 
constitutional protections. More specifically for our purposes, people 
should be free to decide whether and to what extent to subject them­
selves to governmental intrusions. But how do we know when a per­
son has consented? Asked differently, what counts as a valid consent? 
Consider again Bostick. Recall that one of the arguments Bostick ad­
vanced to challenge the search of his luggage is that he did not consent 
to the search. Why, he asked, would a person who knows he is in pos­
session of narcotics consent to a search of his belongings? Assuming 
that a reasonable person in possession of drugs would be disinclined to 
consent to the search of his belongings, there are at least three ways to 
interpret the officers' claim in Bostick that they requested and were 
granted permission to search Bostick's luggage. 
236. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
237. Paul Laurence Dunbar, We Wear the Mask, in AMERICAN NEGRO POETRY 14 
(Arna Bontemps ed., 1963). 
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First, one could interpret this claim to be untruthful. Under this in­
terpretation, either the police officers did not request permission to 
search Bostick's luggage or if they did, Bostick said no. Second, one 
could interpret the officers' claim as truthful. Here, the conclusion 
would be that to the extent Bostick granted the officers permission to 
search his luggage, his consent was a function of the officers' coercion. 
Fundamental to this interpretation would be the idea that, given the 
disincentives for Bostick to agree to the search of his belongings, an 
inference can be made that the officers coerced him into doing so. In 
other words, Bostick may have said yes, but only because he was com­
pelled to; his consent was involuntary. A final way to interpret the of­
ficers' claim would be to assume that the officers neither lied about 
Bostick's consent nor coerced him into consenting. This interpretation 
could reflect the belief that if Bostick said yes to the search ( consid­
ering again the consequences that would likely flow from that consent 
- arrest, prosecution, and incarceration), it was likely because he did 
not know he had a right to say no. Put another way, Bostick may have 
consented because he thought he must. In this sense, Bostick's consent 
was not only involuntary, but also uninformed. 
While each of the foregoing interpretations has a certain amount 
of intuitive appeal, none is strong enough, given the current status of 
Fourth Amendment consent jurisprudence, to support an argument 
that the search of Bostick's luggage was unconstitutional. Below, I of­
fer two reasons why this is so. One reason relates to the manner in 
which Justice O'Connor deploys the rhetoric of innocence ostensibly 
to illuminate who, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the "reasonable 
person" is - or, more properly, who the reasonable person is not. The 
second reason relates to what I have been calling the perpetrator per­
spective. In the context of consent searches, the perpetrator perspec­
tive focuses on what police officers do rather than on what suspects 
know. The claim is that because people are differentially situated by 
race with respect to their knowledge of their constitutional rights and 
their perceived freedom to assert those rights, they are also differen­
tially vulnerable to consent searches. 
B .  Innocence, Consent, and the Fourth Amendment: 
Revisiting Bostick 
To some extent, each of the preceding interpretations of the offi­
cer's claim, that he requested and was granted permission to search 
Bostick's luggage, focuses on the disincentives a person in possession 
of drugs has to consent to such a search. These disincentives suggest 
that (1) Bostick did not consent, (2) he was coerced into consenting, or 
(3) he did not know that he could refuse consent. In Bostick, Justice 
O'Connor implicitly argues that it is constitutionally impermissible to 
consider the disincentives that Bostick, a person in possession of 
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drugs, had to assent to the search of his belongings. According to 
Justice O'Connor, the reasonable person standard presupposes an 
innocent person. Her argument seems to be that, to the extent that a 
person is in possession of drugs, he is not innocent. Stated more di­
rectly, he is factually guilty. Accordingly, such a person may not use 
the fact of his guilt (possessing drugs) to vitiate his consent238 or to 
deny that he consented.239 
1. Challenging Justice O'Connor's Notion of Innocence 
Justice O'Connor's notion of innocence ignores the fact that courts 
give content to our Fourth Amendment rights in the context of cases 
where the defendant is attempting to suppress incriminating evidence 
- that is, where the defendant is not innocent. "Innocent people" -
the people who are not in possession of illegal or incriminating evi­
dence but whose Fourth Amendment rights the police violate - typi­
cally do not bring Fourth Amendment claims.240 And even when they 
do, their chances of winning are quite slim. Thus, for the most part, 
courts determine the constraints the Fourth Amendment imposes on 
police investigative practices in the context of cases involving "guilty" 
people. If Bostick had not been in possession of drugs, the case would 
not have been litigated and the Supreme Court would not have had an 
opportunity to address the constitutionality of the conduct of the offi­
cers. 
This is not to say that the notion of innocence has no place in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.241 The most commonly invoked ra­
tionale for the exclusionary rule is deterrence. The argument is that 
police are less likely to engage in unconstitutional searches and sei­
zures if they know that evidence acquired in violation of a person's 
238. Here, the defendant's argument would be: "Given the punitive consequences of 
being caught with drugs, I would have consented to the search of my belongings only under 
duress or if I did not know I had the right to refuse consent." 
239. Here, the defendant's argument would be: "Given the punitive consequences of 
being caught with drugs, I would not have consented to the search of my belongings." 
240. In the early 1990s, in the aftermath of the Rodney King beating incident, the 
NAACP held a series of hearings in cities across the nation to discuss police conduct in mi­
nority communities. CHARLES OGLETREE ET AL., BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY 4-9 
(1995). Based on those hearings, the NAACP concluded that many minority citizens with 
valid grievances do not file formal complaints against police officers. Id. at 52-65. According 
to witnesses who testified at the hearings, such citizens often are actively discouraged from 
filing complaints against the police, and many fear police reprisal. Id. at 52, 55. Others are 
uninformed about complaint procedures, which are often poorly publicized, or are skeptical 
that such complaints will be taken seriously. Id. at 54-55, 60-67. For a useful and more gen­
eral discussion of the difficulties of prosecuting race trials, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Prose­
cuting Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2000). 
241. See generally Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amend­
ment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456 (1996) (exploring the different ways in which 
the notion of innocence figures in Fourth Amendment law and scholarship). 
March 2002] ( E)Racing The Fourth Amendment 1007 
constitutional rights will be inadmissible at trial. This deterrent effect, 
the argument goes, benefits innocent people. It creates a disincentive 
for the police to search or seize individuals without prior justification. 
Under the exclusionary rule, if an officer unreasonably searches an in­
dividual, she assumes the risk that the person whom she has searched 
has incriminating evidence, which, as the product of an unreasonable 
search, would be inadmissible at trial. To the extent that there is an in­
centive for police officers to avoid this risk, the theory is that people 
who have done nothing wrong - innocent people - will be less vul­
nerable to governmental encroachments on their privacy. This is not 
the sense in which Justice O'Connor employs the rhetoric of inno­
cence. Her notion of innocence turns the Fourth Amendment on its 
head. Her deployment of the term draws our attention away from 
what the officers in Bostick did - boarded a bus without any suspi­
cion of drug activity and targeted Bostick for questioning - and fo­
cuses it on what Bostick had - drugs. 
It is interesting to juxtapose Justice O'Connor's focus on drugs 
with the attention she gives to Bostick's race. Recall that Justice 
O'Connor does not explicitly invoke the fact that Bostick is black, and 
thus she avoids having to address whether Bostick was targeted, at 
least in part, because of his race. As previously suggested, this avoid­
ance strategy sends two interrelated messages: (1) that Bostick was not 
racially vulnerable to the encounter he experienced, and (2) that the 
officers were not motivated by race; they were simply doing their job. 
A similar discursive strategy is at work in the attention Justice 
O'Connor gives to the fact that Bostick was in possession of drugs. 
That is, her focus on drugs sends a message both about Bostick (that 
he is a criminal) and about the police (the officers got it right; their 
suspicions were in fact confirmed). In this way, the Bostick opinion 
does not problematize the ex ante (racial) suspicions the officers might 
have harbored about Bostick; instead, it problematizes the ex post (ra­
cial) fact that Bostick was in possession of drugs. One can read Justice 
O'Connor's opinion to suggest that the problem with Bostick's drug 
possession is not simply that the drugs took away his innocence and 
thus his doctrinal standing to frame the consent inquiry from a person 
in his position. The drugs also took away his racial innocence and thus 
his racial standing to assert that he was the victim of race-based polic­
ing.242 
That Justice O'Connor's notion of innocence is linked to presump­
tions about the criminality of particular identities is revealed in her 
dissent in a recent Supreme Court decision, Atwater v. City of Lago 
Vista.243 In that case, a woman, Gail Atwater, was arrested and trans-
242. As I explain more fully in Part IV, for the most part, racial profiling is problema­
tized only to the extent that the victim of the profile is perceived to be innocent. 
243. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
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ported to the stationhouse for failing to wear her seat belt, failing to 
fasten her children in seat belts, and failing to provide her driver's li­
cense and proof o'f insurance.244 The specific constitutional question 
the case presents is whether the arrest was unreasonable.245 Atwater 
argued that it was.246 Her claim was that a simple misdemeanor crime 
could not serve as a predicate for a full custodial arrest.247 The 
Supreme Court disagreed,248 and Justice O'Connor dissented.249 
What is especially revealing about Justice O'Connor's dissent is 
the way in which she constructs the encounter and the parties involved 
- particularly Atwater and her children. Notwithstanding that 
Atwater committed a crime - several, in fact - she remains, 
throughout Justice O'Connor's dissent, innocent. While Atwater's in­
nocence is clearly a function of the specific crimes she committed 
(again, they were all misdemeanors), it is also a function of her iden­
tity as a (white) mother.25° Consider the following passages from 
Justice O'Connor's dissent: 
Officer Turek handcuffed Ms. Atwater with her hands behind her back, 
placed her in the police car, and drove her to the police station. Ironi­
cally, Turek did not secure Atwater in a seat belt for the drive. At the 
station, Atwater was forced to remove her shoes, relinquish her posses­
sions, and wait in a holding cell for about an hour. A judge finally in­
formed Atwater of her rights and the charges against her, and released 
her when she posted bond. Atwater returned to the scene of the arrest, 
only to find that her car had been towed . . . .  
244. Id. at 324. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 345-46. 
247. Id. at 346. 
248. The majority, after an extensive historical review, rejected Atwater's claim that 
" 'founding-era common-law rules' forbade peace officers to make warrantless misdemeanor 
arrests except in cases of 'breach of the peace.' " Id. at 327. The Court also declined to adopt 
a "modern arrest rule," suggested by Atwater, which would bar custodial arrests for offenses 
that, upon conviction, could not result in incarceration. Id. 
249. Id. at 360 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
250. For a discussion of the devaluation of black motherhood in comparison to white 
motherhood, see Harris, supra note 80, at 251 arguing: 
(that the] dichotomy of Good Mother and Bad Mother continues to be racialized . . . .  (T]o 
the extent that white mothers diverge from the normative construct of the Good Mother -
that is, the further away from conforming with demands of patriarchy either in marital 
status, behavior, class status, or sexual behavior, the more likely they will be seen as more 
like black women and therefore Bad Mothers. 
See also LAURA E. GOMEZ, MISCONCEIVING MOTHER (1997) (exploring how racialized 
images of motherhood are implicated in the prosecutions of mothers who give birth to so­
called "crack babies"); Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Moth� 
erhood, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER, Soc. POL'Y & L. 1 ,  6 (1993) ("In America, the image of the 
black mother has always diverged from, and often contradicted, the image of the white 
mother."). 
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[T]he decision to arrest Atwater was nothing short of counterproductive. 
Atwater's children witnessed Officer Turek yell at their mother and 
threaten to take them into custody. Ultimately, they were forced to leave 
her behind with Turek, knowing that she was being taken to jail. Under­
standably, the 3-year-old-boy was 'very, very, very, traumatized. ' After 
the incident, he had to see a child psychologist regularly, who reported 
that the boy 'felt very guilty that he couldn't stop this horrible thing . . .  
he was powerless to help his mother or sister. Both of Atwater's children 
are now terrified at the sight of any police car. According to Atwater, the 
arrest 'just never leaves us. It's a conversation we have every other day, 
once a week, and it's - it raises its head constantly in our lives.'251 
The fundamental idea the above passages convey is that Atwater and 
her children were not supposed to experience that kind of encounter. 
That is, they were not supposed to be traumatized by, or become terri­
fied of, the police. Their family life should not be burdened by an 
emotionally draining "conversation every other day, once a week" 
about a police interaction. Officer Turek should not have humiliated 
Atwater. Nor should he have rendered the family a public spectacle. 
Implicit in Justice O'Connor's concern for Atwater is the notion that 
Turek's treatment of Atwater sent a public message about Atwater -
that she is a criminal. But neither the misdemeanors Atwater commit­
ted nor her identity as a white mother invited or justified the dissemi­
nation of that message.252 
Significantly, it is precisely because Atwater's encounter is situated 
in a context within which neither blackness nor drugs are a part of the 
case that Justice O'Connor is authorized explicitly to engage race. 
Toward the end of her dissent, Justice O'Connor writes: "[A]s the re­
cent debate over racial profiling demonstrates all too clearly, a rela­
tively minor traffic infraction may often serve as an excuse for stop­
ping and harassing an individual."253 This concern for racial profiling is 
completely absent from Justice O'Connor's opinion in Bostick. No­
where in Bostick does she address whether and to what extent "bus 
251 .  532 U.S. at 324, 370 (citations omitted). 
252. The analysis raises the question of whether and to what extent Justice O'Connor's 
discourse about the case would have been different if Atwater had been black. One response 
might be that the facts of Atwater could neatly fit into political narratives about black 
women as irresponsible mothers. Under this view, Justice O'Connor would not have ob­
jected so vociferously, if at all, to Officer Turek's conduct. Nor would she have discussed 
racial profiling. See Part IV infra (suggesting that racial profile narrative requires "good" 
blacks). Another, perhaps more plausible response is that while Justice O'Connor's critique 
of Turek's conduct likely would have been more restrained, she would nevertheless have 
discussed racial profiling. Under this view, ideologies about black motherhood would limit 
but not completely undermine Atwater's ability to function as an icon of victimization. The 
notion would be that while the facts of Atwater would allow for the construction of Atwater 
as a careless mother (i.e., a mother who does not buckle her kids in seat belts), likely the 
facts would not support the construction of her as a really bad mother (i.e., a mother who 
exposes her children to drugs). 
253. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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sweeps" might provide police officers with an investigative means to 
racially harass individuals. The question is: Why not? That is, what ex­
plains the difference between the space race occupies in O'Connor's 
majority opinion in Bostick and the space it occupies in her dissent in 
Atwater? Why would Justice O'Connor evidence a concern for race­
based policing in the latter but not the former? One answer is that in 
Atwater, but not in Bostick, she can discuss the problem of racial po­
licing without making a racial victim out of a "guilty" person and ra­
cial villains out of "good" police officers.254 Put differently, because 
Bostick's drug possession took away his racial and criminal innocence, 
he could not, in the context of Justice O'Connor's opinion, function as 
an icon of racial victimization. Thus, we have no idea whether his ex­
perience on the bus was racially traumatic; whether it will "raise its 
head constantly in [his] life"; whether, because of that experience, he 
will become less trusting of, and more terrified around, the police. We 
learn simply that Bostick was not innocent. From that, the opinion in­
vites us to conclude that he was not a victim of racism. 
Justice O'Connor's concern for Atwater and her investment in 
problematizing Officer Turek's conduct is even more curious if we 
consider her dissent in Tennessee v. Garner.255 In Garner, a police offi­
cer, Officer Hymon, shot and killed a black teenager who was fleeing 
the scene of a burglary.256 Although the Supreme Court discussed nei­
ther the race of the victim nor the nexus between one's race and one's 
vulnerability to excessive force,257 it concluded that the "seizure" of 
Garner was unreasonable. According to the Court, even if an officer 
has probable cause to seize an individual, he "may not always do so by 
killing him."258 The Court reasoned that Officer Hymon "could not 
reasonably have believed that Garner-young, slight, and unarmed­
posed any threat. Indeed, Hymon never attempted to justify his action 
on any basis other than to prevent an escape."259 Justice O'Connor dis­
sented.260 She balanced the interest differently, concluding "that [the] 
use of deadly force as a last resort to apprehend a criminal suspect 
254. It would be interesting to know how Justice O'Connor would have responded to 
the case had Atwater been in possession of drugs. Presumably, her doctrinal bottom line 
would not change. The question is whether the discourse about Atwater, her children, and 
Officer Turek would. 
255. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
256. The officer who shot Garner was also black. Brief for Appellee-Respondent at 101 
n.52, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (No. 83-1035). 
257. But see Brief for Appellee Repondent at 23-26, Garner, (No. 83-1035) (presenting 
statistical evidence to demonstrate the nexus between the race of the victim and the deploy­
ment of excessive/deadly force). 
258. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9. 
259. Id. at 21. 
260. Id. at 22-33 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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fleeing from the scene of a nighttime burglary is not unreasonable."261 
Analogizing Justice O'Connor's Gamer dissent to her Atwater dissent 
is revealing. One way to articulate the comparisons would be to say 
that, for Justice O'Connor, Atwater's (a white woman's) arrest for 
violating the law is more problematic than Gamer's (a black man's) 
death for fleeing the scene of what the officer merely presumed to be a 
burglary. Significantly, I am not suggesting that Justice O'Connor is 
engaging in a racial project. I simply mean to highlight the racial ide­
ology undergirding her jurisprudence: neither Bostick nor Garner is 
innocent.Atwater, however, is. 
2. Assuming the Doctrinal Legitimacy of Justice O'Connor's 
Notion of Innocence 
Taking as a starting point the notion that Bostick was not in fact 
innocent and assuming that the "reasonable person" consent inquiry 
should be conducted from the perspective of an innocent person do 
not require us to ignore a point with which most people would proba­
bly agree: there were no meaningful incentives for Bostick to consent 
to the search of his luggage. On the contrary, there were strong disin­
centives. These disincentives are relevant to, though certainly not dis­
positive of, whether Bostick consented to the officers' request for 
permission to search his bag. 
With these disincentives in mind, the consent search analysis might 
begin by asking whether the nature of the police officers' conduct 
compelled Bostick to say yes to their request for permission to search 
his belongings. There are reasons to answer this question in the af­
firmative.262 Because the officers neither wielded a gun at Bostick nor 
physically restrained him in any way, however, the coercive nature of 
the encounter might not be immediately apparent. The difficult ques­
tion, then, is this: How does one demonstrate police coercion in the 
absence of clear evidence of police overreaching? The short answer is 
that it depends on the facts of the case. In the context of Bostick, one 
way to give content to the coercion would be to assume that Bostick 
consented to the officers' request for permission to search his belong­
ings and to employ that consent to advance both an argument par­
ticular to Bostick as well as a more general hypothesis. Regarding 
Bostick, the argument would be that the police officers' presence on 
the bus created a sufficiently coercive atmosphere to cause a person 
who was in possession of drugs to consent to the search of his luggage. 
The hypothesis would be that if Bostick consented to the search of his 
belongings knowing that he was in possession of drugs, an innocent 
261. Id. at 29. 
262. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 442 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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person would have consented as well. Indulging this hypothesis is not 
the same as framing the consent inquiry from the perspective of a per­
son who is not innocent. In other words, employing the disincentives 
Bostick had to consent to the search of his luggage to make an argu­
ment about coercion is not the same as arguing that Bostick's status as 
a person in possession of drugs rendered the encounter coercive, com­
pelled his consent, or both. 
C. Involuntary Consent: Bostick's Relationship to 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 
Assume that Bostick assented to the search of his luggage, and that 
his assent was a function of the fact that he did not know that he had a 
right to say no. At least two arguments are available to challenge the 
constitutionality of the search: an involuntary argument and an argu­
ment about uninformed decisionmaking or lack of knowledge. The in­
voluntary argument would be that because Bostick did not know he 
had a right to refuse consent, he thought he must. In other words, he 
perceived that if he said no, the officers would detain or formally ar­
rest him. Under this theory, Bostick's lack of knowledge with respect 
to his right to say no to police authority actually compelled him to say 
yes. The lack of knowledge argument would be that "the capacity to 
choose necessarily depends upon knowledge that there is a choice to 
be made."263 Stated more pointedly with respect to consent searches, 
one cannot be said to have consented to a search, particularly if one is 
disinclined to so consent, if one does not know that consenting is op­
tio·nal. Under this theory, Bostick's lack of knowledge with respect to 
his right to say no rendered his assent uninformed. 
Both of these theories could be subsumed under a broader waiver 
analysis: Here, the argument would be that, to the extent that a person 
consents to the. search of her belongings, she waives her Fourth 
Amendment rights. In order for this waiver to be valid, it must be vol­
untarily and knowingly made. The Supreme Court's holding in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte renders this waiver analysis unavailable. 
Bustamonte involved a consent search pursuant to a traffic stop. A po­
lice officer, Officer Rand, stopped a car after observing two burned­
out lights.264 Robert Bustamonte was a passenger, and five other men 
were in the car. Only one' of the men, passenger Joe Alcala, had iden­
tification.265 Officer Rand asked each man to exit the car.266 By this 
263. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 277 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) . I do 
not interpret this claim as some sort of logical truth. I interpret it to mean that the capacity 
to say yes to something, particularly if one is inclined to say no, presupposes that one knows 
that one can say no. 
264. Id. at 220. 
265. Id. 
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time, two other officers had arrived.267 Subsequent to their arrival, 
Officer Rand requested permission to search the car.268 To this request 
Alcala responded, "Sure, go ahead."269 While there was no indication 
that Officer Rand or the other two officers employed force to elicit 
Alcala's consent,270 none of the officers informed Alcala that he had 
the right to refuse consent.271 Upon searching the car, the officers 
found three stolen checks under one of the seats.272 Bustamante chal­
lenged the legality of the search and lost. 
In adjudicating the constitutionality of the consent search in 
Bustamonte, the Supreme Court framed the inquiry solely in terms of 
voluntariness. According to Bustamonte, " [t]he precise question . . .  is 
what must the prosecution prove to demonstrate that a consent was 
'voluntarily' given."273 In two significant respects, the Bustamonte 
Court's approach to consent searches is consistent with the Bostick 
Court's approach to seizures. First, like Bostick's seizure analysis, 
Bustamonte's consent search analysis reflects the perpetrator perspec­
tive. Specifically, it focuses on what police officers do rather than on 
what individuals responding to police officers know. Second, both 
Bostick and Bustamonte obscure the fact that, because of race, people 
are differentially situated with respect to their vulnerability to police 
encounters. The literature on Bustamonte, and on consent searches 
more generally, has not fully captured the nature of this vulnerability. 
The racial vulnerability here derives not only from the relationship be­
tween race and knowledge about constitutional rights but also, and 
more fundamentally, from the nexus between race and social behavior 
in the context of police encounters. With respect to this latter relation­
ship, two dynamics, both of which are a function of racial stereotypes 
about crime and criminality, deserve mention. 
First, people of color will have to give up more of their privacy -
will have to consent to more intrusive searches - than whites to erase 
the suspicions an officer may have about their criminality. Second, 
people of color are less likely than whites to assert their constitutional 





270. In affirming Bustamonte's conviction, the California Court of Appeal observed 
that "Alcala's assent . . .  was freely, even casually given." People v. Bustamonte, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 17, 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). That court stated, "[a]t the time of the request to search 
the automobile the atmosphere, according to Rand [the officer], was 'congenial' . . . .  Alcala 
even attempted to aid in the search." Id.; see also Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 220. 
271. 412 U.S. at 222. 
272. Id. at 220. 
273. Id. at 223. 
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context of encounters with the police, they should comport themselves 
(a) to signal racial respectability and (b) to make the officers racially 
comfortable.274 The assertion of rights can undermine that perform­
ance strategy. Specifically, it can racially aggravate or intensify the en­
counter, increasing the person of color's vulnerability to physical vio­
lence, arrest, or both. Because the Bustamante Court does not 
explicitly engage race, it obscures the foregoing realities. Demon­
strating the specific ways in which the Court performs this obfuscation 
helps to clear the doctrinal ground for the articulation of other, less 
racially burdening conceptions of consent. The discussion proceeds in 
two parts, focusing first on the Court's conceptualization of voluntari­
ness and then on the Court's conclusion that the traditional waiver 
analysis is inapplicable to consent searches. 
1 .  Voluntariness and Knowledge: Racializing Consent 
a. Performing Consent to Establish Innocence: The Racial Incentive 
System. Bustamonte's voluntariness argument proceeds in five analyti­
cal steps: (1) "The most extensive judicial exposition of the meaning of 
'voluntariness' has been developed in those cases in which the Court 
has had to determine the 'voluntariness' of a defendant's confes­
sion;"275 (2) that body of case law "yield[s] no talismanic definition of 
'voluntariness;' "276 instead, courts have adopted a totality of the cir­
cumstances approach;277 (3) under the totality of the circumstances ap­
proach, both the state of mind of the accused and the nature of the 
police conduct are relevant to, but not necessarily determinative of, 
the voluntariness inquiry;278 ( 4) thus, the fact that a suspect does not 
know his constitutional rights does not, without more, render his as­
sent to the search of his belongings involuntary;279 and (5) the totality 
of the circumstances approach strikes the right balance between law 
enforcement interests and liberty interests.280 
274. Again, this is not to suggest that this socialization does not exist outside of black or 
nonwhite communities. That is, presumably whites feel pressured to comport themselves 
respectably in the context of police encounters as well. The point is that stereotypes about 
crime and criminality, and the nexus between police abuse and race, render the nature of 
this pressure qualitatively and quantitatively different for blacks. Many blacks operate under 
the assumption that police/citizen encounters are potentially life threatening. 
275. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 223. 
276. Id. at 224. 
277. Id. at 226. 
278. Id. at 226-27. 
279. Id. at 227 ("While the state of the accused's mind, and the failure of the police to 
advise the accused on his rights, were certainly factors to be evaluated in assessing the 'vol­
untariness' of an accused's responses, they were not in and of themselves determinative."). 
280. According to the Court: 
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The Court's reasoning contains a false necessity.281 The Court need 
not have employed the due process confession cases to determine 
(rather than simply guide) what constitutes a voluntary consent. In­
deed, in some respects, this was a strange doctrinal move for the Court 
to make. By the time Bustamonte was decided, it had become quite 
clear that the totality of the circumstances inquiry was a weak proce­
dural safeguard.282 Specifically, it did not meaningfully delineate the 
boundaries of permissible police conduct. The regime was variously 
described as " 'useless,' 'perplexing,' and 'legal double-talk.' "283 The 
indeterminacy of the due process framework created a disincentive for 
courts to suppress, and a strong incentive for police officers to elicit 
from a suspect, the probative "I did X.'' Absent extreme examples of 
police overreaching, which smart police officers would carefully avoid, 
the likelihood that a court would, under a due process analysis, sup­
press a defendant's confession was decidedly slim. 
Partly as a response to these incentives and the more general con­
cern that the due process voluntariness framework was unmanageable, 
the Supreme Court had, by the late 1960s, developed two additional 
doctrines to determine the admissibility of confessions. In 1964, the 
[The) "voluntariness" [inquiry] has reflected an accommodation of the complex of values 
implicated in police questioning of a suspect. At one end of the spectrum is the acknowl­
edged need for police questioning as a tool for the effective enforcement of criminal 
Jaws . . . .  At the other end of the spectrum is the set of values reflecting society's deeply felt 
belief that the criminal law cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness, and that the pos­
sibility of unfair and even brutal police tactics poses a real and serious threat to civilized no­
tions of justice. 
Id. at 224-25 (citations omitted). 
281. James Boyle has defined false necessity as "the apparent inevitability of existing 
arrangements, the way that 'what is' gets converted into 'what ought to be.' " James Boyle, 
A Symposium of Critical Legal Study: Introduction, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 929, 930 (1985). For a 
collection of essays that provides a fair representation of the Critical Legal Studies move­
ment, in which the notion of false necessity has been extensively interrogated, see CRITICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES (James Boyle, ed., 1992). 
282. For a critique of the due process approach to confessions, see Laurence A. Benner, 
Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspec­
tive, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 126 (1988); Alfredo Garcia, Mental Sanity and Confessions: The 
Supreme Court's New Version of the Old "Voluntariness" Standard, 21 AKRON L. REV. 275 
(1988); Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the 
Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA . L. REV. 729 (1988); George C. Thomas III, A Philosophical 
Account of Coerced Self-Incrimination, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79 (1993); George C. 
Thomas III, Justice O'Connor's Pragmatic View of Coerced Self-Incrimination, 13 WOMEN'S 
RTS. L. REP. 1 17 (1991); James P. Byrne, Jr., Casenote, Colorado v. Connelly: The Gratui­
tous Union of Voluntariness and State Coercion, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 199 (1987); Robert 
Paul, Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Application of Harmless Error Analysis to Ad­
mission of a Coerced Confession in Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 1061, 1082 (1992); Kathryn Young-sook Kim, Note, Self­
Incrimination, Compulsion, and the Undercover Agent - Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S.Ct. 2394 
(1990), 66 WASH. L. REV. 605, 607 (1991). 
283. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 1 16 n.4 (1985) (providing an indication of the schol­
arly criticism of the due process framework). 
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Court in Massiah v. United States284 articulated a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel doctrine. Under this doctrine, the commencement of 
formal criminal proceedings against a person bars the government 
from deliberately eliciting a confession from that person in the ab-
. sence of the person's counsel. Two years later, in Miranda v. Arizona, 
the Court employed the Fifth Amendment to develop a custodial in­
terrogation doctrine.285 Under this doctrine, the government may not 
engage in custodial interrogation of a suspect without warning that 
suspect of her constitutional rights. Of course, neither Massiah nor 
Miranda was uncontroversially available to the Bustamonte Court. 
Alcala had not been formally charged prior to his consent, nor was his 
consent the product of custodial interrogation. The point is that, to 
some degree, both Massiah and Miranda were responses to the per­
ceived inadequacy and indeterminacy of the due process regime.286 It 
is curious that the Supreme Court would, in the context of determin­
ing the constitutionality of a consent search, invoke that body of law. 
So, what's going on? The following passage from Bustamonte pro-
vides a partial answer: 
In situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but 
lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid 
consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evi­
dence. In the present case for example, while the police had reason to 
stop the car for traffic violations, the State does not contend that there 
was probable cause to search the vehicle or that the search was incident 
to a valid arrest of any of the occupants. Yet, the search yielded tangible 
evidence that served as a basis for a prosecution, and provided some as­
surance that others, wholly innocent of the crime, were not mistakenly 
brought to trial. And in those cases where there is probable cause to ar­
rest or search, but where the police lack a warrant, a consent search may 
still be valuable. If the search is conducted and proves fruitless, that in it­
self may convince the police that an arrest with its possible stigma and 
embarrassment is unnecessary, or that a far more extensive search pur­
suant to a warrant is not justified.287 
This passage is remarkable. It links the legitimacy of consent searches 
to the fact that police officers often will not have the requisite justifi­
cation to intrude upon a person's privacy. This turns Fourth Amend­
ment protections upside down; it is precisely because consent searches 
284. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
285. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For a discussion of the state of due process case law before 
Miranda, see Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195 
(1996). See also, Kenji Yoshino, Miranda's Fall, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1399, 1409-11 (2000) 
(same) (book review). 
286. The Court's discussion of the due process confession cases presents that body of 
law as though there were no controversy about the workability of the totality of the circum­
stances inquiry. 
287. 412 U.S. at 227-28 (footnotes omitted). 
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do not require a prior justification that they ought to be suspect. Police 
officers do not have an absolute right to incriminating evidence. Put 
differently, they may not intrude upon our privacy and liberty interests 
by any means necessary. Thus, the fact that the officers in Bustamante 
found incriminating evidence begins rather than ends the inquiry; the 
question is not whether, but rather how police officers ascertain the 
whereabouts of and retrieve incriminating evidence. 
This upside-down conception of the Fourth Amendment has pro­
found racial implications given existing racial stereotypes about crime 
and criminality. In the context of a police encounter with a black per­
son, for example, the officer's starting point likely will be that this per­
son is a criminal or a potential criminal. This burden of presumed 
criminality - a significant part of the burden of blackness - will not 
be easy to disprove. An officer's racial bias might lead him to ignore 
stereotype-disconfirming data. In other words, an officer's ex ante in­
vestment in seeing black people as criminal might racially blind him to 
the possibility of their innocence. The tension between stereotypes 
about blackness, on the one hand, and the perception of innocence 
necessary to avoid or easily terminate police encounters, on the other, 
creates a "racial incentive system" for blacks to signal noncriminality. 
That is, in the context of a police encounter, a black person will need 
to find ways to demonstrate to the police officer that stereotypes 
about blackness are wrong (all or most black people are not criminals) 
or that they do not apply to him (this black person is not a criminal). 
With respect to consent searches, one way for a black person to 
present counter-stereotypical information in response to the racial in­
centive system is to say yes to an officer's request for permission to 
conduct a search. As the Bustamante Court explains: "If the search is 
conducted and proves fruitless, that in itself may convince the police 
that an arrest with its possible stigma and embarrassment is unneces­
sary. "288 The problem, however, is that because of racial stereotypes 
there is greater pressure for blacks to say yes to consent searches than 
there is for whites. Consenting to a search may be the only way a black 
person can demonstrate his innocence, particularly if the black person 
is young, male, "unprofessionally" dressed, and in a high crime (read: 
black neighborhood) or predominantly white (read: low crime) area. 
Thus, assuming that consent searches are a means by which any per­
son can establish his innocence, the extent to which one perceives the 
need to do this - that is, to give up privacy to prove innocence - is a 
function of race. 
Figure I, The Racial Incentive System, illustrates this problem 
more schematically. 
288. Id. at 228. 
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Figure 1 
The Racial Incentive System 
2(a) 
no correlation 
The racial incentive system is constituted by: (1) the suspect's in­
terest in avoiding/terminating police contact, (2) norms of law abid­
ingness, and (3) identity stereotypes. Point 1 represents the suspect's 
interest in avoiding/terminating police contact. The stronger this inter­
est, the stronger the incentive for the suspect to signal cooperation by 
engaging in privacy-compromising conduct (e.g., consenting to a 
search). Given the fact that race shapes peoples' trust of, and sense of 
vulnerability with respect to, the police, on the whole, it is likely black 
people will have a stronger interest in avoiding/terminating police en­
counters than whites and thus a greater incentive to signal coopera­
tion. 
Point 2 delineates three possible relationships that might exist be­
tween the norms of law abidingness and racial stereotypes about 
criminality. First, as reflected in Point 2(a), the relationship might be 
disconnected. Here, the suspect does not perceive that the officer har­
bors a stereotype about whether, or to what extent, she is law abiding. 
Second, the norms/stereotype relationship might be positively corre­
lated: thus Point 2(b ). Here, the suspect's assumption is that the police 
officer's stereotypes about her comport with norms of law. Finally, as 
suggested by Point 2( c ), the norms/stereotype relationship might be a 
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negative one. When this is the case, the suspect's assumption is that 
the police officer's stereotypes about her are at odds with or opposi­
tional to the norms of law abidingness. 
Other things being equal, the incentive to signal cooperation is 
greatest at Point 2(c) and weakest at Point 2(a). Because blacks are 
more likely than whites to have interactions with the police that reflect 
Point 2( c) and whites are more likely than blacks to have police inter­
actions that reflect Point 2(a), blacks have a stronger incentive than 
whites to employ consent searches (among other privacy­
compromising strategies) to signal cooperation/non-criminality. 
Quite apart from the theoretical incentive for blacks, in the context 
of police encounters, to signal cooperation via privacy and dignity­
compromising identity performances, is the fact that they are encour­
aged to do both as a matter of socialization and formal or political ad­
vice. Consider, for example, Dr. Robert L. Johnson's and Dr. Steven 
Simring's The Race Trap: Smart Strategies for Effective Racial Com­
munication in Business and In Life.289 In it, Johnson and Simring offer 
the following strategies for people who are racially profiled: 
• Don't argue the Fourth Amendment. . . .  [A]t the point you are 
stopped it is important to maintain control of your emotions 
and your behavior. 
• Don't be sarcastic or condescending to the officer. Always be 
cooperative and polite. 
• Don't display anger - even if justified. Most police officers re­
sent challenges to their authority, and may overreact to any 
real or perceived affront. 
• Don't lose sight of your goal. The objective in most racial pro­
filing scenarios is to end the encounter as quickly as possible 
with a minimum of potential trauma. Getting stopped for no 
good reason is inconvenient. But being jacked up against your 
car and searched is an experience that can stay with you for 
years. Getting handcuffed and taken into custody escalates the 
nightmare.290 
Johnson and Simring conclude their discussion with the suggestion 
that " [r]acial profiling by the police is a reality in a system that often 
treats minorities unfairly. However, the immediate issue isn't fairness. 
Rather, it's your ability to negotiate the encounter you are facing at 
the time."291 The negotiation to which Johnson and Simring refer is be­
tween a suspect's sense of self (as a rights-bearing person of worth and 
dignity) and the suspect's sense of what he needs to do to manage the 
289. JOHNSON & SIMRING, supra note 161; see also MEEKS, supra note 37, at 138, 142, 
148. 
290. Id. at 121-22. 
291. Id. at 121 (emphasis added). 
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police encounter (establish that he is not a criminal). Conduct engaged 
in to demonstrate the latter often will compromise the former. 
Yet blacks make this compromise or strike this bargain all the 
time. Indeed, their parents, family members, and community leaders 
teach them how - when, if at all, to speak, when and how to say 
"Sir,"292 or Officer, or Trooper,293 whether or not to move,294 and when, 
if at all, to assert rights.295 In short, blacks grow up with the expecta­
tion that they will be called upon to negotiate their dignity and privacy 
in the context of police encounters. Part of what I am suggesting here 
is that one way to perform this negotiation is to say "yes" to an offi­
cer's request for permission to conduct a search. Not only does this 
strategy signal cooperation and obedience, it can also establish inno­
cence. 
It bears mentioning again that whites are subject to pressures to 
comply with requests from the police as well. That is, whites are also 
subject to the racial incentive system I have described. However, the 
pressure/incentive for whites to comply with police orders is not as 
great as the pressure/incentive for blacks to comply; because white 
people are not presumed to be criminals. Because of stereotypes, 
black people are subject to a kind of surplus compliance. They are 
more vulnerable to compliance requests, more likely to comply, and 
have to give up more privacy to do so. 
b. The Limitations of Consent as a Performance Strategy. But con­
sent searches will not always be enough to establish innocence. Nor is 
the Bustamonte doctrinal regime fundamentally informed by concerns 
about innocence. With respect to the latter point, consider again the 
Court's observation that "[i]f . . .  [a consent] search is conducted and 
[it] proves fruitless, that in itself may convince the police that an arrest 
with its possible stigma and embarrassment is unnecessary, or that a 
far more extensive search pursuant to a warrant is not justified."2% 
This argument is disingenuous. The very reason police officers engage 
in consent searches is that, without them, probative evidence will be 
"lost."297 As the Court observes, "a search authorized by a valid con-
292. See David Dante Trout, The Race Industry, Brutality, and the Law of Mothers, in 
NOT GUILTY, supra note 30, at 60 ("These lessons for young men of color, learned through 
the Jaws of the Law of Mothers' quizzes, questions, and warnings . . .  That wisdom follows 
you around the country . . .  to Louisville where a son of New York was taught the nuances of 
saying 'Sir.' "). 
293. JOHNSON & SIMRING, supra note 161, at 125. 
294. Id. at 121. 
295. Id; see also RUSSELL, supra note 80, at 34. 
296. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973). 
297. An analogy might be made to the criminal confessions allegedly Jost as a result of 
the arrest warning required under Miranda v. Arizona. Paul G. Cassell has worked assidu­
ously to document what he views as the Miranda decision's debilitating effect on Jaw en-
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sent may be the only means [police officers have] of obtaining impor­
tant and reliable evidence."298 In this sense, the Court's investment in 
consent searches derives less from its perception that such searches 
are an efficient and effective way to establish innocence and more 
from its perception that they are an efficient and effective way to es­
tablish guilt. 
This is not to say that consent searches do not offer individuals a 
possible means by which to terminate a police encounter. Certainly, 
exposing the interior of one's bag to a police officer is one way of 
saying, "I am not carrying drugs." Contrary to the Court's assumption, 
however, this will not always be enough to dissipate an officer's suspi­
cions. That is, saying yes to a search may be insufficient to establish 
one's innocence. Imagine, for example, that a police officer perceives 
but does not have probable cause or articulable suspicion to believe 
that Tony, a black man, is a drug dealer. Assume that Tony is carrying 
a bag and that the officer requests permission to search it. Stipulate 
that Tony says yes, and the officer searches the bag but does not find 
any drugs. The officer's suspicions of Tony's criminality will not neces­
sarily disappear. In other words, Tony's consent to the search of his 
bag will not necessarily terminate the interaction. In fact, his consent 
may prolong it. The officer may believe that Tony granted permission 
to search his bag because he is carrying drugs elsewhere on his person. 
Under this assumption, Tony strategically consents in order to conceal 
his criminality. Alternatively, the officer may believe that Tony's con­
sent reflects (racial) vulnerability. This vulnerability could derive from 
Tony's awareness that the officer may be employing stereotypes to 
judge him, stereotypes that reflect the assumption that Tony is a 
criminal. If the officer believes that Tony has this racial awareness, he 
may also believe that Tony will want to prove to him (the officer) that 
he (Tony) is not the stereotypical black man - that is, a drug dealer. 
To the extent that the officer interprets Tony's consent in either of 
these ways, he is likely to request permission to conduct another and 
more intrusive search: a search of Tony's clothing. If Tony does not 
consent to this second search, the officer's suspicions are likely to in­
tensify. Why would a person who is not carrying drugs grant permis­
sion to search his bag but n·ot his person? This hypothetical suggests 
that it is less than clear that "fruitless" consent searches - consent 
searches that do not produce incriminating evidence - will be enough 
to terminate an encounter between an individual and the police. 
And this is not just an hypothetical. The Supreme Court has 
granted certiorari in a case that implicates precisely this issue: whether 
compromising privacy will also work as a performance strategy­
United States v. Drayton.299 The facts of the case are quite similar to 
forcement. See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. 
U. L. REV. 387 (1996). 
298. 412 U.S. at 227 (footnote omitted). 
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d States v. Drayton.299 The facts of the case are quite similar to Bostick. 
Three members of the Tallahassee police department300 boarded a bus 
just as it was about to depart. Working from the back of the bus for­
ward, the officers asked passengers questions as to their travel destina­
tions, their identity, and their personal belongings. The "[d]efendants 
Drayton and Brown were seated next to each other a few rows from 
the rear."301 One of the officers identified himself as a police officer, 
informed the defendants that he was part of a drug interdiction team, 
and asked whether they had any luggage. Both responded in the af­
firmative. The officer then asked for permission to search the bag, to 
which Brown responded, "Go ahead." Another officer searched the 
bag but no illegal substances were found.302 
To the extent that Brown's consent was a privacy-compromising 
strategy to disconfirm the assumption of criminality and to end the en­
counter, the strategy did not work. Indeed, the strategy had precisely 
the opposite effect. Upon learning that Brown's bag did not contain 
any illegal drugs, the officer requested permission to conduct another, 
more intrusive search of Brown's person: a pat down. His reason? He 
thought the defendants "were overly cooperative during the search [of 
the bag]."303 In short, the fact that Brown and Drayton consented to 
the search of their bag created rather than eliminated suspicion, and 
prolonged rather than terminated the encounter.304 
c. Undermining the Racial Incentive System: Why Warnings Might 
Help. Let us suppose, though, that fruitless consent searches have this 
terminating effect. The question remains as to how we should judge 
their constitutionality. According to Bustamonte, the inquiry is this: 
"Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained 
choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used 
against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for 
self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends 
due process. "305 
Implicit in the Court's analysis are two counterintuitive empirical 
claims. First, the Court assumes that a person's lack of knowledge with 
299. 231 F. 3d 787 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 70 U.S.L.W. 3420 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2002) 
(No. 01-631). 
300. One of the officers is black and the other two are white. Id. 
301. Id. at 789. 
302. Id. 
303. Id. (emphasis added). 
304. The pat down of Brown produced incriminating evidence, as did the subsequent 
pat down of Drayton. Both the defendants were subjected to a full search off the bus, which 
uncovered additional evidence. Id. at 789-90. The Court of Appeals concluded that neither 
search was consensual and thus the evidence should not have been admitted. Id. at 788. 
305. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (citation omitted). 
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respect to her right to reject a police officer's request to search her 
belongings is not likely to constrain her choice as to whether she 
should consent. Second, the Court claims that, assuming a person is 
otherwise predisposed to decline consent, the fact that she may not 
know that she has the right to refuse consent is not likely to "over­
bear" her will. Both claims are contrary to the Court's explicit recogni­
tion that if people knew their constitutional rights, they probably 
would not consent to governmental searches. In other words, the 
Court's own analysis reflects the idea that people who do not know 
their constitutional rights are likely to feel compelled to assent to a 
police officer's request for permission to search. In this respect, the 
Court's analysis is not really about voluntariness; it is about creating 
the fiction of consent to legitimize searches for which the government 
has no prior justification. 
Explicitly racializing the analysis further illuminates this fiction. 
Recall that according to Bustamante, the consent search inquiry asks: 
[Is] the confession[/consent] the product of an essentially free and uncon­
strained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess[/consent], 
it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and 
his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his con­
fession[/consent] offends due process.306 
The Court ignores how race - and more particularly, racial stereo­
types - can constrain one's choice, one's will, and one's capacity for 
self-determination. As previously discussed, in the context of a police 
encounter, a black person's behavior is structured by a racial incentive 
system. Likely he will always be concerned about, and thus be con­
strained by, the question of whether a particular course of conduct or 
identity performance will confirm or negate assumptions about his 
criminality. Informing this person of his constitutional rights would 
help to ameliorate this burden by undermining the racial incentive sys­
tem. Specifically, it would mitigate the racial pressure for the black 
person to say yes to an officer's request for permission to search. This 
is not to say that knowledge of one's constitutional rights will always 
be sufficient racially to free a person's will from the burden of stereo­
types. A black person may perceive that a police officer is likely to in­
terpret his assertion of constitutional rights as confronting authority.307 
Still, to the extent that the officer informs the suspect of his rights, the 
warning sends a message that, as a matter a law (though not as a mat­
ter of practical reality), the suspect is not required to consent to a 
search as an exit, or a suspicion-disconfirming, strategy. 
Had the Bustamante Court been mindful of the stereotype­
disconfirming performance strategies people of color employ in the 
306. Id. 
307. Such a person might be construed as violent or uppity. 
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context of police encounters, it could not so easily have concluded that 
the encounter in Bustamante was not coercive. Implicit in the Court's 
analysis, and consistent with the perpetrator perspective, is the idea 
that the police officers' conduct in Bustamante was not particularly 
egregious. The officers did not physically or verbally abuse any of the 
six men. As the Court indicates, "[p]rior to the search no one was 
threatened with arrest,"308 and, according to the uncontradicted testi­
mony of one of the officers, the situation " 'was all very congenial. '  "309 
But rather than signaling a lack of coercion, the congeniality of the en­
counter was arguably a function of coercion. The encounter occurred 
at 2:40 a.m. in the morning in Sunnyvale, California, a predominately 
white community in the Bay Area.310 The officers were all white and at 
least three of the occupants of the car were Latinos.311 In the early 
1970s, the relationship between police and the Latina/o community in 
California was marked by distrust and hostility, with many Latina/o 
leaders decrying instances of police brutality against their constitu­
ents.312 Given stereotypes about Latinos - that they are illegal immi­
grants and criminally inclined - the occupants of the car undoubtedly 
would have been concerned about how the officers were going to treat 
308. 412 U.S. at 220. 
309. Id. 
310. See id. According to 1990 Census figures, 65% of Sunnyvale's 1 17,229 residents 
were white, 19% were Asian or Pacific Islander, 7% were Hispanic, and 3% were black. 
These statistics are available at http://www.baynet.com/homes/US/BA/Santa_Clara/ 
demographics/Sunnyvale.html. 
311 .  Three of the occupants have surnames that do not explicitly signify Latina/o iden­
tity. 
312. In 1970, the Chicano Moratorium movement held a series of rallies in California. 
The most famous of these rallies took place in East Los Angeles in August 1970, when a 
crowd of 20,000 gathered to protest U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. The rally ended 
in violence as participants clashed with LAPD officers and Los Angeles County Sheriff's 
deputies. Three people died in the conflict, including Mexican-American journalist Ruben 
Salazar, who was killed by a tear gas canister fired by law enforcement. See Mexican­
Americans March in California to Mark '70 Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1995, at Al2. 
Months later, in January 1971, a Chicano Moratorium rally was held in Los Angeles to pro­
test police brutality, and police fired on the crowd, injuring more than 30 people and killing 
one. See New Yori!. Times Abstracts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1971, at 29. Prompted in part by 
these clashes, a Caiifornia Assembly committee held hearings in 1972 on the state of rela­
tions between Mexican Americans and law enforcement. See ASSEMBLY SELECT 
COMMIITEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, HEARING JANUARY 28, 1972, Los 
ANGELES, CALIFORNIA: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE POLICE AND MEXICAN-AMERICANS
. 
(1972); ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMIITEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, HEARING 
APRIL 21, 1972, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE POLICE AND 
MEXICAN-AMERICANS (1972); ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMIITEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION 
OF JUSTICE, HEARING APRIL 28, 1972, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA: RELATIONS BETWEEN 
THE POLICE AND MEXICAN-AMERICANS (1972). In these hearings, witnesses described nu­
merous instances in which Latinas/os had been victimized by law enforcement, including 
cases of beatings, fatal shootings, and deaths in police custody. See HEARING JAN. 28 at 5-24. 
Witnesses also testified about Latina/o perceptions of law enforcement, reporting that a 
large majority believed that police were often abusive during arrests and detentions. Id. at 
92-93. 
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them. They might have believed that fully cooperating with the police 
officers would decrease the likelihood that the police officers would 
physically abuse or otherwise mistreat them. They were bargaining in 
the shadow of potential racial violence.313 This potential for violence 
both chills and overdetermines communication. As one commentator 
puts it: 
If, say, during a twenty-five-dollar traffic stop, an officer should decide 
that my manners are not good enough, he can summarily end my life. If 
my wife and daughter are lucky, an official might issue a tepid apology -
with raised shoulders and thrown-up hands. It would be mistake, albeit a 
fatal one. And I would be faulted for disobedience, for resistance, for 
unlawful breathing.314 
All of this is to say that the congeniality between the officers and 
the six Latinos could have derived from a strategy on the part of 
Latinos to signal racial obedience. This would explain not only why 
Alcala consented to the search, but also why he helped the officer 
conduct it. 
Because the Court does not explicitly engage race, it avoids having 
to address, and thus masks the existence of, the foregoing racial dy­
namics. Its perpetrator-centered analysis colorblinds the encounter. 
Race is invisible here. Under the Court's construction of the event, the 
officers merely requested, and were granted, permission to conduct a 
search. This construction presumes that the officers pursued a legiti­
mate investigative strategy. They did nothing wrong. Their conduct 
does not reflect the kind of police behavior that the due process re­
gime was intended to regulate. After all, officers did not "wrench" the 
consent out of Alcala.315 To the extent that Alcala consented because 
he did not know his constitutional rights, the officers are not to be 
blamed. Their job does not involve equalizing the social and racial ter­
rain on which police officers act. 
2. Bustamonte's Waiver Analysis 
In rejecting the idea that police officers should be required to in­
form suspects of their constitutional rights prior to conducting a con-
313. Cf RUSSELL, supra note 80, at 34 (noting that "[f]or Black men, who are more 
likely to be stopped by the police than anyone else, each stop has the potential for police 
brutality"). 
314. Preston, supra note 30, at 158. 
315. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949) (finding confession involuntary where 
"the detention of an accused" was turned into a "process of wrenching from him evidence 
which could not be extorted in open court with all its safeguards"); U.S. v. Damaske, 4 
C.M.R. 466 (CGBR 1952) (finding confession voluntary where "[t]here is no proof of any 
kind tending to show that the will of the accused was overborne in any manner or degree, or 
that there was any attempt to turn his detention for trial into a process of wrenching a con­
fession from him"). 
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sent search, the Court has to address the question of whether consent 
searches are waivers. An answer in the affirmative would render such 
searches unreasonable unless, barring an exigency, they were pre­
ceded by an instruction or a warning to the suspect that he has a right 
to refuse consent. The Court, however, answers the question in the 
negative, and its analysis reflects the perpetrator perspective. That is, 
the Court focuses on how warnings would burden police officers (i.e., 
law enforcement interests) and pays scant attention to how the lack of 
warnings burdens suspects (i.e., privacy interests). Finally, because the 
Court does not explicitly engage race, it fails to consider the extent to 
which consent searches, under particular racial circumstances, can be 
conceptualized as a form of "racial interrogation" - that is, police 
questioning that is reasonably likely to produce a privacy deprivation. 
Such a conceptualization provides a strong basis for the claim that 
consent searches should be preceded by warnings. 
There are two ways to formulate a relationship between the consti­
tutional legitimacy of consent searches and the notion that the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Both for­
mulations can be broadly interpreted as arguments about waiver. The 
first formulation is that an otherwise unreasonable search is rendered 
reasonable by a valid consent. Under this formulation, a person who 
consents to a warrantless search is saying to a police officer: "Even 
though you don't have a warrant to search my bag, it is not unreason­
able for you to do so, because I am giving you permission." The sec­
ond formulation is that a valid consent authorizes an unreasonable 
search. Here, the consenting person essentially says to the police offi­
cer: "I know you don't have a warrant to search my bag and that it is 
therefore unreasonable and unconstitutional for you to do so. But I 
am giving you permission to violate my constitutional rights, so go 
ahead and conduct the search." Doctrinally, one might quibble over 
which of the two formulations is more consistent with the idea that the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. An 
argument can be made, moreover, that neither formulation implicates 
the Supreme Court's waiver jurisprudence. Arguably, the former issue 
is more formalistic than substantive. Thus, focusing again on 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, it is the latter issue to which I now tum -
that is, should consent searches be conceptualized as waivers? Ac­
cording to Bustamante, if by a waiver one means the intentional relin­
quishment of a known right, the standard articulated in Johnson v. 
Zerbst,316 consent searches should not be conceptualized as waivers. 
The Court articulates two chief reasons to explain why. 
First, the Court argues that the Zerbst standard governs trial-like 
rights. According to the Court, "[a]lmost without exception, the re-
316. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
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quirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only 
to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defen­
dant in order to preserve a fair trial."317 Fourth Amendment rights, the 
Court reasons, are not trial-related rights. "Nothing, either in the pur­
poses behind requiring a 'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver of trial 
rights, or in the practical application of such a requirement suggests 
that it ought to be extended to the constitutional guarantee against un­
reasonable searches and seizures."318 Second, the Court argues that 
employing the Zerbst standard to regulate consent searches "would 
inevitably lead to a requirement of detailed warnings."319 Such warn­
ings, the Court argued, would be both impractical and, given the con­
text in which consent searches typically take place, inappropriate. 
Both of these arguments reflect the perpetrator perspective. 
With respect to the first, it is unclear why the dichotomy between 
trial-like rights and other criminal process rights decides the question 
of whether consent searches should be informed. Assuming the legiti­
macy and manageability of this dichotomy, the normative question 
remains: Should a person who says yes to a governmental intrusion 
know that she has the right to say no? One could take the position (as 
Bustamante implicitly does) that trial-like constitutional rights require 
more procedural safeguards than other constitutional rights and still 
answer that question in the affirmative. The starting point for the ar­
gument could be that the waiver of any constitutional right should, to 
the extent possible, be informed. That is, as a general matter, a person 
should not be said to have given up something as important as a con­
stitutional right unless she understands that she need not.320 To the ex­
tent that one is of the view that trial-like rights are special, one could 
accord these rights "extra" procedural safeguards. One might do this 
in at least three ways. First, these safeguards could be reflected in the 
prosecutor's burden of proof. Under this approach, the nature of the 
prosecutor's burden with respect to demonstrating that a person 
waived her constitutional rights could be a function of the constitu­
tional right being waived - that is, whether or not it is trial-like. Sec­
ond, the extra safeguards could be imposed on law enforcement offi­
cials. Under this approach, the manner in which a police officer could 
legitimately elicit a waiver of a constitutional right would depend in 
317. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 237. 
318. Id. at 241. 
319. Id. at 245 n.33. 
320. Of course, people waive their constitutional rights all the time without knowing it. 
In the context of a civil trial, for example, a witness might believe erroneously that she has to 
answer a self-incriminating question because only criminal defendants can "take the Fifth." 
Should the issue arise, she will be held to have waived her Fifth Amendment right to silence, 
even though she did not know she did not have to give up that right. I am suggesting that to 
the extent that the cost of avoiding unknowing waivers are low, we should avoid them. 
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part on the nature of constitutional right at stake. Still a third ap­
proach could be based on judicial intervention. Under this approach, 
while both guilty pleas (the waiver of the right to a jury trial) and con­
sent searches (the waiver of the right against unreasonable searches 
and seizures) would have to be informed, only the former would re­
quire an ex ante determination by a judge. Each of the foregoing ap­
proaches moves the dichotomy between. trial-like rights and other 
criminal process rights away from the more fundamental question of 
whether the waiver of a constitutional right should be informed. The 
new inquiry would focus on articulating the appropriate criteria for 
determining whether (and the procedural safeguards for ensuring 
that) waivers are informed.321 
This brings us to the second chief reason the Bustamante Court 
concludes that the government should not be required to demonstrate 
that a person who consents to a search knows she has a right to decline 
consent: such a requirement would require police officers to adminis ... 
ter extensive warnings. The Court seems to imagine that police offi­
cers would be required to employ something like the following script: 
You have a right to refuse to allow me to search your home, and if you 
decide to refuse, I will respect your refusal. If you do decide to let me 
search, you won't be able to change your mind later on, and during the 
search I'll be able to look in places and take things which I couldn't even 
if I could get a search warrant. You have a right to a lawyer before you 
decide, and if you can't afford a' lawyer we will get you one and you 
won't have to pay for him. There are many different laws which are de­
signed to protect you from my searching, but they are too complicated 
for me to explain or for you to understand, so if you think you would like 
to take advantage of this very important information, you will need a 
lawyer to help you before you tell me I can search.322 
Many would argue that requiring this warning would be impractica­
ble.323 Indeed, that is precisely what the government argued on appeal 
- "that the very complexity of such a warning proves its unworkabil­
ity. "324 But to say that warnings would be required is not yet to estab­
lish the nature of the warnings. In other words, one might conclude 
that police officers should be required to warn suspects of their right 
to refuse consent and yet reject the idea that the warnings would need 
to be extensive. The choice is not between telling the suspect nothing 
321. For a useful discussion of the different ways in which the Supreme Court conceptu­
alizes waivers in the criminal context, see William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Pro­
cedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761 (1989). 
322. Brief for Petitioner at 21-22, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 
71-732). 
323: Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 231 (arguing that "it would be thoroughly impractical to 
impose on the normal consent search the detailed requirements of an effective warning"). 
324. Brief for Petitioner at 22, Bustamante (No. 71-732); Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 243. 
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and telling her everything; a middle ground exists. Prior to conducting 
a consent search, police officers could be required to inform a suspect 
that "you have a right to refuse consent." At the time Bustamonte was 
litigated, "federal agents were already in the practice of giving such 
warnings. "325 
Of course, the notion that suspects should be informed of their 
constitutional rights is not novel. Indeed, as previously indicated, · 
seven years before Bustamonte was decided, the Supreme Court's 
Miranda326opinion established a constitutional regime that required 
officers to apprise suspects of their constitutional rights prior to custo­
dial interrogation. Bustamonte's response to the Miranda "precedent" 
is formalistic: consent searches are not custodial interrogations.327 The 
latter is presumptively coercive; the former is not.328 
But consent searches can, under particular racial circumstances, be 
understood as presumptively coercive. In part, this is because race is 
not just an identity in a narrow descriptive sense. It is also a social 
structure - a complex of social meanings - within which people are 
situated and from which they cannot easily escape. This structure is 
constituted by, among other things, negative stereotypes. In the con­
text of police encounters, black people are almost always going to be 
locked inside the officer's racial stereotypes. This location is not sim­
ply uncomfortable. It is, like custody, psychologically and physically 
constraining. In this location, the police officer has complete control . 
over the initial racial meaning he assigns to the black person's identity. 
The more negative that racial assignment, the more unsafe and inse­
cure the black person is likely to feel and the more limited his freedom 
of movement and expression will be. Under these circumstances, a 
black person will be under enormous "racial pressure" both to discon­
firm negative stereotypes and to signal cooperation. In other words, he 
will feel forced to demonstrate racial .obedience. A black person 
trapped in this position is likely to experience an officer's request for 
permission to conduct a search as "racial interrogation" - that is, as 
an inquiry that is reasonably likely to produce a privacy deprivation. 
Consequently, racial interrogation, like custodial interrogation, should 
be preceded by warnings. 
Even if "racial interrogations" are not as problematic as "custodial 
interrogations," the conclusion that consent searches should not be 
325. COLE, supra note 131, at 30. 
326. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
327. Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 246. 
328. According to Bustamante, the Miranda "Court found that custodial interrogation 
by the police was inherently coercive, and consequently held that detailed warnings were 
required to protect the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The Court made it 
clear that the basis for its decision was the need to protect the fairness of the trial itself." 
Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 240. 
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preceded by warnings is not inexorable. Put another way, there is no 
reason to believe that, with respect to the circumstances under which 
the police should be required to apprise people of their constitutional 
rights, Miranda created a floor. Further, Miranda reflects concerns 
that transcend the narrower doctrinal question that the case pre­
sented. "[T]he Court thought that requiring that every suspect be read 
his rights and provided an attorney on request would put all interroga­
tion suspects on equal footing. "329 A similar argument can be made 
about consent searches: requiring police officers to inform every sus­
pect of her right to refuse consent would help to equalize people's 
vulnerability to consent searches. 
IV. TRAFFICKING RACE 
And they asked me right at Christmas 
If my blackness, would it rub off? 
I said, "Ask your mama. " 
Langston Hughes330 
Any discussion of race and policing that excludes an examination 
of traffic stops is necessarily incomplete. Because we all commit traffic 
infractions all the time, and because the police have almost unbridled 
discretion with respect to deciding whom to stop, traffic stops provide 
police officers with the perfect opportunity to engage in pretextual, 
race-based policing. The problem is compounded by the reality that 
police officers have neither the resources nor the inclination to stop 
everyone. Under these conditions, the question becomes: Who are the 
police most likely to stop? Empirical evidence suggests that they are 
more likely to stop blacks and Latinas/os than whites.331 This evidence 
confirms what blacks and Latinas/os have been saying for a long time: 
it is a crime to Drive While Black/Brown. Many of us find ourselves 
committing this crime - that is, trafficking in race - everyday. We try 
desperately not to get caught. Some strategies (e.g., avoiding certain 
329. COLE, supra note 131, at 29. 
330. LANGSTON HUGHES, ASK YOUR MAMA: 12 MOODS FOR JAZZ 8 (1961). 
331. For example, one study found that "[b)etween January 1995 and September 1996, 
of the 823 citizens detained for drug searches on one stretch of Interstate 95, over seventy 
percent were African American." Thompson, supra note 92, at 957-58; see also Jennifer A. 
Larrabee, "DWB (Driving While Black)" and Equal Protection: The Realities of an Uncon­
stitutional Police Practice, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 291, 297 (1997) ("In one Florida county, 62% of 
the drivers stopped were minorities, and on an interstate in Colorado, 190 of 200 stops 'tar­
geted minorities.' "); Iver Peterson, Turnpike Data Show Decline in Searches, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 24, 2001, at Bl (reporting statistics compiled by New Jersey state police revealing that 
"[m]embers of minorities remain far more likely to be the subject of a consent search . . . .  Of 
the 440 vehicles searched along the [New Jersey] turnpike in 1999, 211 were driven by 
blacks, 119 by whites, 109 by Hispanics and 1 by an Asian"). For an examination of the vari­
ous studies detailing the extent of racial profiling, see David A. Harris, The Stories, the Sta­
tistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999). 
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neighborhoods and driving low-profile cars) work better than others 
(e.g., sartorial choices and vanity license plates that signal professional 
identity).332 None of these strategies, however, is 100% effective, and 
all of them are costly. 
Few people publicly would take the position that it is legitimate for 
police officers to target black and brown motorists for traffic stops. 
That practice, which typically is labeled racial profiling, is almost uni­
versally condemned. Yet, racial profiling remains a very real social 
problem. Indeed, every few months a new report is released revealing 
just how pervasive racial profiling really is. There is a question, then, 
about the near universal condemnation of racial profiling, on the one 
hand, and its prevalence as a social practice, on the other. What ex­
plains the contradiction? 
In two respects, the perpetrator perspective provides a partial ex­
planation. First, the public condemnation of racial profiling is not to­
tal. Instead, it is based on the idea that "bad" cops are racially profil­
ing "good" blacks and Latinas/os - doctors, lawyers, students, 
athletes, teachers, etc.333 - "people with good jobs and families."334 In 
this sense, the public is condemning not racial profiling per se, but 
rather racial profiling as it is deployed against certain blacks and Lati­
nas/os. Second, the Supreme Court's conceptualization of racial pro­
filing as a problem of motivation or conscious racial intentionality, 
rather than as a material harm that affects a person's privacy and 
sense of security, positions racial profiling beyond the doctrinal reach 
of the Fourth Amendment. To the extent that racial profiling escapes 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny it is, in a substantive sense, constitution­
ally unchecked. 
332. As Katheryn Russell notes: 
Many Black men have developed protective mechanisms to either avoid vehicle stops by the 
police or to minimize the potential for harm during these stops. The primary shield they use 
is an altered public persona. This includes a range of adaptive behaviors, e.g., sitting erect 
while driving, driving at the precise posted speed limit, avoiding certain neighborhoods, not 
wearing certain head gear (e.g., a baseball cap), and avoiding flashy cars. Another preemp­
tive strategy that is available to a select few is vanity license plates that indicate professional 
status (e.g., M.D. or ESQ). Of course, vanity tags can work as both a magnet and a deterrent 
for a police stop. 
RUSSELL, supra note 80, at 34; see also Micheal A. Fletcher, Driven to Extremes: Black Men 
Take Steps To Avoid Police Stops, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1996, at Al. 
333. See Harris, supra note 331, at 265-66 (suggesting the actors Wesley Snipes, Will 
Smith, Blair Underwood, and Le Var Burton, and the attorney Johnnie Cochran have been 
racially profiled). 
334. Id. at 269. 
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A. · The Supreme Court and Racial Profiling 
Although Whren v. United States335 is not the first case in which the 
Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of race-based po­
licing, it is the case to which scholars most often refer to discuss the 
Supreme Court's response to racial profiling. In Whren, plain clothes 
officers in an unmarked car observed a Pathfinder at a stop sign in a 
"high drug area. "336 According to the officers, they became suspicious 
because the occupants of the car were young, the driver seemed to be 
looking toward the lap of the passenger, and the car had a temporary 
license plate.337 
The officers' suspicions intensified after the vehicle remained at a 
stop sign for an "unusually long time" and subsequently drove off in 
excess of the speed limit.338 The officers followed the vehicle, which 
came to a stop at a traffic light.339 Upon approaching the vehicle, one 
of the officers observed that Whren, the passenger, was holding two 
plastic bags of a white powdery substance.340 On the assumption that 
the substance was cocaine, the officers arrested both men.341 
One could argue that the officers racially profiled Whren.342 The 
claim would be that, but for Whren's race (he is black), the officers' 
suspicions would not have been aroused, and they would not have 
stopped the vehicle. Put another way, if Whren were white, the police 
likely would not have noticed the Pathfinder and Whren would have 
escaped the encounter altogether. 
It is not easy .to prove the foregoing claim. After all, the officers 
had an "objective" reason for stopping the vehicle: the driver had 
committed a traffic infraction. To the extent that this underlying justi­
fication is established, it becomes difficult to prove that the police offi­
cers racially profiled Whren. The Supreme Court is right, then, to 
335. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
336. Id. at 808. 
337 . . Id. 
338. Id. 
339. Id. 
340. Id. at 809. ' 
341. Id. 
342. Several articles have used the Whren decision as a starting point for a discussion of 
racial profiling. See Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Pretext Stops and Racial 
Profiling After Whren v. United States: The New York and New Jersey Responses Com­
pared, 63 ALB. L. REV. 725 (2000); Christo Lassiter, Eliminating Consent from the Lexicon 
of Traffic Stop Interrogations, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 79 (1998); Katheryn K. Russell, "Driving 
While Black": Corollary Phenomena and Collateral Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 717 
(1999). 
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worry about the difficulties of proving that a particular police activity 
is race-motivated.343 
But quite apart from the evidentiary difficulty of establishing racial 
profiling is the cognizability of such a claim in the first place. In 
Whren, the Supreme Court makes it clear that, at least under the 
Fourth Amendment, racial profiling claims are not constitutionally 
cognizable. In other words, for purposes of Fourth Amendment law, 
race does not matter. Indeed, the Court does not mention Whren's 
race in its recitation of the facts. It mentions that the occupants of the 
Pathfinder were "youthful" (which the officers claimed was one basis 
for their suspicion),344 but not that they were black (which the officers 
claimed did not inform their decision to stop the Pathfinder). Thus, in 
the context of discussing the "legitimate" basis for the police officer's 
stop, Whren's race is not textually referenced. We learn that Whren is 
black via the Court's rejection of the argument that the Fourth 
Amendment can be employed to regulate race-based policing.345 Here, 
the Supreme Court is doing things with words.346 That is to say, the 
Court's racialization of the facts is not merely descriptive; it is perfor­
mative, making race appear and disappear, relevant and irrelevant as a 
matter of text, law, and social reality.347 With words, the Court recog­
nizes Whren's race to deny him remediation and de-recognizes his 
race to deny the "important" police function blackness performs as a 
proxy for suspicion. Whren is problematic, then, n:ot only because of 
the racial doctrine the Court announces (the Fourth Amendment does 
not reach racial profiling) but also because of the racial normativity of 
the opinion (the officers in Whren did not engage in racial profiling). 
Fundamental to the Court's argument that the Fourth Amendment 
does not reach racial profiling is the idea that ulterior motives includ­
ing but not limited to race cannot "invalidat[ e] objectively justifiable 
behavior under the Fourth Amendment."348 The Court is clear in 
pointing out that it is not suggesting that race-based profiling is consti­
tutionally legitimate. It expressly indicates that racially discriminatory 
343. The Supreme Court often has questioned the efficacy of an inquiry into hidden, 
improper motives in the Fourteenth Amendment context. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson; 403 
U.S. 217, 224 (1971) (stating, in upholding a Jackson, Mississippi ordinance that closed city­
owned swimming pools to stave off their desegregation, that "it is extremely difficult for a 
court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a 
legislative enactment"); see also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 647 (1982) (Stevens, J., dis­
senting) ("Assuming that it is the intentions of the 'state actors' that is critical, how will their 
mental processes be discovered?"). · 
344. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808. 
345. Id. at 810. For an excellent racial critique of Whren, see Thompson, supra note 92. 
346. See generally J.L. AUSTIN, supra note 50. 
347. Id. at 4-11 (distinguishing between constative utterances which describe things and 
performative utterances which bring things into being). 
348. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812. 
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policing violates the Fourteenth Amendment.349 The Court's argu­
ment, then, is that such policing is not per se inconsistent with the 
Fourth Amendment.350 In reaching this conclusion, the Court erects, 
even as it purports merely to apply, a "doctrinal barrier."351 Reflecting 
the perpetrator perspective, this barrier is supported by a conceptuali­
zation of racial profiling as an attitude that resides in the mind of bad 
police officers rather than as a practice that "good" and "bad" police 
officers engage in (often without intent) and people of color experi­
ence. 
B. Policing Innocence: Looking for a Few Good Blacks. 
Although the constitutionality or moral legitimacy of racial profil­
ing is arguably independent of whether the individual is committing or 
349. Id. at 813. In order to prevail on a racial discrimination claim in the Fourteenth 
Amendment context, however, a plaintiff must be able to show that the defendant acted in­
tentionally. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (holding that "the invidious 
quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially 
discriminatory purpose"). For critiques of the standard articulated in Davis, see Barbara J. 
Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Dis­
criminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 968-69 (1993) (arguing that "the Davis rule reflects 
a distinctively white way of thinking about race" that is marked by "a complacency con­
cerning, or even a commitment to, the racial status quo"); Lawrence, supra note 73, at 322: 
Traditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about racial matters are in­
fluenced in large part by factors that can be characterized as neither intentional - in the 
sense that some outcomes are self-consciously sought - nor unintentional - in the sense 
that the outcomes are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the decisionmaker's beliefs, 
desires, and wishes. 
350. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. For a detailed account of the widespread adoption of the 
Whren standard, see Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 342 at 738 n.98: 
The only state high court to reject Whren outright is the Washington State Supreme Court 
. . . .  The only intermediate state appellate court to outright reject Whren is the New York 
Appellate Division First Department . . .  In almost every other state, the objective standard 
acclaimed by Whren has been adopted as law by at least some court. 
See also Petrel v. State, 675 So. 2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); People v. 
Thompson, 283 Ill. App. 3d 796, 798 (Ill. 1996); State v. Hollins, 672 N.E. 2d 427, 430 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1996); State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 205 (Iowa 1996); State v. George, 557 
N.W.2d 575, 577 (Minn. 1997); Gama v. State, 920 P.2d 1010, 1012-13 (Nev. 1996); State v. 
McCall, 929 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 842-43 
(Wash. 1999). 
351. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A 
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1 .4, at 20 (3d ed. Supp. 2002) (suggesting that 
the Court's "reckless use of its own precedents . . .  makes it appear that the issue raised by 
petitioners was already settled, while in fact it was very much an open question"); Patricia 
Leary & Stephanie Rae Williams, Toward a State Constitutional Check on Police Discretion 
to Patrol the Fourth Amendment's Outer Frontier: A Subjective Test For Pretextual Seizures, 
69 TEMP. L. REV. 1007, 1025 (1996) (arguing that Whren "is built upon unreasoned distinc­
tions, perversions of precedent, a question-begging unarticulated and unsupported premise, 
bootstrapping, logical inconsistencies, and a narrow vision of the Fourth Amendment"); 
Sklansky, supra note 108, at 298 ("What made the recent vehicle stop cases [including 
Whren] straightforward for the Court plainly was not the doctrinal inevitability of the re­
sults."). 
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has committed a crime,352 the public campaign against racial profiling 
invariably calls upon notions of innocence. If, for example, a police of­
ficer racially profiles a black person who is not in possession of drugs 
or any other incriminating evidence, that person is perceived to be in­
nocent. More particularly, he becomes a good black, and the officer 
who racially profiled him becomes a bad cop. As a good black, this 
person can be employed as an icon of racial victimization to challenge 
the conduct of the bad cop. This is precisely how the public has come 
to view racial profiling - as a bad law enforcement practice that af­
fects good or innocent blacks, Latinas/as, and other nonwhites. In this 
sense, the public's understanding of racial profiling is locked into the 
perpetrator perspective.353 
In part, this understanding of racial profiling derives from the way 
in which racial profiling is litigated and framed in public discourse. 
Consider, for example, the ACLU's campaign against racial profiling. 
The image and text below are excerpted from an ACLU pamphlet. 
352. Some scholars have argued that the Supreme Court's focus on process fairness has 
been at a cost to law enforcement interest. See Stephen J. Markman, The Fifth Amendment 
and Custodial Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering Miranda," 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 938, 
945-48 (1987) (positing that Miranda rights have exacted a grave cost to the effectiveness of 
law enforcement, referring to studies in Philadelphia, New York County, and Pittsburgh that 
showed "immediate, dramatic reductions in statements and admissions obtained in custodial 
questioning" following the Miranda decision); see also HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE 
COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 52-55 (1996) (detailing the case of the exclusion of evi­
dence against a defendant suspected of kidnapping, raping and holding captive a fourteen­
year-old girl because the police officers' search of the defendant's apartment violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights). "This absurd decision completely ignores the facts of the case. 
More reasoned minds might suggest that Johnson forfeited his right to privacy when he kid­
napped and locked Angela Skinner in his apartment." Id. at 53. Some argue that the police 
deserve more protection than suspects, who are "irrational, uncaring . . .  thugs" who have 
"ripped the Constitution to threads." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dis­
senting). But see Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth Amendment 
Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1, 31 (1987) (arguing that the purpose of the Bill of 
Rights is not to promote government efficiency but rather to identify values that must be 
protected regardless of the desire for expediency); Stephen J. Schulofer, Reconsidering 
Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 436 (1987). 
353. Outside of concerns about pragmatic racial politics, there might be a politically de-
fensible reason for focusing on "good blacks." Consider David Harris's explanation: 
I deliberately chose to interview middle-class [black] people [about their experiences with 
racial profiling]. By doing so, I do not wish to deny or exclude the experiences of others who 
may not fit within this group, and certainly would not argue that their experiences are any 
less important than those of the people on whom I have focused. But I made this choice in 
an attempt to show that "driving while black" is not only an experience of the young black 
male, or those blacks at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. All blacks confront the is­
sue directly, regardless of age, dress, occupation, or social station. 
Harris, supra note 331, at 269-70, n.18. 
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Carlos Gonzalez 
Is a junior high math teacher 
who was tailed by police, or­
dered out of his Mustang, and 
handcuffed on the street. 
"I have lived in South Central 
Los Angeles for the past twenty­
five years. I grew up loving the 
community that has watched me 
grow into the man I am today -
a math teacher at Edison Mid­
dle School in my community. I 
was driving my red convertible 
Mustang when I was stopped, 
ordered out of my car, harassed, 
and handcuffed before the 
LAPD CRASH unit officers 
even asked me for my name. I 
was scared and I felt humiliated, 
all because two LAPD officers 
thought that I was a hoodlum or 
a criminal because of the way I 
looked. 
"When I arrived home, I was 
noticeably angry and confused. I 
discussed the incident with my 
family and they were outraged. 
My son noticed that I was upset 
because I wasn't the same play­
ful father I had always been. He 
asked me what was wrong, so I 
had to sit down and explain to 
him the ill-behavior of some 
people toward others. I hope my 
coming forward will ensure that 
my sons will not have to experi­
ence .the kind of racist treatment 
that I experienced at the hands 
of the LAPD." 
Timothy Campbell 
Is a real estate developer who 
was pulled over by police in his 
Landrover and ordered out of 
the car at gunpoint. 
"I was born, raised, and edu­
cated in Southern California. 
When I was a child, my parents 
taught me that the police were 
my friends and I could trust 
them. When I got older, how­
ever, I learned otherwise. I have 
been harassed by police for no 
valid reason on several occa­
sions since I was old enough to 
drive. 
"I thought that as I got older 
and looked more mature, I 
wouldn't be harassed anymore. 
But I found out that age and 
maturity are no deterrents for 
some police officers who stop 
people based on their race. 
"I can understand how people 
who have not experienced what 
I've experienced may find it 
hard to believe that the police 
sometimes stop people only 
based on their race. But because 
I've been stopped repeatedly for 
that reason, I am proof that it 
happens. This conduct by police 
has to stop. When I've been 
stopped because of my race 
alone, I've felt violated and 
powerless in front of a bully 
with a badge and a gun." 
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The caption above the image asks: "What do these men have in 
common?" One answer, perhaps the easiest, is that they were both ra­
cially profiled. But at least two other similarities between these two 
men explain their interracial appearance on the cover of an ACLU 
pamphlet. 
First, both men are "respectable." The visual economy of each im­
age disconfirms stereotypes. They are not thugs, or gangsters, or drug 
dealers. They are ordinary men. Their suits and ties, polished shoes, 
and manicured faces exude middle class respectability.354 To the extent 
that we perceive either of these men to be suspicious, it must be be­
cause of their race. In every other way, both men appear to be inno­
cent and law abiding. 
Second, the text of the pamphlet narrates a story about both men 
within which their innocence and respectability are explicit. With re­
spect to Carlos Gonzalez, for example, the text reveals that he "is a 
junior high math teacher" in the community in which he grew up: 
South Central Los Angeles. He appears to be a responsible family 
man: a father who plays and communicates with his sons. His experi­
ence with racial profiling "humiliated" him. According to Gonzalez, 
he was made to endure that humiliation "all because two LAPD offi­
cers thought I was a hoodlum or a criminal because of the way I 
looked." To the extent that Gonzalez appears respectable - in suit 
and tie - the "look" to which he refers is, of course, his race. Indeed, 
controlling for Gonzalez's race, he is utterly unintelligible as a hood­
lum. 
The message the ACLU hopes to convey with this pamphlet is 
clear: racial profiling "results in the persecution of innocent people 
based on their skin color."355 The political pragmatism behind this idea 
is also clear: to the extent that (white) people understand that racial 
profiling harms innocent blacks or Latinas/os, they are more likely to 
condemn racial profiling and the police officers who practice it. 
This strategy is similar to the strategy the NAACP employed in the 
1930s and 1940s to determine which criminal process cases to litigate. 
That is, the Association specifically sought out cases in which it per­
ceived the defendants to be innocent.356 The notion was that, in the 
Jim Crow era, white Americans were not going to be sympathetic to 
arguments about due process or racial inequality in the context of 
cases involving "bad Negroes." This approach to litigation was part of 
354. HAZEL V. CARBY, RACE MEN (1998). 
355. ACLU, DRIVING WHILE BLACK 5 (1999). 
356. See MARK v. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LA w: THURGOOD MARSHALL 
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, 28-29 (1994) (describing the NAACP's policy re­
garding criminal cases, illustrated by Association lead attorney Thurgood Marshall's deci­
sion to decline involvement in the defense of a youth convicted of rape because the youth 
was "not the type of person to justify our intervention"). 
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a broader civil rights strategy to re-present black people as civil and 
civilized.357 Litigating cases within which the defendants were not in­
nocent would have undermined this project of racial respectability.358 
According to Professor Randall Kennedy, the politics of respect-
ability reflects two basic, if controversial, ideas: 
The principal tenet of the politics of respectability is that, freed of the 
crippling invidious racial discriminations, blacks are capable of meeting 
the established moral standards of white middle-class Americans . . . .  
One of its strategies is to distance blacks as far as possible from negative 
stereotypes used to justify racial discrimination against all Negroes.359 
The second idea that buttresses the politics of respectability is that 
a "stigmatized minority" must make every effort to present itself so as 
to enhance the "reputation of the group" and "avoid the derogatory 
charges lying in wait in a hostile environment."360 To the extent that 
either of these ideas structure how we think about racial profiling, 
only reputation-enhancing or stereotype-disconfirming minorities like 
Carlos Gonzalez and Timothy Campbell can figure as representative 
victims. 
Not everyone who is racially profiled, however, has the innocent 
identities of Campbell or Gonzalez. Some are decidedly less respect­
able. Consider again United States v. Whren. Recall that Whren, the 
passenger, was found to be in possession of drugs. An examination of 
the ACLU's treatment of his case reveals just how important notions 
of innocence and respectability are to galvanizing the public against, 
and delegitimizing, racial profiling. 
The ACLU discusses Whren in its clear, concise, and politically 
useful Driving While Black booklet. Its analysis of the case in this 
357. For a brief overview of the relationship between civil rights and the politics of re­
spectability, see Austin, supra note 18, at 1791 (arguing that " [d]rawing on lawbreaker cul­
ture would add a bit of toughness, resilience, bluntness, and defiance to contemporary main­
stream black political discourse, which evidences a marked preoccupation with civility, 
respectability, sentimentality, and decorum"). 
358. In his account of the infamous Scottsboro trials of the early 1930s, in which nine 
black youths were accused of raping two white women in Alabama, James Goodman notes 
that Walter White, the NAACP's secretary at the time, was reluctant to involve his organiza­
tion in the youths' defense partly because he feared that the NAACP's image was at risk. See 
JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO 33 (1994): 
(White J didn't enter the case the moment he read the first Associated Press reports of the ar­
rests and near lynchings, or the moment black leaders in Chattanooga, writing a few days be­
fore the trials . .  ., asked for help. He couldn't blindly associate the NAACP with what 
looked to him like nine pathetic teenagers, a motley crew of miscreants at best. at worst a 
gang of rapists, without risking the respectability it had taken two decades to gain. 
359. KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 17. 
360. Id. at 20. For critiques of Randall Kennedy's employment of the politics of respect­
ability, see Paul Butler, (Color)Blind Faith: The Tragedy of Race, Crime, and the Law, 1 1 1  
HARV. L.  REV. 1270 (1998) (reviewing RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 
(1997), and Sheri Lynn Johnson, Respectability, Race Neutrality, and Truth, 107 YALE. L.J. 
2619 (1998) (reviewing RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997)). 
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venue is almost entirely doctrinal.361 The pamphlet features no images 
of Whren. Nor does the booklet narrate a story about Whren's life -
his family, education, upbringing, and community membership. Even 
the racial facts of Whren are conspicuously absent from the ACLU's 
description of the case, much as they are absent from the Court's reci­
tation of the facts. 
The obfuscation of the circumstances under which Whren was ar­
rested relates to the fact that, unlike Campbell and Gonzalez, Whren 
was not innocent. He was a drug possessor, if not a drug dealer. He 
confirmed rather than disconfirmed stereotypes about black criminal­
ity. Accordingly, he is unlikely to engender public sympathy. The 
"good black" trope is not available to him. Presumably, the ACLU 
understood that their ability to employ Whren as a representative icon 
for racial profiling victimization was circumscribed by the fact that 
many people would perceive him to be a bad black. The ACLU may 
have surmised that, to the extent that people perceive Whren as bad, 
they likely would perceive the police officers who arrested him as 
good (as officers whose racial suspicions were confirmed). 
None of this is to suggest that the ACLU's campaign against racial 
profiling has been unhelpful. On the contrary, the ACLU has played, 
and continues to play, an enormously important role in increasing 
public awareness about, and helping to fashion legal and political re­
sponses to, race-based, pretextual policing. As a result of this role, one 
can finally say that there is "[s]ome cautious optimism about the 
problem of racial profiling."362 
But most of the news about racial profiling remains bad. And part 
of the bad news derives from the fact that public campaigns against ra­
cial profiling are locked into the perpetrator perspective. These cam­
paigns are buttressed by the notion that bad police officers are har­
assing good blacks. The problem is that this good black/bad cop 
framework does not fully capture cases like Whren. Moreover, the 
framework renders such cases difficult to challenge publicly. Yet, it is 
precisely the cases involving bad blacks, cases like Whren, where the 
victim of racial profiling is vulnerable to incarceration, that the public 
must come to care about.363 The ACLU's respectability-oriented ap-
361. According to the booklet, "[T]h.e constitutionality of pretextual traffic stops - us­
ing minor traffic infractions, real or alleged, as an excuse to stop and search a vehicle and its 
passengers - reached the Supreme Court in 1996 in a case called Whren v. United States." 
ACLU, supra note 355, at 5. 
362. David A. Sklansky, Some Cautious Optimism About the Problem of Racial Profil­
ing, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 293 (2001). 
363. On August 12, 2001, the Justice Department reported that of the 1.3 million people 
currently incarcerated in the nation's state and federal prisons, 428,000 were black men aged 
twenty through twenty-nine. That segment of the prison population is equal to 9.7% of all 
black men in that age group. By comparison, only 2.9% of Hispanic men and 1.1 % of non­
Hispanic white men in the same age group were imprisoned. See Fox Butterfield, Number of 
People in State Prisons Declines Slightly, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2001, at Al. While blacks 
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proach to racial profiling encourages public indifference to, or at least 
is unlikely to engender public condemnation of, these cases. 
The problem is worse: any approach to racial profiling that reflects 
(implicitly or explicitly) the idea that there are "good" and "bad" 
blacks entrenches the idea of blackness as a crime of identity. Indeed, 
the very notion that there are "good" and "bad" black people has po­
litical currency and makes sense only because there is already a pre­
sumption of blackness as bad (read: criminal). For example, few peo­
ple, in the context of thinking about crime, would conceptualize 
whiteness or the category "white people" in terms of "good" and 
"bad." The dichotomy is intelligible vis-a-vis blacks because people 
understand it to mean "not all black people are bad. There are excep­
tions. Some of them are good. "364 This understanding encourages 
group surveillance - a racial gaze - even as it purports to be con­
cerned only with accountable (bad) individuals (blacks). It invites 
black presentations of self as a respectable thing.365 And it subjects all 
blacks to a kind of racial objectification that makes it "logical" - cre­
ates an incentive - for black people to be available for, indeed advo­
cate for, white racial inspection of blackness. 
Consider again Randall Kennedy's endorsement of respectability: 
It should be clear by now that I am recommending a politics of re­
spectability, albeit a version that steers clear of excesses . . . .  Some read­
ers will undoubtedly object on the grounds that, however modified, the 
politics of respectability smells of Uncle Tomism. It may have been a 
necessary concession earlier, they concede, but championing the politics 
of respectability today, they charge, is an anachronistic error. Obviously, 
I disagree. In American political culture, the reputation of groups, be 
they religious denominations, labor unions, or racial groups, matters 
greatly. For that reason alone, those dedicated to advancing the interests 
made up 12% of the U.S. population, there were currently 70,700 blacks in prison for mur­
der, compared with 44,000 whites; 144,700 blacks were imprisoned for drug offenses, com­
pared with 50,700 whites; and 97,300 blacks were in prison for robbery, compared with 
33,800 whites. Id. One statistical study found that in 1994, nearly one in three black men 
aged twenty through twenty-nine was under the jurisdiction of the U.S. criminal justice sys­
tem, either in prison or jail, on probation or parole. See MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, 
YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 1,  3 
(1995). 
364. This is not to say that whiteness is never conceptualized under good/bad binaries. 
Certainly in the context of Jim Crow, there were discourses - that both whites and blacks 
deployed - to the effect that not all whites are bad, the presumption being that most whites 
in the South were. 
365. Catharine MacKinnon makes a similar point about gender. She writes: 
Dominance eroticized defines the imperatives of its masculinity, submission eroticized de­
fines its femininity. So many distinctive features of women's status is second class - the re­
striction and constraint and contortion, the servility and the display, the self-mutilation and 
requisite presentation of self as a beautiful thing, the enforced passivity, the humiliation - are 
made in the context of sex. 
CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 130 (1989) (em­
phasis added). 
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of African Americans ought to urge them to conduct themselves in a 
fashion that, without sacrificing rights or dignity, elicits respect and sym­
pathy rather than fear and anger from colleagues of other races.366 
Part of the problem with Kennedy's approach is that he does not 
seem to perceive there to be material costs to a politics of respectabil­
ity, so long as this ideology "steers clear of excesses."367 What I am 
suggesting, however, is that at least some of the excesses of the politics 
of respectability cannot be disaggregated from it. Put another way, the 
politics of respectability are inherently costly.368 It is not clear to me 
that blacks can, and Kennedy's analysis does not supply a methodol­
ogy for how blacks might, "conduct themselves in a fashion that, with­
out sacrificing rights or dignity, elicits respect and sympathy rather 
than fear and anger from colleagues of other races."369 Identity per­
formances, particularly when they are intended to alter how "others 
see us" are always compromising. And as my discussion of consent 
searches and the seizure doctrine attests, they can compromise dignity 
and they can compromise rights. All of that said, I agree with 
Kennedy's basic idea that racial reputation and civil rights gains are 
positively correlated. The normative question is whether that correla­
tion should be further entrenched. Kennedy seems to answer that 
question in the affirmative without (1) fully acknowledging the costs 
and burdens of "respectable" identity performances, and (2) realizing 
that the politics of respectability entrenches the notion that blacks are 
presumptively unrespectable. Finally, Kennedy's analysis nowhere 
discusses whiteness and respectability. He does not employ the lan­
guage of respectability to impose a burden on whites to "conduct 
themselves in a fashion that, without sacrificing rights and dignities, 
elicits respect and sympathy rather than fear and anger from [black 
people]."370 The imposition of such a burden might be particularly 
helpful in the context of policing given the level of distrust, anger and 
fear black people have of the police. 
Of course, I am not the first to critique the politics of respectability 
generally and/or the particular way in which Professor Kennedy de­
ploys the concept. However, much of this critique is based on the idea 
that the politics of respectability does little to address the social condi­
tions of "bad blacks." As Regina Austin observes: 
[The politics of respectability] furthers the interests of a middle class un­
certain of its material security and social status in white society. The per-
366. KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 21. 
367. Id. 
368. See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 9 (discussing the costs associated with 
identity performances that are informed by the politics of respectability). 
369. KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 21. 
370. Cf KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 21. 
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sons who fare best under this approach are those who are the most ex­
ceptional (i.e. those most like successful white people). At the same time, 
concentrating on black exceptionalism does little to improve the material 
conditions of those who conform to the stereotypes. Unfortunately, there 
are too many young people caught up in the criminal justice system to 
write them all off or to provide for their reentry into the mainstream one 
or two at a time. In addition, the politics of distinction encourages 
greater surveillance and harassment of those black citizens who are most 
vulnerable to unjustified interference because they resemble the law­
breakers in age, gender, and class.371 
Paul Butler372 and Sheri Lynn Johnson373 advance a similar claim. 
What I am suggesting is that the good/bad dichotomy and the politics 
of respectability that underwrite it does not even protect "good" 
blacks. The case is quite the contrary. For to the extent that police of­
ficers operate under the assumption that part of their law enforcement 
project is to ferret out the "good" blacks from the "bad" blacks, and to 
the extent that the goodness (noncriminality) of blackness is not as­
sumed but must be demonstrated (ex ante via identity performance) 
or established (ex post via a search or seizure), all black people are 
vulnerable to racial profiling. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Race itself has never been seen by the naked eye. 
D. Marvin Jones374 
The stories of Timothy Campbell and Carlos Gonzalez are effec­
tive precisely because they lack nuance. Outrage at their humiliation 
comes easy. The problem with such sharp examples of racial injustice 
is their tendency to blunt our sympathy for racial victims whose cases 
are more difficult. The Supreme Court in Whren had an opportunity 
to address a racially nuanced police encounter. Instead, the Court re­
inforced its commitment to a colorblind ideology, a commitment that 
is in fact racialized. The Court's move doubtlessly was made easier by 
the specter of this country's history of egregious racial crimes - par­
ticularly in the context of policing - to which Whren's case paled in 
comparison. 
Significantly, Whren did not emerge in a jurisprudential vacuum. 
Bostick, Delgado, and Bustamante created racial precedent. More par­
ticularly, each case helped to structure the colorblind terms upon 
371. Austin, supra note 16, at 1773-74 (footnote omitted). 
372. Butler, supra note 360 (noting the extent to which the politics of respectability is 
unconcerned with the overrepresentation of black men in prisons). 
373. Johnson, supra note 360. 
374. Jones, supra note 55, at 448. 
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which Whren would engage race. Cumulatively, these cases stand for 
the proposition that race matters in the Fourth Amendment context 
only to the extent that a police officer's conduct is overtly racially co­
ercive. 
The absence of avowedly racist officers does not mean, however, 
that a nonwhite person's encounter with police is unaffected by race. 
Historical and present-day realities complicate minorities' interactions 
with good cops as well as bad. For minorities' Fourth Amendment in­
terests to be protected, this racial reality must be recognized and ad­
dressed. Yet, this is precisely what the Supreme Court has failed to do. 
It carefully enlists the ideology of colorblindness to elide the com­
plexities of race. As a result of this racial elision, people of color con­
tinue to experience the Fourth Amendment more as a technology of 
surveillance than as a constitutional provision that renders them "se­
cure in their persons, homes, papers and effects." 
